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TYPES OF POWER ASSERTION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER IN MARRIAGE

JOYCE ELLIOTT FOSS

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TYPES OF POWER ASSERTION AND THE DISTRIBUTION
OF POWER IN MARRIAGE

by

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M.A., University of New Hampshire, 1974

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
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
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
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES	x
LIST OF FIGURES.	xiii
ABSTRACT	xiv
I. POWER MODES: A NEGLECTED AREA OF FAMILY STUDY . .	1
OBJECTIVES AND REVIEW OF CHAPTERS.	7
II. METHODOLOGY.	10
SAMPLE SELECTION	10
Differences Among Sub-Samples.	12
BASIC SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS	14
PROCEDURES	24
Session Format	24
Special Features of the IMC Task	26
IMC Items.	27
Use of Audio Tapes	28
III. RE-THINKING FAMILIAR CONCEPTS.	29
PERSONAL RESOURCES	32
Other Definitions of Personal Resources. .	32
Relationship to Power Variables.	34
Previous Measures of Resources	34
ATTRIBUTED POWER	38
Previous Measurement and Relationship to Other Power Variables.	38

POWER DISTRIBUTION NORM.	41
Other Definitions.	41
Relationship to Other Power Variables.	42
OUTCOME VARIABLES.	43
IV. RESOURCES, THE POWER DISTRIBUTION, AND OUTCOMES.	46
CONSTRUCTION OF INDEXES: PERSONAL RESOURCES.	48
Method of Standardizing Measures	49
The PZ Score	51
Relationship to Other Methods of Standardization.	51
EXTRINSIC RESOURCES.	52
Internal Consistency of the Extrinsic Re- sources Index.	55
Patterns for Husbands and Wives.	55
External Criterion Item Analysis	58
INTRINSIC RESOURCES.	60
Intrinsic Resources Index.	62
Internal Consistency	63
External Criterion Item Analysis	63
RELATIVE RESOURCES	65
Indexes of Relative Resources.	68
RESOURCES OF WIVES AND HUSBANDS.	71
REPORTS FROM THE FRONT: ATTRIBUTED POWER AND POWER DISTRIBUTION NORMS	76
Measuring the Power Distribution Variables Index Construction	79
Husband-Wife Consistency	80
Prescriptions and Descriptions: Relation- ships.	80
RESOURCES AND THE POWER DISTRIBUTION	83
Attributed Power and Resources	88
THE END RESULTS: OUTCOMES	90

Unilateral and Bilateral Outcomes.	92
Marital Relations as a "Zero-Sum Game"	93
Unilateral "Wins".	98
Outcomes and the Distribution of Power	99
Outcomes and Personal Resources.	101
CONCLUSION	103
V. THE CONCEPT OF POWER MODES	107
DEFINING POWER MODES	107
Relationship to Other Variables.	108
DEVELOPING A MEASURE OF POWER MODES.	110
Identifying the Range of Behavior to be	
Considered	111
Content-Free Approaches.	114
Content-Based Approaches	114
HOFFMAN'S QUALIFIED AND UNQUALIFIED POWER	
ASSERTIONS	116
VI. THE MARITAL POWER ASSERTION CODING SYSTEM (MPACS).	119
OVERVIEW OF THE CODING SYSTEM.	119
Unqualified Power Assertions	120
Qualified Power Assertions	123
Consequence Identification	123
Qualified Partisan Assertion	124
Definitional Assertion	125
Bilateral Power Assertions	126
Miscellaneous Codes.	127
PROCEDURES	128
A Trial and Error Process.	128
Coding Procedures.	129
BASIC MPACS FINDINGS	130
Internal Relationships	130
MPACS Scores of Husbands and Wives	134
Previous Research.	134
Difference and Similarity.	137
Relationships Between Husbands' and	
Wives' Scores.	138

Basic Frequencies and the Laboratory- Field Continuum.	140
VII. POWER MODES: LINKS WITH OTHER ASPECTS OF POWER. .	142
POWER MODES AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER. . .	143
Middle and Working Class Couples	146
Power Distribution Norms and Power Modes .	148
The Influence of Social Class.	148
Relating the Two Power Distribution Variables.	150
PERSONAL RESOURCES AND POWER MODES	152
Extrinsic Personal Resources	152
Intrinsic Personal Resources	154
Relative Personal Resources.	157
THE CASE OF VERBAL AGGRESSION.	160
Resources and Verbal Aggression.	163
POWER MODES AND OUTCOMES	165
Wives' Power Modes	169
Verbal Aggression and Outcomes	169
CONCLUSION	171
VIII. CONCLUSION	173
OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH	173
Limitations and Strengths.	174
SOME SELECTED FINDINGS	175
Husbands and Wives	176
Personal Resources	177
Marriage and Zero-Sum Games.	178
POWER MODES AND GOVERNANCE IN FAMILIES	180
BIBLIOGRAPHY	185
APPENDIX A: Questionnaire Items for Key Variables	192

APPENDIX B:	Inventory of Marital Conflict (IMC) Forms and Instructions.	197
APPENDIX C:	Marital Power Assertion Coding System (MPACS).	208
APPENDIX D:	Detailed Correlation Matrixes for Power Modes of Husbands and Wives . .	223
BIOGRAPHICAL DATA.		226

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
2.1 Sample Characteristics of Wives, for Clinical, Non-Clinical, and All Couples.	15
2.2 Sample Characteristics of Husbands, for Clinical, Non-Clinical, and All Couples.	17
4.1 Correlation Matrix for Five Extrinsic Personal Resources Measures, and a Multidimensional Index Combining Them, for Husbands and Wives	56
4.2 Correlations of Five Extrinsic Resources and a Multidimensional Index Combining the Five Items, with an Index of Attributed Power, for Husbands and Wives.	61
4.3 Correlation of Two Intrinsic Resources Measures and a Multidimensional Index Combining Them, with an Index of Attributed Power, for Husbands and Wives.	64
4.4 Correlation Matrix for Relative Personal Resources Items and Indexes, for Extrinsic and Intrinsic Resources.	69
4.5 Correlations of Relative Personal Resources Items and Indexes, with Husband-Oriented Attributed Power Scores, for Wives and Husbands . . .	70
4.6 Intercorrelations of Personal Resources of Husbands and Wives	72
4.7 Intercorrelation Matrix for Intrinsic and Extrinsic Personal Resources of Husbands and Wives.	74
4.8 Correlations between Husbands' and Wives' Reports of Power Distribution Norms and Attributer Power.	81
4.9 Descriptive Statistics for Three Outcomes Measures	95
4.10 Correlations between Power Distribution Variables and Outcomes, for Husbands and Wives. . . .	100

4.11	Correlations between Personal Resources and Outcomes, for Husbands and Wives	102
6.1	Correlation Matrix for Power Modes of Husbands .	132
6.2	Correlation Matrix for Power Modes of Wives. . .	133
6.3	Mean Power Modes Scores of Husbands and Wives, and Correlations between Husbands' and Wives' Scores	135
6.4	Intercorrelations of Power Modes of Husbands and Wives.	139
7.1	Correlations between Attributed Power and Power Modes, for Husbands and Wives and by Class . . .	144
7.2	Correlations between Power Distribution Norms and Power Modes, for Husbands and Wives and by Class.	149
7.3	Mean Attributed Power and Power Distribution Scores of Husbands and Wives, by Class	151
7.4	Correlations between Extrinsic Personal Resources and Power Modes, for Husbands and Wives and by Class	153
7.5	Correlations between Intrinsic Personal Resources and Power Modes, for Husbands and Wives and by Class	155
7.6	Correlations between Relative Personal Resources and Power Modes of Husbands and Wives, for Extrinsic and Intrinsic Resources and by Class . .	158
7.7	Correlations between Scores on Power Variables and Verbal Aggression of Husbands and Wives, by Class.	162
7.8	Correlations between Husbands' Power Modes and Three Types of Outcomes, by Class.	166
7.9	Correlations between Wives' Power Modes and Three Types of Outcomes, by Class.	167
7.10	Correlations between Verbal Aggression of Husbands and Wives and Three Types of Outcomes, by Class	170

D.1	Detailed Correlation Matrix for Power Modes of Husbands.	225
D.2	Detailed Correlation Matrix for Power Modes of Wives	226

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
1 Partial Model of Power Relations	6
4.1 Correlations between Power Distribution Norms and Attributed Power, for Wives and Husbands . .	82
4.2 Correlations between Extrinsic Resources and Power Distribution Norms	84
4.3 Correlations between Intrinsic Resources and Power Distribution Norms	87
4.4 Correlations between Extrinsic Resources and Attributed Power	89
4.5 Correlations between Intrinsic Resources and Attributed Power	91
4.6 Sample Vignette, Inventory of Marital Conflicts (IMC).	94
4.7 Changes in the Distribution of Power through a Power "Event".	105
6.1 Summary of Marital Power Assertion Coding System Categories.	121
8 Power Distribution and Governance Options. . . .	184

ABSTRACT

TYPES OF POWER ASSERTION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER IN MARRIAGE

by

JOYCE E. FOSS

This research explores the types of power assertions, or "power modes," used by married couples. The combined observation and self-report study includes seventy-eight couples, some of whom were receiving marital counseling. The interaction stimulus was the Inventory of Marital Conflict (IMC) task developed by Olson and Ryder. This is a highly-involving, realistic conflict resolution task which induces disagreement between the participants.

Previous theoretical and empirical work has focused almost exclusively on explaining variations in the distribution of power in marriage. In this research, new data are provided concerning relationships between such variables as personal resources, authority, reported power, and decision-making outcomes. A contribution in this area is the still uncommon multi-method (observation and self-report) and multi-subject (husbands and wives) approach.

The overriding issue in the project is how marital partners go about "powering," or the types of power assertions

they use. Attention to this issue means going beyond analysis of the fairly stable distribution of power toward a potentially more dynamic, process-oriented approach to confrontation and change in families.

Toward this end, the Marital Power Assertion Coding System (MPACS) was developed to code laboratory interaction stimulated by the IMC task. The system contains three broad divisions, each with several sub-types: (1) unqualified, direct power assertions; (2) qualified, indirect power assertion (includes persuasion, attempts at situation definition, and consequence identification); and (3) bilateral power assertions (explicit attempts to bargain or negotiate). In presenting the findings based on this system, emphasis is placed on basic descriptive information, husband-wife differences in types of power assertions, verbal aggression as a type of power assertion, and implications of the research for analogies between families and zero-sum or mixed motive games. In addition, relationships between power modes and the power distribution and outcomes variables are explored.

CHAPTER I

POWER MODES: A NEGLECTED AREA OF FAMILY STUDY

The voluminous literature on power relations in families has been characterized by a great deal of controversy over concepts, methodology, and theory. The most basic issue is how power ought to be defined. In particular, is power an ability or potential to influence, or does it refer to actual attempts to influence or control outcomes, or even only to successful attempts at influence? Further, is power a single, unidimensional concept, or is it multi-dimensional--i.e., an umbrella term for all the dimensions just mentioned? (These issues are addressed in some detail in Chapter III, and for recent discussions and critiques see Olson and Cromwell, 1975; Safilios-Rothschild, 1970; Sprey, 1972; Straus, 1976; and Turk, 1975).

Some major methodological issues include the relative usefulness of observation and self-report methods (Olson, 1969; Olson and Rabunsky, 1972; Turk and Bell, 1972); the use of "win scores" as a measure of power in observation studies (Turk, 1974); and the use of a single family member (the wife) to report on marital power (Safilios-Rothschild, 1970).

The almost exclusive theoretical concern with the distribution of power, or the relative amounts of power of family members, has also been questioned (Foss and Straus, 1975; Sprey, 1972, 1975). It is this last issue which is of paramount importance here.

The resource theory of power, a variant of exchange theory (Cromwell and Olson, 1975:24; Smith, 1970), has dominated the recent study of marital power relations. This approach, at a most basic level, suggests that the marital partner with the greater personal resources relative to the other will have a greater ability to influence the other (Blood and Wolfe, 1960:11-12). The development of this theory within family sociology has taken the form of tying it more closely to exchange theory (Heer, 1963; Smith, 1970), as well as specifying it cross-culturally in terms of cultural norms about who should have more power (Burr, 1973; Rodman, 1972). In addition, the notion of resources has figured prominently in models of power developed outside the family sociology arena. Examples of recent general developments include Rogers' (1974) typology of resources as bases of power, and Buckley and Burns (1975) work on meta-power.

Until recently, the study of power relations specifically in marriage, based heavily on resource theory, has been almost solely concerned with one aspect of power structure: The relatively stable distribution of power. Little attention has been paid to processual aspects of

power. In an analysis of measures of family power available through 1965, Foss and Straus found that almost all measures referring to the husband-wife relationship focus on the relative amounts of power (power distribution). There is a corresponding lack of measures of how husbands and wives go about influencing each other (1975:15).¹

Others have noted the lack of theoretical attention to power processes in marriage. Olson and Cromwell observe that "very little systematic work has been done on the family power processes" (1975:6), and Sprey has called for a shift in analytical focus to the study of "powering" or the "ongoing confrontation in which the power inputs of all participants are reciprocally put to the test" (1972:236).

It is not suggested here that the distribution of power is unimportant, nor that it has already received enough attention. The recent critiques and assessments of the state of the art of measuring power distribution themselves indicate that a great deal still needs to be done in this area (see Bahr, 1972; Olson and Rabunsky, 1972; Olson and Cromwell, 1975; Safilios-Rothschild, 1970; Turk and Bell, 1972). Rather, it is suggested that preoccupation with the relative amounts of power of husbands and wives

¹The situation is completely reversed with reference to parent-child measures. Apparently there is an assumption that children have little or no power, and thus these measures focus not on the power distribution, but on the "powering techniques" used by parents on their children (but not those used by children on parents) (Foss and Straus, 1975).

(power distribution) may blind us to the importance of also investigating the techniques by which marital partners attempt to exercise power. We need to develop measures and models for the study of types of power assertion (power modes).

Such an addition to a model of marital power relations could make at least three basic contributions. First, asking how decisions or resolutions are reached, rather than who wins, encourages a shift away from an exclusively win-lose view of marital power (Sprey, 1971). Second, the question "who wins" tends to discourage moving beyond the individual level of analysis, especially in studying dyadic relationships like marriage. In contrast, examining power modes may encourage less individualistic analysis. Third, if structure is defined as a pattern characteristic of a relationship at a given point in time, and if the power distribution is an aspect of power structure, then an exclusive focus on the distribution of power means an exclusive focus on a fairly static aspect of power relations. To the extent that types of power assertions (power modes) develop a characteristic pattern in a marriage, they too are an aspect of power structure and can be treated as static. However, analysis of power modes seems more likely to contribute to the eventual study of process and dynamics in power relations. Thus, a third potential advantage of extending current models of marital

power to include power modes lies in the development of an ultimately more dynamic, process-oriented approach.

Based on laboratory observations and self-reports of seventy-eight married couples, the research described here has as its overriding goal the exploration of types of power assertion and their relationships to other important dimensions of power. Figure 1 serves as a guide to the research, by identifying the variables included and offering a preliminary model of how power modes may be incorporated into current approaches to marital power relations.

Briefly, power modes are treated as equal in importance to "attributed power"² in providing a bridge between the personal resources of group members and the outcomes of group decision-making or conflict resolution. In the figure, "power modes," or types of power assertion, is heavily outlined to indicate that this is the central variable in the research. The heavy solid lines indicate the main relationships to be explored--those between power modes and personal resources, power distribution norms, attributed power, and "outcome variables." Light solid lines indicate sub-relationships which might be explored in future research, and/or indicate where mutual causal influence is expected.

²Attributed power refers to the power distribution, usually assessed through self-report methods. See Chapter III for a detailed discussion.




Figure 1. Partial Model of Power Relations

OBJECTIVES AND REVIEW OF CHAPTERS

Chapter II presents the method of data gathering and sample description for the research. The remaining chapters are reviewed here in the context of their contributions to the objectives of the project.

1. To Clarify Important Dimensions of Power

This is actually a sub-goal of the project, necessitated by the present state of controversy and confusion concerning power concepts. Any current study of power relations in the family must somehow come to grips with basic conceptual issues. In Chapters III and V, variables included in this study, such as resources, power norms, and power modes, are discussed in considerable detail. At the very least, the rather lengthy discussions of key concepts should make explicit how power terms are being used in this particular research. However, it is also hoped that others will find the approach offered here useful, and a more general contribution toward conceptual clarification in this area will be made.

2. To Provide Further Data Concerning Resources and the Distribution of Power in Marriages

The research includes several variables which refer to personal resources and to the distribution of power. A second sub-goal of the project is to examine relationships among these variables, and thus to provide further data relevant to an aspect of power relations which, while already

heavily researched, is by no means sufficiently understood. Chapter IV is devoted to this issue.

3. To Develop a Typology of, and System of Coding, Power Assertions Made By Husbands and Wives in the Context of Laboratory Interaction

The types of power assertions made by marital partners are the central concern of this study. As indicated above, the focus of research and theory in this area has been on the distribution of power. The question of how spouses go about "powering" has largely been neglected. Thus, the development of a coding system for power modes should make a major contribution toward measurement in this field. Further, relationships among types of power assertions may be explored. In addition, devising a typology of power assertions in marital interaction should help in ascertaining the parameters of power modes which can be observed in a laboratory setting, as well as in providing a baseline which might ultimately be extended toward examining the broader range of power assertions which are available in a natural setting. The concept of power modes is discussed in detail in Chapter V, while Chapter VI presents the coding system devised for the study, basic descriptive findings, and analysis of inter-code relationships.

4. To Explore Relationships between Power Modes and Variables Which Represent the Distribution of Power and Personal Resources

In particular, possible relationships between power modes and personal resources, power distribution norms,

and self-reports about the power structure (attributed power) are examined in Chapter VII. The development of a typology of power assertions is viewed here as a first step toward a more dynamic, processual approach to marital power relations. The objective of this aspect of the research is to provide some initial inquiry into relationships between aspects of the power structure and power processes in marriage.

5. To Explore Relationships between Power Modes and the Outcomes of Conflict Resolution

Beyond the major objective of devising a typology and coding scheme for powering techniques or power modes, one thrust of this research is toward examining the extent to which aspects of the distribution of power may affect or explain the use of different types of power assertions (see 4 above). However, it has also been suggested that power modes act as a bridge between such aspects of the power structure and the outcomes of decision-making or conflict resolution events. Therefore, the types of power assertions made by marital partners may have important implications for the kinds of solutions they arrive at. In order to explore such implications, the relationships between power modes and outcome variables are examined in Chapter VII. Finally, Chapter VIII provides an overview of the project.

CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY

The present exploration of power modes and their relationships to other dimensions of power is based on a combined self-report and observation study of seventy-eight married couples, carried out at the University of New Hampshire during the summer of 1975. This Chapter describes the sample selection, basic sample characteristics, and data-gathering procedures for the overall project. In addition, features of the larger project which have special importance for this particular research on power modes are discussed.

SAMPLE SELECTION

A total of seventy-eight couples participated in the overall project. Couples were chosen through three selection procedures. An initial attempt to obtain a random sample from the Dover City Directory provided only eight couples.¹ As a result of this poor response, a

¹For the Dover sample, letters describing the project were mailed, followed by telephone calls by personnel from a professional research agency. Even before all seventy-five households initially in the sample had been contacted, it was clear the response was very low.

second procedure was developed for the town of Durham. Potential subjects were randomly selected from the town voting lists. A personal visit was made to the home of each potential subject couple to determine if the couples met the criteria for inclusion in the study, and to explain the nature of the project. One hundred twenty potential couples were selected based on the criteria that they be married and living together in Durham at the time of the sample selection. Couples who were divorced, separated, no longer living in Durham, etc., were not considered part of the universe from which the sample was drawn. For the eligible couples, the personal visit was followed after a day or two with a phone call to arrange an appointment. The response rate in Durham was 45 percent, or fifty-four of the one hundred twenty eligible couples.

Finally, sixteen of the couples were referred to the project by private marriage counselors and agencies which provide marriage counseling services in the Seacoast area (within which the non-agency couples were also located).²

²An attempt was made to contact all of the agencies and private counselors in the area. Only one private counselor could not be contacted after repeated attempts. Of the remaining five private counselors and three agencies, all expressed considerable interest and the intention of referring clients. Only one of the private counselors did not, in fact, refer at least one couple.

With the exception of one agency, all of these sources followed a procedure of describing the project to client couples and suggesting that they call the project for an appointment. For the other agency, a project staff member was given names of interested clients and telephoned them

Differences Among Sub-Samples

The above differences in selection procedures and response rates suggest possible differences among the three sub-samples in reasons for participating and characteristics of the subjects.

Several reasons may be offered as to why the response in Dover was so much lower than in Durham. First, the letter mailed to Dover residents was, in retrospect, too lengthy and elaborate. A much briefer and simpler description of the project was given to Durham residents during the initial contact at home. Second, the personal visit in Durham provided an opportunity to clarify the project and allay misgivings (not to mention the greater difficulty of saying no in a face-to-face encounter). Third, the association of the project with the University of New Hampshire was probably a more positive factor for residents of Durham (where the University of New Hampshire is located) than for those in Dover. Last but not necessarily least, it was much easier for Durham residents to get to the research site.

In terms of assessing the 45 percent response rate in Durham alone, the length of time required to participate (about two hours), the fact that videotaping was part of the procedure, and the necessity of obtaining the participation

for an appointment. This agency also preferred to have sessions conducted at its own facilities, so three of the sixteen sessions with agency couples were not conducted at the main research site.

of both spouses, all suggest that a relatively low response should be expected. On the other hand, the ten dollar stipend paid to each non-agency couple, and the number of people in the community who are involved with the University, may have produced a higher response than would otherwise be expected.

The motivation for participating in the project was probably somewhat different for the couples referred by area counselors. The project was presented to these couples partly as an opportunity for an experience which might be helpful for them and/or their counselors in dealing with their problems. These couples did not receive a stipend, as it was decided in concert with the counselors that it would seem strange to receive payment for a counseling-related experience. Finally, whether and on what basis agency couples were selected for referral was left to the discretion of the counselors. In addition, some couples who were referred may not actually have contacted the project. Thus, the couples included in the sample are not necessarily representative of couples in marriage counseling in this area.

Given the response rate in the Durham and especially the Dover sub-samples, and the inclusion of couples referred by marriage counselors, the generalizability of findings from the sample as a whole is limited. Despite this, the combined sample has the advantage of being moderately large in comparison with those used in other observational studies of marital interaction.

The specific research on power modes includes all of the seventy-eight couples who participated in the project. While the larger project required the inclusion of both agency and non-agency couples, general comparisons of these two groups are not an objective of this particular study. However, beyond augmenting the size of the sample, the agency couples are important to this research in that they may use a range of power modes which is somewhat different from the range used by couples who are not in counseling. The inclusion of these couples, then, may provide an opportunity to observe a broader range of power assertions than would be possible if only non-clinical couples were included. This is important for developing the system of coding power modes. At best, including agency couples in the study ensures the broadest possible typology of power modes. At worst, in this respect, there are no differences between the two groups of couples.

BASIC SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS

Table 2.1 presents basic characteristics of the wives in the sample, and Table 2.2 presents the same characteristics for the husbands. Each table also breaks down the sample information separately for clinical and non-clinical couples.³

³Note that the clinical/non-clinical breakdown here is based on whether the couple was referred to the project by an area counselor. Some of the so-called "non-clinical"

Table 2.1. Sample Characteristics of Wives, for Clinical, Non-Clinical, and All Couples

Variable	Clinical (%)	Non-Clinical (%)	All Wives (%)
<u>Religion</u>			
Protestant	75.8	69.4	70.5
Catholic	18.8	21.0	20.5
Other/None	6.3	9.7	9.0
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(16)	(62)	(78)
<u>Children</u>			
None	37.5	8.1	14.1
At least one under 6 years of age	25.0	17.7	19.2
All 6 years of age or older	37.5	74.2	66.7
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(16)	(62)	(78)
<u>Personal Income</u>			
Under \$1000	26.7	50.0	45.3
\$1000-\$5999	53.3	26.7	32.0
\$6000-\$9999	6.7	11.7	10.7
\$10000-\$14999	6.7	10.0	9.3
\$15000-\$19999	-	1.7	1.3
\$20000-\$24999	-	-	-
\$25000 and over	6.7	-	1.3
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(15)	(60)	(75)
<u>Total Family Income</u>			
Under \$6000	6.7	1.7	2.7
\$6000-\$9999	26.7	8.3	12.0
\$10000-\$14999	40.0	18.3	22.7
\$15000-\$19999	20.0	25.0	24.0
\$20000-\$24999	-	18.3	14.7
\$25000 and over	6.7	28.3	24.0
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(15)	(60)	(75)

Table 2.1 (Continued)

Variable	Clinical (%)	Non-Clinical (%)	All Wives (%)
<u>Education</u>			
High school or less	50.0	16.1	23.1
Partial college	50.0	35.5	38.5
College grad	-	35.5	28.2
Graduate work	-	12.9	10.3
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(16)	(62)	(78)
<u>Work Status</u>			
Full time	43.8	36.8	38.4
Part time	25.0	22.8	23.3
Other	31.3	40.4	38.3
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(16)	(57)	(73)
<u>Occupation</u>			
Major professional/ executive	-	2.9	2.2
Business/profes- sional	9.1	32.4	26.7
Administrative/minor professional	-	17.6	13.3
Clerical/sales	27.3	38.2	35.6
Blue collar	63.6	8.8	22.2
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(11)	(34)	(45)
<u>Age</u>			
20-29			17.0
30-39			33.0
40-49			28.0
50+			22.0
TOTAL			100.0
(N)	(16)	(62)	(78)
Mean	32.1	42.0	40.0
Median	31.5	43.2	38.5

Table 2.2. Sample Characteristics of Husbands, for Clinical, Non-Clinical, and All Couples

Variable	Clinical (%)	Non-Clinical (%)	All Husbands (%)
<u>Religion</u>			
Protestant	62.5	71.0	69.2
Catholic	37.5	19.4	23.1
Other/None	-	9.7	7.7
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(16)	(62)	(78)
<u>Children</u>			
None	37.5	8.1	14.1
At least one under 6 years of age	31.3	19.4	21.8
All 6 years of age or older	31.3	72.6	64.1
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(16)	(62)	(78)
<u>Personal Income</u>			
Under \$1000	-	1.7	1.3
\$1000-\$5999	6.3	8.3	7.9
\$6000-\$9999	43.8	6.7	14.5
\$10000-\$14999	43.8	16.7	22.4
\$15000-\$19999	-	30.0	23.7
\$20000-\$24999	-	20.0	15.8
\$25000 and over	6.3	16.7	14.5
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(16)	(60)	(76)
<u>Total Family Income</u>			
Under \$6000	-	1.7	1.3
\$6000-\$9999	25.0	6.7	10.5
\$10000-\$14999	50.0	13.3	21.1
\$15000-\$19999	18.8	25.0	23.7
\$20000-\$24999	-	20.0	15.8
\$25000 and over	6.3	33.3	27.6
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(16)	(60)	(76)

Table 2.2 (Continued)

Variable	Clinical (%)	Non-Clinical (%)	All Husbands (%)
<u>Education</u>			
High school or less	43.8	11.3	17.9
Partial college	37.5	12.9	17.9
College grad	18.8	33.9	30.8
Graduate work	-	41.9	33.3
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(16)	(62)	(78)
<u>Work Status</u>			
Full time	81.3	89.8	88.0
Part time	6.3	3.4	4.0
Other	12.5	6.8	8.0
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(16)	(59)	(75)
<u>Occupation</u>			
Major professional/ executive	-	46.6	37.5
Business/profes- sional	-	19.0	15.3
Administrative/minor professional	14.3	24.1	22.2
Clerical/sales	35.7	5.2	11.1
Blue collar	50.0	5.2	13.9
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(14)	(58)	(72)
<u>Age</u>			
20-29			14.0
30-39			33.0
40-49			26.0
50+			27.0
TOTAL			100.0
(N)	(16)	(62)	(78)
Mean	33.8	43.9	41.8
Median	32.0	44.0	41.5

Taking the information for the sample as a whole (total N = 78 couples), first it is clear that the breakdown on religious affiliation is about the same for wives and husbands. Roughly 70 percent are Protestant, 20 percent are Catholic, and the rest report other affiliations or no religious preference. (While the husbands and wives as groups each report about the same breakdown on religion, this is not to say that for all or almost all the couples both spouses have the same religious preference.)

One of the more fascinating bits of sample information is the number and ages of children. This is one of only two variables being discussed here for which both spouses are presumably reporting on "the same thing." While for religion, for example, the wife is giving her religion and the husband his, and the two can quite legitimately differ, for information on the children the wife and husband reports should simply be redundant. Interestingly, this is not the case. Among the wives, 14.1 percent reported having no children, 19.2 percent having at least one child under six years of age, and 66.7 percent having at least one child but none under six years old. The husbands do report having no children at the same rate as the wives, but two more husbands than wives report having children who are

couples may, in fact, have been in counseling at the time of the research (or received counseling in the past), but were not selected for the research on that basis.

all at least six years old.⁴ I think that the wife's report on this variable is more likely to be accurate (and should be used in analyses) since the age shift of a child from five to six (pre-school to in-school) is typically of more importance in the wife's life career than the husband's. Thus, the wife has more reason to know which age group the child falls into. Further information included in the tables is that the mean number of children for the sample as a whole is 2.31 (N=77), and for those couples who have any children the mean is 2.7 (N=67).

Reports by the wives and husbands as to personal income follow the typical pattern of the wives' income being skewed heavily toward the no/low income level. In addition, the husbands' incomes appear to be somewhat higher than one would expect if the sample were representative. The educational and occupational data discussed below confirm the sample's skewness toward the upper middle class. The total family income data even more strongly confirm the upper middle class nature of the sample. Beyond this, while only a few discrepancies exist in the wife and husband reports (as groups) on family income, it is interesting that all are in the direction of the husband's reporting higher

⁴As for the other variables there may be a larger number of couple discrepancies than is indicated by the group differences. Such discrepancy information is always interesting in its own right, but will only be pursued in this work when specifically needed for substantive analysis.

income. It could be that husbands are more subject to a need to appear successful on this item than wives, or it could be that there is a difference in knowledge of family finances and when this exists the husband is more likely to be knowledgeable (in some cases, a husband may even be hiding income from his wife). I will opt for the latter explanation, and assume that the higher family income reports of the husbands are the more accurate (and should be used in any subsequent analysis).

The educational level of the project participants is again consistent with the tendency toward an upper middle class sample, as well as with the location of the project in a "university town." Approximately one-third of the husbands have at least some graduate level education, and another 30 percent are college graduates. Thus, almost two-thirds of the men hold at least college degrees. Only two men and two women have less than a high school education. As expected, the educational attainments of the wives are lower than for the husbands. About two-fifths of the women have some college work, 30 percent are college graduates, and 10 percent have at least some graduate work.

Among the men, the professional occupations are very heavily represented, reflecting the number of college professors included in the sample.⁵ For the wives who gave

⁵The occupational data are based on Hollingshead's seven-point Occupational Scale. For this presentation, the

occupational data (N-45), there is also a significant representation of at least the middle and lower level professional occupations, although as expected there is also a larger proportion in the lower level occupations than for the men. In terms of work status, almost 90 percent of the men work full time. A large percentage of the wives report working outside the home, almost two-fifths full time and another one-fourth part time.

The ages of the participants suggest that the sample is somewhat older than would be expected if representative. The husbands' mean age is 41.8, and the wives' 39.9; the age distribution for both groups appears centered in middle-age and normally distributed.

The age variable provides a most interesting transition point for making a brief summary comparison between the clinical and non-clinical couples. The clinical couples are clearly much younger than the non-clinical couples, and this age difference probably goes very far in explaining other differences between the groups. The clinical couples are more likely to have no children or children under six, report lower personal and family incomes and occupational levels, are less well educated, and are more likely to include a full time working wife. Clearly, a good part of each of these could be due to the clinical couples' relative

three lowest levels (skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled manual labor) are collapsed due to the small number of cases in those categories.

youngness, although some differences (such as in education) may also substantially relate to the broader population base from which the clinical couples are drawn (as opposed to the university population base of the non-clinical couples).

Finally, it is interesting to speculate on one additional issue. If there is an actual relationship between the use of an agency and the ages of couples (and this is not really established by the data presented here), we may suggest two different explanations. One, it may be that couples in the early stages of the family life cycle face stresses that older couples have already been through. Thus, couples in counseling are young because young couples actually face great stress. Or it may be that there is little difference in the degree of stress (although probably in the type) faced by younger and older couples, but this generation of younger couples are more willing to seek help for whatever difficulties they might have. These two explanations are not mutually exclusive and are offered as possibilities for consideration.

To summarize, the overall project sample is heavily skewed toward the upper middle class, with relatively high income, educational, and occupational levels. The sample would be further skewed in this direction were it not for the inclusion of the clinical couples. Thus, in many respects the clinical couples help make the sample more representative.

PROCEDURES

The sessions were conducted in two laboratory settings at the University of New Hampshire.⁶ Each laboratory "package" included a room for videotaping and four additional rooms where each member of a couple (two couples at a time) could individually complete questionnaire materials. Most of the sessions took place in the evening.

Each videotaping room contained a small table where the spouses were asked to sit close together to facilitate conversation and to allow for videotaping. Each also included a portable video camera on a tripod, the control console for the camera, and a separate audio cassette tape recorder. While the equipment was fairly extensive, the units were quite compact. Couples did not seem especially concerned about the equipment, except sometimes at the beginning of the taping. The seating arrangements and the couple's preoccupation with completing a joint answer form during taping may have helped focus the marital partners on each other and on the task rather than on the equipment.

Session Format

Each couple was guided through the procedure by a session administrator. The couple was brought to a room

⁶The exceptions were the three couples at one of the agencies, whose sessions took place at the agency. The physical setting was similar to the setting at University of New Hampshire, and the procedures the same.

where the procedure was briefly described and instructions were given for filling out questionnaires (identical except for husband/wife wording) on background, marital history, esteem scales, and so forth. The administrator made it clear that responses for this part of the session would not be shown to one's spouse and would not be used again in the session. Spouses completed the questionnaires in separate rooms, and then were brought together again to receive instructions for the Inventory of Marital Conflicts (IMC) task (see Appendix B).

The IMC was developed at the University of Minnesota as a stimulus for marital interaction (Olson and Ryder, 1970). Each member of a couple reads eighteen brief descriptions of couples having various kinds of marital conflicts and answers questions about each case. In twelve of these stories, two different perspectives on the situation are presented: the husband's form provides one perspective and the wife's form another. For the other six items, both spouses receive exactly the same perspective. This design sets the stage for disagreement on twelve of the items, and does not induce disagreement on the other six.

Both spouses received the IMC instructions together. Then they read the eighteen vignettes and filled out individual answer forms in separate rooms. When both were finished, they returned the case descriptions to the session administrator and kept their own answer forms for personal reference. The couple was brought to the taping room where

they discussed each vignette, resolved disagreements, and completed a joint answer form. The discussion was videotaped and tape recorded. The couple was told that they had thirty minutes to discuss all the items and they were reminded after twenty minutes. However, couples were allowed to continue for as long as they needed to finish. The session administrator was not in the room during the discussion. After the IMC discussion, the spouses independently completed the IMC Post Discussion Form concerning their reactions to the procedure, as well as a brief set of questions concerning power relations (Blood and Wolfe Decision Power Index). Finally, the session administrator answered any questions and debriefed the couple. The entire session was generally about two hours long.

Special Features of the IMC Task

As a stimulus for marital interaction in the laboratory, the IMC has several important features. First, the procedure is designed to induce disagreement and thus to negate the tendency for family members to present a united, mutually supportive front to observers. Second, the task appears to be highly involving. One indication of involvement is that while participants are told in advance that they will receive different perspectives on the vignettes (see the IMC instructions in Appendix B), couples generally complete the discussion task as if they were ignorant of this aspect of the procedure. Third, the vignettes have

an unusual degree of realism and relevance, in that they describe couples having common marital difficulties. Fourth, providing different perspectives to the participants on the same situation adds another element of realism, in that if the participants were actually dealing with a disagreement of their own, they would undoubtedly bring different points of view to the issue.

The IMC has one additional feature which is of special interest in this particular research. Most disagreement-inducing tasks, such as variants of Strodbeck's "revealed differences technique" (Strodbeck, 1951), ask group members to make a single judgment or devise a single solution to a disagreement. However, in the IMC procedure, participants make two judgments about each vignette--one concerning who is responsible for the problem and the other concerning how the problem should be solved (see items a and d on the individual forms and parts A and B on the joint discussion form in Appendix B). This aspect of the IMC task is superior to the one-judgment procedures in that two kinds of joint solution are possible--one in which the resolution represents a unilateral "win" for one member of the couple, and the other in which the resolution is a compromise between the initial choices of the two participants.

IMC Items. The interaction coding for this research was done for only the twelve conflict or disagreement-inducing vignettes. Thus, the six vignettes for which both spouses

receive the same information were not coded. This decision was based on the assumption that the six non-conflict vignettes would not usually produce rich material with respect to the power modes coding system. To include these six vignettes would have required a greater use of resources than seemed justified by their potential contribution to the study.

Use of Audio Tapes. This research did not make use of the videotapes. Coding was done using the audio tapes and the transcripts of these tapes simultaneously. Of interest here is a study by Murphy and Mendelson (1973) designed to compare inter-coder reliabilities using videotapes or transcripts alone. There was 81.5 percent agreement when videotapes were used, but only 60.34 percent with transcripts alone, using Leary's Interpersonal Checklist (ICL) coding system. However, Terrill and Terrill (1965), also using the ICL, apparently obtained 78 percent agreement using audio tapes. Thus, it appears that tapes offer significant improvement over transcripts alone, but videotape does not produce much higher agreement than audio tape. Aside from the question of inter-rater reliability, use of videotapes would provide an opportunity to examine non-verbal behavior relevant to the question of power modes. At some point it would be worthwhile to expand a system of coding power modes to include such behavior; however, this is beyond the scope of the present study.

CHAPTER III

RE-THINKING FAMILIAR CONCEPTS

In this Chapter current approaches to the conceptualization and measurement of several familiar concepts in the marital power field are reviewed and the approach used in the present study is presented. For each of the concepts a number of issues are addressed. First, the concept is defined as it is used in this research, and the relationship of this definition to other common definitions is examined. Such specification is crucial to the study of marital power relations since there is so much variability and confusion in the use of terms in the literature. As mentioned earlier, this effort at conceptual clarification is one objective of the project, and will hopefully make a contribution in its own right. Second, the concept is related to, and distinguished from, other power concepts where necessary. These aspects of the analysis take their lead from a preliminary systematization of power terms developed by Straus (1976). Third, previous approaches to measuring the concept are examined, and, the measurement of the variable specifically in this research is presented. Combining the discussion of conceptualization and measurement in this way has the advantage of clarifying the rationale for each measure as it is considered.

Before dealing with the specific power variables included in the research, some discussion of the term "power" itself is in order. A great deal of debate has taken place over the definition and measurement of power. Turk (1975) has argued that the confusion is so great as to warrant eliminating the concept altogether. However, Olson and Cromwell take the less drastic stand that power is multi-dimensional and the term "should be employed as a generic construct, consisting of several different, but related, concepts and dimensions" (1975:5). While Straus is in basic agreement with this approach, he further suggests that "'power' should never be used unmodified, except when one wishes to refer to all the . . . dimensions as a single package" (1976:2).

The approach taken here is similar to that of Straus. All of the power variables have specific modifiers. No attempt is made to measure "power" itself, since it is seen as an umbrella concept for a number of specific dimensions. However, a global definition of power is offered, as follows: Power is the set of variables involved in the alteration or maintenance of group outcomes by group members. The main purpose of presenting such a definition is to provide a sensitizer for discussing the specific power variables. One advantage of this lies in initiating a consistent terminology to be used with all the power variables. In addition, this initial definition provides the opportunity to consider at the outset two issues basic to all the power variables.

These issues are reflected in the phrase "group outcomes." This phrase suggests, first, an orientation in which power and power relations are seen as relative to specific social systems (Rogers, 1974). Thus, an individual's "power" in one social system, such as marriage, may be quite different from his/her power in another. Moreover, if power is viewed this way, then it cannot be said that it is merely a " . . . fixed or stable individual disposition. Rather, it is a social phenomenon susceptible to the ebb and flow of the social life in which it is embedded" (Rogers, 1974:1432).

A second implication of defining power in terms of group outcomes is that this represents a more general definition than is commonly found. Family researchers have tended to focus on dyads, and so have often defined power as the ability to influence the other's behavior. Turk points out that defining power in terms of group outcomes and defining it in terms of the other's behavior both amount to the same thing when one is dealing with dyads (1975:83). Since this research will focus on the marital dyad, either version of the definition would be appropriate here. However, awareness of the more general definition is important if the ultimate goal is a theory of power relations which applies not just to dyads but to larger units as well.

PERSONAL RESOURCES

Definition. Any capabilities, characteristics, or goods possessed by an individual which may be used to facilitate or hinder satisfaction of needs or provision of benefits (for self or others).

Other Definitions of Personal Resources

Roger's definition of resources is typical of many current definitions: "A resource is any attribute, circumstance, or possession that increases the ability of its holder to influence a person or group" (1974:1425). Similarly, Olson and Cromwell speak of the "resources an individual possesses which may increase their ability to exercise control in a given situation" (1975:5-6). Common synonyms for resources include "bases of power" (originated by French and Raven, 1959), "power resources" and "types of power."

The definition used here differs from the above in that power terms are not embedded in it, and it thus avoids problems of tautology. To use terms like "power resources," and to define resources in terms of their effect on power, as does Rogers, seems improper in that the assumption of a causal relationship is built right into the term and its definition. It is important to define resources independently of their relationship to power dimensions, both to avoid the relatively formal problem of tautology and for more substantive reasons. Combining resources and power in one's definition implies that power dimensions only depend on resources, although this is clearly not intended by family power

theorists. Rather, resource/exchange theorists generally would agree that "levels of power are determined by the interaction of resources, dependencies, and alternatives" (Smith, 1970:862). Discussions of resources also are usually qualified by stating that resources provide only a potential for power, or that possession of resources does not guarantee that an individual will actually attempt to exercise power or be successful in that attempt (Safilios-Rothschild, 1970:80; Sprey, 1975:64). However, even with such cautions and qualifications, it is inappropriate and confusing to use as synonyms for personal resources phrases like "types of power."

Another important definition of resources is " . . . anything that one partner may make available to the other, helping the latter satisfy his needs or attain his goals" (Blood and Wolfe, 1960:12). This is similar to the present approach in not entangling resources and power. However, the Blood and Wolfe definition differs from ours in its focus on attributes which make a positive contribution to a person's welfare, and its neglect of the possibility of using resources to prevent the other from attaining goals. As Foa and Foa point out (1975:4), the notion of resources covers both "positive and negative encounters," "mutual deprivation" as well as "mutual provision," and aggression as well as supportive behavior. Further, the Blood and Wolfe definition includes only those attributes which may be made available to the other. It thus fails to recognize

that resources which are not made available to the other may still have implications for power in allowing one individual to remain independent of the demands of the other (see Blau, 1964).

To summarize, the central features of the present definition of personal resources are its independence from power terms, the inclusion of attributes which have implications not only for the other but also for oneself, and the recognition that resources can be used both to provide benefits and to prevent them.

Relationship to Power Variables

The purpose of including personal resources in this study is not to attempt another test of the resource theory of power. A full-blown test of the more sophisticated versions of resource/exchange theory would require measures of dependencies and alternatives (as in Smith, 1970), and these are not available here. Rather, the intent is to explore relationships between resources and the central variable in the study, power modes. Both the general levels of resources and the kinds of resources held by marital partners are expected to have some relationship to the types of power assertions they make.

Previous Measures of Resources

There are two approaches to the measurement of resources. The first derives from the "bases of power" model originated by French and Raven (1959). For reasons

outlined below, this approach is the less satisfactory of the two. In delineating five potential bases of power, French and Raven focus on the subjective orientation of a person (P) toward the relationship with the other (O).¹ The five bases of power are then used to outline five types of power:

- (a) reward power, based on P's perception that O has the ability to mediate rewards for him;
- (b) coercive power, based on P's perception that O has the ability to mediate punishments for him;
- (c) legitimate power, based on the perception by P that O has a legitimate right to prescribe behavior for him;
- (d) referent power, based on P's identification with O;
- (e) expert power, based on the perception that O has some special knowledge or expertness (French and Raven, 1959:263).

One major difficulty with this approach is the tendency for resources and several dimensions of power to become entangled, as in the alternative definitions of resources discussed earlier. Straus notes a problem with the terminology growing out of the bases of power model, as evidenced by terms like "referent power," and indicates that such terms confuse power assertions, power modes, and personal resources. He suggests that rather than "informational power," for example, terms such as "knowledge" should be used (Straus, 1976:2).

¹Apparently the only study in the family power literature which actually approached the measurement of resources from this subjective orientation model is Smith's (1970) study of parental influence on adolescents. Raven et al. (1975) do use the "bases of power" model in a study of husband-wife power relations, but they shift the focus to responses of the other to different kinds of power assertions. This research is thus more relevant to power modes than personal resources.

This solution not only eliminates a great deal of conceptual confusion, but it also opens the door to assessing resources on a more "objective" basis than the subjective orientation measures demanded by the original French and Raven model. In fact, a second difficulty of the bases of power model as originally formulated is the neglect of resources which an individual may possess independently of the other's orientation toward him/her. As the definition used here suggests, resources are not just important in their availability to the other, but also in their facilitation of the holder's independence. The "objective" resources possessed by an individual may be just as important as the other's subjective orientation toward those resources. Thus, the actual "expertise" of A is as significant as B's belief that A has a certain amount of expertise. It is suggested here that the objective and the subjective aspects of resources are distinct, that the two do not always coincide with one another in a particular relationship, and that their relationship is an interesting subject of study in its own right.

Finally, the particular categories of resources originally outlined by French and Raven also present difficulties. First, in this model authority ("legitimate power") is included as a resource. It may not be inherently inappropriate to view authority in this way. However, authority represents a quite different dimension (the normative) from the structural dimension which the other resources usually

enumerated represent. Further, recent work within resource theory has consistently treated authority as a separate variable which mediates the influence of resources on power dimensions (as in Rodman's (1972) "theory of resources in cultural context"), and indeed as a variable which is itself influenced by resources (Allen and Straus, 1975:3). For these reasons, authority will be treated here as a separate variable, even though some would give it the conceptual status of a resource. Second, the reward and coercive categories outlined by French and Raven are certainly very broad. It seems preferable to concentrate on the more specific resources which may make it possible for one to reward or punish another, rather than to combine these into such broad categories.²

Far more common in the measurement of resources than the bases of power model is the approach taken by Blood and Wolfe (1960). This alternative does focus on specific resources as suggested just above, and it is also consistent with the disentangling definition of resources presented here. The actual resources considered by Blood and Wolfe and by many subsequent investigators (such as Fox, 1973; Scanzoni, 1972) consist of characteristics like income, education, and occupation. Allen and Straus note that these types of resources refer to "economic and prestige conferring

²This is not to say that French and Raven's categories are not useful in other respects. This model is probably most helpful in examining types of power assertions. In fact, French and Raven (1959) offer a very insightful discussion of the implications of using different types of power assertions for the other's response.

characteristics" of the spouses, which correspond to "what Blau (1964:20-22) would call 'extrinsic resources'" (1975:7). In addition, resources of a more personal and interpersonal nature have been considered, and these may be seen as equivalent to what Blau calls "intrinsic" resources (Allen and Straus, 1975:7). For example, Heer (1963) suggested that personal attributes like attractiveness and role competence should be considered as resources. In a study of resources and husband-wife violence, Allen and Straus included items on self-esteem, achievement orientation, sociability, and anxiety in a measure of resources (1975:7). This research includes measures of both the "extrinsic" and the "intrinsic" types of resources, and these are discussed in detail in the following chapter.

ATTRIBUTED POWER

Definition. The attribution to an individual of the ability to alter group outcomes. More specifically, reports as to the distribution of power in a group.

Previous Measurement and Relationship to Other Power Variables

The concept of attributed power is derived from current self-report measures which purport to assess the power structure or the relative power of members of a group. Such measures seek to find out "who has the power," and thus focus on the relative amounts of power of husbands and wives, or the distribution of power (Foss and Straus, 1975:14-17). These self-report measures range from single-item questions

like "who is the real boss in your family?" (Turk and Bell, 1975); to the extensively used Blood and Wolfe Decision Power Index, which asks respondents to indicate who usually has the final say in a series of family-related decisions; to predictions of which partner would make a particular decision during a laboratory task, and retrospective reports of which partner actually did make the decision (Olson and Rabunsky, 1972).

It is suggested here that self-report measures of the marital power distribution are appropriately viewed as attributional statements. Attribution may be defined as the process of imputing or assigning certain properties, abilities, motivations, etc. to entities (including self and others) in the environment (after Kelley, 1967). In terms of self-report measures of "power structure" in marriage we may say that imputations are being made about the relative abilities of oneself and one's spouse to alter group outcomes.

Applying some of the insights of attribution theory to these measures has certain advantages. For example, Kelley suggests that it is possible to "identify systematic discrepancies between the attributions different persons or different types of persons make" and these differences may be a function of "differences between actor and observer in their respective information about possible causes and co-variances" (1973:125). It is certainly the case that

differences have been found between attributions about the power distribution made by husbands and wives. Turk and Bell (1972) found that husbands and wives tend to attribute greater power to their partners than the partner attributes to him/herself, and this is consistent with findings by Heer (1962, 1963) and others. (In contrast, Olson (1969) found that husbands tend to overestimate, and wives tend to underestimate, their own power.) Attribution theory suggests, at the very least, that systematic differences between respondents should be expected and viewed as theoretically important, rather than merely as irritating methodological obstacles.

Viewing self-reports of the marital power distribution as attributions may also help to clarify other findings which have often been considered troublesome. In particular, a number of researchers have been dismayed at the extent to which authority is related to self-reports of the power structure. For example, in review of a number of methodological studies, Olson and Cromwell conclude at one point that "those studies using retrospective self-report measures of power, of which there are many, are actually tapping who is perceived as the authority" (1975:136). Such comments imply that correlations between normative and structural measures indicate that the structural measures are invalid. We would suggest that self-report measures represent attributions about the distribution of power, and as

such they are a function not only of the perceived outcomes of previous power confrontations, but also such other dimensions as norms about who should "have more power" (authority) and the personal resources possessed by group members, as well as differential information available to the persons making the attributions (as in Kelley, 1973).

POWER DISTRIBUTION NORM

Definition. Expectations/beliefs about the way power should be distributed in a group. In a dyad, the right of A to alter B's behavior. Authority.

Other Definitions

This is a fairly standard, non-controversial concept. It may be seen as the normative companion to attributed power, in that both concepts focus on the distribution of power among group members. Whereas the concept of attributed power refers to attributions about the actual power distribution, power distribution norms focus on the question of who should have more power, or how power should be distributed in a group (i.e., one variable is ostensibly descriptive and the other prescriptive).

Norms about the distribution of power are usually referred to as "power norms" or "norms about power." The more specific "power distribution norm" is considered preferable here in that it makes explicit the notion that norms about the distribution of power are only one specific

type of power norm. There are other dimensions of power which are subject to normative definition. In particular, different types of power assertions may also be studied on a normative level. That is, we may examine not only what kinds of power assertions are made, but also which types are considered legitimate or illegitimate (Foss and Straus, 1975:16-17). The latter issue refers to what may be called "power mode norms."³

Relationship to Other Power Variables

A considerable body of research indicates that norms about the distribution of power in marriage have important implications for other dimensions of power. In a re-examination of research findings from eleven cultures, Rodman (1972) found not only that power distribution norms directly affect what we term "attributed power," but also that the relationship between personal resources and attributed power depends upon norms about the power distribution. Burr (1973) further specified this relationship when he concluded that personal resources are related to power attributions only when the prescribed or normative distribution of power is equalitarian. The present study will be able to provide additional evidence concerning such relationships.

³While recent research specifically on norms about physical aggression between husbands and wives suggests the importance of this variable (Straus, 1975), data on "power mode norms" are not available for the present study.

The main reason for including power distribution norms here, however, is their possible relationship with power modes or types of power assertions. Safilios-Rothschild (1970:80) has suggested that a spouse who lacks authority (usually the wife) will not make power assertions which are direct, but will use indirect, "manipulative" approaches in attempting to influence the other. On the other hand, the spouse with the greater authority (the one whom the power distribution norms favor) may need to make only mild power assertions unless directly challenged (1970:80). Even in the context of a laboratory interaction task, where the range of available power modes is limited compared to those in a natural setting, it may be possible to shed light on such alternative hypotheses.

OUTCOME VARIABLES

The final aspect of power to be considered here concerns the outcomes of the conflict resolution process, or the actual choices or decisions made by the participants in the laboratory situation. These task outcomes or decisions have typically been used by researchers as measures of "achieved power"--the actual success of an actor in altering group outcomes (Straus, 1976). Thus, if the final decision reached by a couple is the same as the husband's initial choice, then the husband is given a "win." Sprey (1972), among others, has argued that this is a poor measure of achieved, or successful, power. This is partly a problem

due to the time distance between particular acts of power assertion and the final decision actually made by a couple. Probably the best way of measuring achieved power would be through an act-by-act counting of instances of immediate compliance to a command--similar to the "effective power" score in SIMFAM (Straus and Tallman, 1971). Sprey (1972, 1975) offers a further, and perhaps more important argument against the use of "win scores" as measures of achieved power, or success in making power assertions. Such scores assume that family relationships represent an "I win-you lose" situation, or indeed a zero-sum game, and according to Sprey, this assumption about families is unwarranted.

It may be suggested, however, that whether or not families are analogous to zero-sum game situations is an empirical question. Some families may indeed treat situations as zero-sum games even though there is no structural reason for doing so, while others may not. In line with this, one of the possible uses of the IMC task outcomes is as an indicator of the extent to which the couple is treating the task as a unilateral "win" situation or as a situation offering bilateral solution possibilities. As mentioned earlier, the IMC task is uniquely suited to shedding light on this issue, since two choices must be made by the couple for each vignette. Thus, one outcome measure is the couple's tendency toward unilateral or bilateral solutions. When both choices made by a couple favor one member of the couple, this outcome is unilateral. Bilateral outcomes are those in

which of the two choices made by the couple, one choice favors one spouse and the other choice favors the other spouse. The unilateral-bilateral solution measure in particular allows an opportunity to explore relationships between types of outcomes and resources, power distribution variables, and (most importantly) power modes.

Chapter IV presents the specific measures, basic descriptive findings, and analyses of interrelationships for the concepts discussed in this Chapter.

CHAPTER IV

RESOURCES, THE POWER DISTRIBUTION, AND OUTCOMES

The concepts analyzed in the last chapter, and the findings presented in this chapter, refer to two of the three power domains identified by Olson and Cromwell (1975:5-7). Personal resources and power distribution norms represent the "bases of power" domain, and the outcomes or "achieved" power variables are part of the "power outcomes domain." While Olson and Cromwell include attributed power in the outcomes domain, I think it can also be counted--particularly as it is conceptualized here--as a bases of power (or "potential" power) concept. The one domain which is left out so far is "power processes," and this will be addressed in the later chapters on power modes or types of power assertion.

Before we get to the study of power processes, we are confined in this chapter to the fairly static analyses of relationships between power base variables and outcomes which have dominated previous research. The obvious question, then, is "Why still another analysis of these structural variables--why not move directly to power process concepts?" There are a number of reasons for pursuing one more

examination of relationships between personal resources, power distribution variables, and outcomes.

First of all, it is useful in terms of assessing the generalizability of the ground-breaking power modes data, to see how the present findings for the more heavily researched variables fit those of previous research. Second, presenting these relationships is necessary background for fitting the power modes analysis into the model of marital power relations in Chapter I.

In their own right, the findings offered in this chapter are worthwhile. For one thing, it is only recently that studies have been done using both self-report and observational methods (Cromwell, Klein, and Wieting, 1975; Olson, 1969; Olson and Rabunsky, 1972; Turk and Bell, 1972). A side effect of such studies is that they are generally the only ones which obtain data from both husbands and wives. In this chapter, then, we can bring a still rare multi-method approach, and the perspectives of both marital partners, to the study of power structure.

In addition, the outcomes variable in this research provides an opportunity to examine both win-oriented and compromise behavior by the spouses, and thus a chance to test some important notions derived from conflict and game theories.

Finally, the need for a processual approach to marital power does not diminish the importance of understanding power structure, or the relatively stable distribution of power and power-related attributes in a relationship.

CONSTRUCTION OF INDEXES: PERSONAL RESOURCES

In the last chapter, personal resources were defined as "any capabilities, characteristics, or goods possessed by an individual which may be used to facilitate or hinder satisfaction of needs or provision of benefits (for self or others)." Further, two kinds of resources were identified as important in conjugal power relations. Extrinsic resources are the "economic and prestige-conferring characteristics" of the spouses, while intrinsic resources are the interpersonal skills and personal qualities which the partners bring to the relationship (Allen and Straus, 1979). By far most of the research on marital power has focused only on extrinsic resources. However, much of the theoretical work has suggested that non-economic resources are also relevant to marital power (Heer, 1963; Safilios-Rothschild, 1970), and in recent empirical work these variables are important (Safilios-Rothschild, 1976; Straus, 1977).

In this section, the methodology for constructing indexes of intrinsic and extrinsic resources is described. The personal resources indexes are the most complex in the research, so this discussion is rather lengthy. However, several of the issues raised are common to the construction of other indexes, so this presentation does double duty.

In most of the research on personal resources and marital power, particular resources have been correlated

one by one with some index of power. This is useful in assessing the impact of each resource separately, but is rather cumbersome. Further, the single-variable analyses do not give us a full sense of the extent to which all of the resource variables, taken together, may help to explain power relations. Finally, since the main focus of the present research is not to test resource theory, a one-by-one analysis of resources would take up an inordinate amount of attention. Thus, overall indexes of extrinsic and intrinsic resources are desirable here as concise summaries.

Method of Standardizing Measures

Most of the variables treated in this chapter consist of indexes each made up of a number of items or dimensions. Some method of standardizing both the items and the indexes was desirable. The personal resources indexes, for example, include very disparate items--from a tricotomous classification of work status, to a seven-point occupational rating scale, etc. Since such measures differ markedly in range and variance, it is necessary to standardize the items to equalize¹ their respective contributions to the composite index.

¹It is also possible to differentially weigh items for an index; however, there were no theoretical reasons for doing so in the indexes constructed for this research.

The indexes for "power distribution norms" and "attributed power" are based on items from the Decision Power Index (Blood and Wolfe, 1960). While these items "were pre-designed to have equal score ranges, . . . the mean, variance, and skewness of the items . . . often differ markedly from each other, again indicating the need for item standardization" (Straus and Kumagai, 1978). Thus, both the indexes of personal resources and indexes related to the distribution of power require standardization for the purpose of ensuring that each item contributes equally to the total index.

At another level, it is often important to also standardize the indexes themselves, so as to "express scores in units that have a known meaning" (Straus and Kumagai, 1978). For example, the sum of the raw scores on the attributed power items (Blood and Wolfe Decision Power Index) ranges from 5 to 40. Given this unusual range, the meaning of a reported score of 20 is not readily apparent. In situations like this it is helpful to the reader to express index scores in some standard unit.

A second advantage of standardizing index scores is that scores for different variables are expressed in the same units, making for a more ready understanding of differences and similarities in how the variables in the research "work." For the most part, indexes used in this chapter were constructed by standardizing first the items and then the index.

The PZ Score. The method of standardization chosen for this research is the PZ score, developed by Straus (1978; Straus and Kumagai, 1978). Like the Z score, PZ scores have the advantages of meeting the assumptions of necessary statistical procedures. However, the PZ score is preferable in being more readily understood than the Z score. The PZ score combines the notion of scores being expressed as "a percentage of the maximum raw score" (as in class tests), "with the measurement characteristics of Z scores and is therefore called a 'PZ' scale" (Straus, 1978).

"PZ scores have a range of 0 (Z score of ≤ -2.5) to 100 (Z score of ≥ 2.5), with a mean of 50, which is 50 percent of the maximum possible score, and a standard deviation of 20" (Straus, 1978).² Roughly speaking, the meaning of a PZ score of 70 on the index of attributed power, would be that relative to the rest of the sample, the respondent received 70 percent of the total possible score.³

Relationship to Other Methods of Standardization.

The PZ score is a new method of expressing item and index

²For computing from raw scores, $PZ = 50 + (20 + ((X - \bar{X})/SD))$. From Z scores, $PZ = 50 + 20Z$. For additional details on the characteristics of PZ scores and their relationship to Z and other standard scores, see Straus (1978).

³A rather neat feature of the PZ score can be illustrated here. Twenty PZ points equal 1 SD. Thus, since the mean of a PZ distribution is 50, a PZ score of 70 is 1 standard deviation above the mean.

scores in terms of a standard unit. Evidence for the relative adequacy of this method is found in a comparison of eleven methods of index construction (Straus and Kumagai, 1978). In this research, PZ scores on four variables were almost perfectly correlated with other standard scores for the same variables (such as the Z score), and correlations between eight variables and an external criterion variable were essentially the same whether Z or PZ scores were used. These findings are of special relevance here, since two of the four primary variables studied (SES and decision power of husband) are highly similar to the personal resources and power distribution variables in the present research. Given these findings, the choice of PZ scores as a method of standardization which combines the advantages of a Z score with considerably greater ease of understanding, seems well justified.

EXTRINSIC RESOURCES

Five items relating to economic performance were used to form an index of extrinsic resources for each partner. The individual's education, occupation, and personal income are three commonly used indicators.⁴

⁴Education was measured on a seven-point scale ranging from less than eighth grade through some work on a graduate degree. Income was based on a seven-point scale ranging from less than \$1,000/year to over \$25,000/year. Occupation also was measured on a seven-point scale, based on Hollingshead's occupational classification, and ranging from unskilled workers to "higher executives and major professionals."

In addition, the work status of the individual (working full time outside the home, part time or not working outside) was included. This particular variable was seen as especially important for the women, and a number of studies have shown the work status of the wife to be related to the distribution of power (Brown, 1977; Heer, 1958; Scanzoni, 1970:160). Although few of the men in this sample were not employed full time, it seems worthwhile to also include work status among the husbands' resources. This is because less than full time employment is a significant deficit in the husband's "arsenal" of resources.

Finally, the fifth extrinsic resources item was a self-rating as to one's economic contribution to the marriage. Each partner rated his/her own economic contribution on a five-point scale.⁵ This item is a desirable addition to

⁵The economic contributions item is one of four experimental items on contributions to the couple's marriage which posed a special problem in terms of scoring responses. Each partner rated his own contribution in the economic, emotional, social, and sexual areas as "much more than it ought to be," "more than it ought to be," "just about right," "less than it ought to be," or "much less than it ought to be."

Given the wording of the responses, it could be argued that the "just about right" category should receive the highest numerical score (3), the two adjacent categories a middle score, regardless of direction (2), and the end points both receive the lowest score (1). This is because feeling that one's contribution was much too large could be seen as equally distressing as feeling that it was much too small.

On the other hand, it is possible that despite the wording, respondents were basically ranking themselves on

the overall index, since it is anchored in the partners' personal views of appropriate economic contributions. This is qualitatively different from the four other extrinsic resources, where the "absolute" value of the individual's resources is what counts.

A multidimensional Extrinsic Resources Index (ERI) was constructed in three steps. First, each of the five extrinsic items was standardized. Next the sum of the resulting scores was computed, and finally, this sum of the items was itself standardized so as to be in PZ score form. Thus, the resulting PZ'd index has a range of 0 to 100, a mean of 50, and a standard deviation of 20.⁶

an ordinary five-point scale, from making a very small contribution to making a very large one.

In order to determine which scoring procedure to use, a "trace-line analysis" was conducted as follows.

There are sound theoretical reasons for believing that the contributions items are positively correlated with attributed power. Therefore, the attributed power index can be used as an external criterion variable for determining the scoring direction for the contributions questions. The mean attributed power scores for each response category on the contributions questions were computed. Since the attributed power scores tended to peak at the "much more than it ought to be" category, rather than at the "just about right" category, the contributions items were scored on a five-point scale (from 1 = much less, to 5 = much more) (the detailed information for the trace-line analysis can be made available upon request).

⁶Both the specific items and the index were standardized separately for women and men. Thus, the wives' scores were standardized in terms of wives only, not in terms of the entire sample of one hundred fifty-six individuals, and similarly for the husbands. This means that the same PZ value does not necessarily mean the same thing for a man and a woman.

Internal Consistency of the Extrinsic Resources Index

Table 4.1 gives the product-moment correlation matrix for each of the five extrinsic resource items and the multidimensional indexes. This analysis gives information as to the internal consistency of the external resources indexes. In other words, this indicates whether the five items "hang together" or are all tapping some aspect of the same underlying dimension. As Straus (1977:5) points out, very high intercorrelations among the items are not necessarily desirable here. This is because if the correlations approach perfection, there is no point in constructing an index at all since any one item would do as well.

As the table indicates, not every item is significantly related to every other item, for either the women or the men. However, each item is "tied into" at least one other item, and thus it seems justifiable to retain all of the items for the overall indexes.

Patterns for Husbands and Wives. The three classic economic variables--income, education, and occupation--are clearly interrelated for both men and women, and the pattern does not seem to differ between the groups. However, there are some interesting differences in how the work status and self-rating of economic contributions items operate. For both husbands and wives, work status is strongly related to income. However, only for the wives

Table 4.1. Correlation Matrix for Five Extrinsic Personal Resources Measures, and a Multidimensional Index Combining Them, for Husbands and Wives

Extrinsic Personal Resources	EDUC	INC	WKST	OCC	ECON
<u>Husbands</u>					
Education (EDUC)	-				
Personal Income (INC)	.29	-			
Work Status (WKST)	.06	.53	-		
Occupation (OCC)	.73	.40	.01	-	
Economic Contribution to Marriage (ECON)	-.03	.19	.07	.01	-
Extrinsic Resources Index (ERI)	.66	.77	.55	.71	.37
<u>Wives</u>					
Education	-				
Personal Income	.22	-			
Work Status	-.02	.62	-		
Occupation	.60	.30	.00	-	
Economic Contribution to Marriage	-.11	.31	.36	-.09	-
Extrinsic Resources Index	.52	.82	.67	.54	.51

does work status correlate with any other extrinsic resource item--notably the self-rating of economic contribution to the marriage.

For the economic contribution item, the only significant relationship for the men is with personal income. Thus, the husbands' self-rating was positively related to income but not to any of the other economic items. The wives' self-ratings were positively related to both income and work status. The small negative correlations between self rating of economic contribution and education and occupational level for the women are particularly interesting. It may be that women with relatively high educational achievement and occupational positions have higher expectations for their own economic contributions to the marriage and thus rate themselves more harshly than other women. This may especially be the case if one notes the possibility that women are structurally barred from actually achieving the level of occupational functioning which a high level of educational attainment, as well as personal standards, may lead them to expect for themselves.

To summarize in terms of the criterion of internal consistency, the five extrinsic resources items appear sufficiently interrelated to warrant combining them into a single index. This is especially the case for the three standard items--income, occupation, and education. The work status and self-rating of economic contribution items appear more important for the wives than for the husbands.

External Criterion Item Analysis

Another way of assessing the adequacy of the extrinsic resources index is to do an "external criterion item analysis" (Straus, 1964:354). This analysis has to do with the validity of the indexes, while the internal consistency analysis above relates to reliability.

The criterion variable is the attributed power index. Both the "resource theory" of conjugal power and previous research predict certain relationships between it (as the Blood and Wolfe Decision Power Index), and most of the items in the extrinsic resources index.⁷

Ordinarily, an external criterion analysis would be used with a large pool of items as an empirical "weeding out" device in index construction. However, here there are a small number of items and good theoretical reasons for including each of them. Thus, the external criterion analysis becomes not so much a selection process, as a means of finding out if the items are "working" in this research in expected ways.

Table 4.2 gives the product-moment correlations between the five extrinsic resources items as well as the

⁷Using the attributed power index as the external criterion does not rule out later discussing the correlations of the resulting extrinsic indexes with attributed power. This is because the latter discussion is not intended as a "test" of the resource theory, but as an overall summary of the resources and attributed power relationship.

indexes, and attributed power, for both husbands and wives. Roughly speaking, the items operate as expected, with some exceptions. For the husbands, with the exception of education, each item shows at least a moderate correlation with attributed power. The correlation between the index as a whole and attributed power is fairly strong, and higher than for any single item. These findings are generally consistent with previous findings of relationships between husband's absolute resources and attributed power (Allen and Straus, 1979, presently in press; Blood and Wolfe, 1960).

The picture for the wives is quite different: there are no relationships between the wives' personal extrinsic resources and attributed power. However, this is not inconsistent with previous findings. For example, Allen and Straus (1979) found hardly any relationship between wife's resources and power (see also Price-Bonham, 1976).⁸

The one relationship for the wives is a moderate one between the self-rating of economic contribution and attributed power, and is not in the expected direction. In other words, the higher the wife's rating of her own economic contribution to the marriage the higher the relative power she attributes to her husband. One possible explanation

⁸In that research, the expected negative relationship between wives extrinsic resources and level of husband's power was found only for working class wives. Since the present sample includes only ten working class couples, this is an important finding. More on this when the relationships between resources and power distribution variables are examined in their own right.

relates to the fact that the self rating item could be scored highly by women with very low levels of the other extrinsic resources. Thus, I could rate my contribution as very high even if I were not working, bringing in income, etc., if I have a traditional view of the division of labor in the family. Further, if I believe that as a wife I am not expected to bring in economic goods and my husband is, I may also subscribe to a traditional husband-oriented distribution of power.

In summary, based on the internal consistency analysis, and the fact that the external criterion analysis "worked" at least moderately well for the husbands, the combination of the five extrinsic resource items into overall indexes is considered appropriate here.

INTRINSIC RESOURCES

Two measures relating to social and emotional attributes were used to form an index of intrinsic resources for each partner. The first is a ten-item measure of self esteem, in which the respondent is asked to indicate on a four-point scale how strongly she agrees/disagrees with statements like "I feel that I have a number of good qualities" or "All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure." The rationale for including self esteem as an interpersonal resource in marriage is two-fold. One, a person with high self esteem may possess leadership. Two, a person with high self esteem is less likely to be

Table 4.2. Correlations of Five Extrinsic Resources and a Multidimensional Index Combining the Five Items, with an Index of Attributed Power, for Husbands and Wives

Extrinsic Resource	Correlation with Husband-Oriented Attributed Power Score	
	Husbands	Wives
Education	.00	.01
Personal Income	.33	-.05
Work Status	.25	.01
Occupation	.18	-.02
Economic Contribution to Marriage	.16	.17
Extrinsic Resources Index	.36	.03

the sort of emotional drain on the partner which may hinder the satisfaction of the partner's needs (see definition of resources above).

The second measure of intrinsic resources is a three-item self rating of one's social, emotional and sexual contributions to the marriage. (These are parallel to the economic contribution item used in the ERI.) A sample item is "In term of our social life, my contribution as a husband is . . . (much more than it ought to be, more than it ought, just about right, less than it ought to be, much less than it ought to be)". These items appear to be a fairly direct assessment of the partners' views of the personal, social, and sexual resources they bring to the relationship.

Intrinsic Resources Index

A two-dimensional Intrinsic Resources Index (IRI) was constructed in a manner similar to that for the extrinsic index (ERI). First, each of the self-esteem and contributions items was standardized. Next, the sums of the resulting esteem scores and contributions scores were computed, and these two sums were themselves standardized in PZ score form. Thus, at this point, two standardized indexes--Self Esteem (SE) and Marital Contributions (MC)--had been constructed. Next the scores on these two indexes were summed and the resulting score was standardized in PZ form.

The resulting Intrinsic Resources Index, in PZ form, ranges from 0 to 100, has a mean of 50, and a standard deviation of 20.

Internal Consistency. The two intrinsic resources measures are interrelated for the husbands ($r = .27$), but not for the wives ($r = .09$). Thus, the rather curious finding for the women is that positive self esteem does not appear to be positively related to their ratings of contributions to the marriage. However, the moderate correlation found for the husbands seems to justify combining the two into an overall index.

External Criterion Item Analysis. Table 4.3 gives the product-moment correlations between the two intrinsic resources measures and the overall index, and an index of attributed power. While for the men there is little relationship between intrinsic resources and attributed power, for the wives there is a moderate correlation in the expected direction between marital contributions, at least, and reported power. Thus, the higher the wives' ratings of their own intrinsic contributions to the marriage, the lower the level of power they attribute to their husbands. Self esteem does not seem related to power even for the wives, despite strong theoretical reasons for such a relationship.

While this analysis is in one way disappointing, in another it is not. When the external criterion analyses

Table 4.3. Correlation of Two Intrinsic Resources Measures and a Multidimensional Index Combining Them, with an Index of Attributed Power, for Husbands and Wives

Intrinsic Resource	Correlation with Husband- Oriented Attributed Power Score	
	Husbands	Wives
Self Esteem	.10	-.03
Marital Contributions	.10	-.25
Intrinsic Resources Index	.15	-.19

for both the extrinsic and intrinsic resources indexes are taken together, there is a pattern of different resources relating to attributed power for men and women which is compatible with previous research findings. Extrinsic resources appear more significant for the husbands, while intrinsic seem somewhat more important for the wives, in relation to attributed power. Since these relationships are explored here for measurement purposes only, further specification of the findings awaits the more substantive discussion to follow.

As in the analysis for extrinsic resources, the theoretical reasoning and the pattern of relationships seems to warrant using the two-dimensional intrinsic resource index.

A final note on the resources index construction. Originally my plan was to construct an overall or total resources index. However, since the extrinsic and intrinsic resources operate so differently for the wives and the husbands, it would be inappropriate to combine the two types into a single index. Such a combination would most likely obscure important findings rather than help uncover them.

RELATIVE RESOURCES

The thrust of the resource theory of marital power is that it is the relative resources of the partners which affects the distribution of power. While my primary purpose

is not testing this theory, the relationships to be examined here are subsumed by the theory. Thus, indexes of relative resources were constructed to allow exploring the relationships actually posited by resource theory.

The relative resources measures are formed on the basis of the proportion which the husband contributes to the total amount of a resource possessed by a couple. The formula then is the amount of the husband's resource, divided by the sum of the husband's and wife's resources. (Precedents for this procedure are Price-Bonham, 1976:631; Straus, 1978). The range for any item is from 0 to 100. A score of zero means the husband contributes none of a resource, and the wife contributes all of it. A score of 100 means all of that resource is contributed by the husband, and a score of 50 means each contributes the resource equally, or the resource is held in equal amounts by each spouse.

These measures are most clearly exemplified by the personal income item. The proportion of the couple's total income which the husband contributes is easily understood. If the couple's total income is \$20,000 and the husband's personal income is \$15,000 then the relative income score is 75.

Conceptualizing the notion of relative resource measures is somewhat more difficult with the intrinsic resources. For example, the meaning of a relative resources

score of 75 for self esteem is less readily understood than for income. It is hard to think of summing the self esteem scores of two individuals and then viewing the sum as the total esteem of the couple. However, if it is realized that the relative score simply is a way of conveniently summarizing who has a higher level of a particular attribute, then the score makes some sense. Thus, a score of 50 on the relative self esteem means each partner has about the same level of confidence; a score of 25 means the wife has much higher self esteem than the husband, and so forth.

There are two quirks of relative scores that need to be kept in mind. First of all, it is possible for couples who have vastly different absolute levels of resources to receive the same relative score. That is, a couple in which the wife earns \$20,000 and the husband \$30,000 (for a total of \$50,000) would receive the same relative income score (namely 60), as a couple in which the wife earns \$4,000 and the husband \$6,000 (for a total of \$10,000). The other side of this, however, is that the same absolute difference between partners quite appropriately has very different implications for the relative score, depending on the base. Thus, a \$10,000 difference gives a relative score of 60 when the total is \$50,000, but the relative score is 83 when the base is \$12,000.

Secondly, in instances where each partner has zero of a resource, then the relative score is 50. This is

certainly strange in terms of the absolute value of the resource, but makes sense in representing the equality of their positions relative to one another.

Indexes of Relative Resources

Two relative resources indexes were constructed--one for intrinsic and one for extrinsic resources. For each index, each of the component items was converted to relative form. Then each relative item was converted into PZ scores and the resulting items were summed. The resulting figure was itself transformed into PZ form. The resulting indexes have a range of 0 to 100, mean of 50, and standard deviation of 20.

Tables 4.4 and 4.5 give information as to the internal consistency and external validity of the relative indexes. The internal consistency results are similar to those for the absolute resource indexes.

However, for the analysis using the attributed power index as the external criterion, the relative resources indexes appear to be less adequate than the absolute versions. There is only one statistically significant relationship (between the wife's report of the power distribution and the relative intrinsic marital contributions score), and this is only a moderate correlation. Thus, contrary to expectations based on the resource theory of marital power, the absolute levels of the resources held by the partners seem more important than their relative resources. These

Table 4.4. Correlation Matrix for Relative Personal Resources Items and Indexes, for Extrinsic and Intrinsic Resources

Relative Personal Resources	R- EDUC	R- INC	R- WKST	R- OCC	R- ECON
<u>Extrinsic Resources</u>					
Relative Education (R-EDUC)	-				
Relative Income (R-INC)	.19	-			
Relative Work Status (R-WKST)	-.02	.57	-		
Relative Occupation (R-OCC)	.18	.13	.04	-	
Relative Economic Contri- bution to Marriage (R-ECON)	.05	.38	.39	-.02	-
Relative Extrinsic Re- sources Index (R-ERI)	.49	.78	.74	.41	.64
		R-SE		R-MC	
<u>Intrinsic Resources</u>					
Relative Self Esteem (R-SE)		-			
Relative Marital Contributions (R-MC)		.28		-	
Relative Intrinsic Resources Index (R-IRI)		.81		.77	

Table 4.5. Correlations of Relative Personal Resources Items and Indexes, with Husband-Oriented Attributed Power Scores, for Wives and Husbands

Relative Personal Resources Items	Correlation with Husband- Oriented Attributed Power Score	
	Husband	Wife
<u>Extrinsic Resources</u>		
R-EDUC	-.09	-.03
R-INC	.06	.09
R-WKST	.04	-.06
R-OCC	.05	-.16
R-ECON	.05	-.09
R-ERI	.09	-.09
<u>Intrinsic Resources</u>		
R-SE	-.04	.07
R-MC	-.03	.20
R-IRI	.00	.10

relationships will be explored more fully in the sections to follow.

RESOURCES OF WIVES AND HUSBANDS

The interrelationships among the intrinsic and extrinsic resources of the partners demonstrate some interesting differences in how resources relate to marriage for men and women.

Table 4.6 gives the product-moment correlations between the resources of the wives and the husbands. For the ERI (Extrinsic Resources Index), there is no correlation, but this lack of relationship obscures some strong relationships for the individual items. For example, the partners' education and occupational level are highly correlated. However, there are very slight negative relationships for income and self-ratings of economic contribution, and a moderate negative correlation for work status. Thus, the positive and negative correlations for the partners' extrinsic resource items cancel each other out and produce no correlation for the index as a whole.

There is a slight negative relationship for the IRI (Intrinsic Resources Index), such that the higher the wife's intrinsic resources, the lower the husband's. When the self esteem and contributions indexes themselves are looked at, though, we find moderate contradictory relationships. The partners' self esteem scores are positively related, but their marital contributions are negatively related. This

Table 4.6. Intercorrelations of Personal Resources of Husbands and Wives

Resource	Husband-Wife Correlation
<u>Extrinsic</u>	
EDUC - education	.52
INC - income	-.07
WKST - work status	-.22
OCC - occupation	.37
ECON - economic contribution to the marriage	-.08
ERI - Extrinsic Resources Index	.05
<u>Intrinsic</u>	
SE - self esteem	.19
MC - marital contributions	-.19
IRI - Intrinsic Resources Index	-.10

may be a function of the wording of the contributions items, which asked for a weighing of one person's input against the other's. If I see myself as doing more than I should have to, my husband will see himself as doing less and our responses will be negatively correlated (even though consistent).

The most interesting findings on the links between husbands' and wives' resources are given in Table 4.7. For the husbands, there is a moderately strong correlation between extrinsic and intrinsic resources. Following Scanzoni's (1970) lead of seeing the husband's "articulation" with the economic system as the base point from which more intrinsic rewards are derived, we can posit a causal order in which extrinsic resources are temporally prior to intrinsic ones. Then, we can say that as the husband's "economic and prestige-conferring" resources (ERI) increase, his self esteem and rating of his interpersonal contributions to the marriage (IRI) also increase.

Among the wives, this connection is not nearly so strong. There is only a slight positive relationship between her extrinsic resources and her intrinsic resources, indicating that the wives' sense of self and perception of what they bring to marriage are not very closely tied to their performance in the economic sphere.

When the husband's extrinsic resources are correlated with the wife's intrinsic resources there is only a small relationship. This is contrary to the implications

Table 4.7. Intercorrelation Matrix for Intrinsic and Extrinsic Personal Resources of Husbands and Wives

Type of Resource	Husband		Wife	
	Extrinsic	Intrinsic	Extrinsic	Intrinsic
<u>Husband</u>				
Extrinsic	-			
Intrinsic	.34	-		
<u>Wife</u>				
Extrinsic	.05	-.16	-	
Intrinsic	.15	-.10	.13	-

of Scanzoni's work, which suggests that the husband's extrinsic resources should increase the rewards experienced by the wife in marriage, and she in exchange will make a greater intrinsic contribution to the marriage (as well as have a higher sense of self esteem). In fact, Scanzoni's model (1970) actually implies that the husband's extrinsic resources are of greater importance in this regard than those of the wife.

Finally, there is the intriguing finding that the wife's extrinsic resources are negatively related to the husband's intrinsic resources. As the wife's economic input increases, the husband's sense of self and of input interpersonally to the marriage is lowered. The dynamic for this may be that wives of men who do not give much interpersonally to the marriage seek satisfaction outside of the marriage, through work. Or, it may be that husbands of wives who are extrinsically successful experience a loss of self respect as a result of their wives' success. Such a negative self definition might be induced by the wife's definition, or it might be self-inflicted.¹⁰

¹⁰These relationships were also re-examined separately for working class and middle class couples. There were only slight differences, except that for the working class wives (N = only 10) extrinsic and intrinsic resources were a little more highly correlated, and the husband's intrinsic resources showed some positive relationship to both types of resources for the wives.

REPORTS FROM THE FRONT: ATTRIBUTED POWER AND POWER DISTRIBUTION NORMS

This section introduces the two self-report measures of the power distribution--power distribution norms and attributed power. Attributed power was defined in Chapter III as "the attribution to an individual of the ability to alter group outcomes -- more specifically, reports as to the distribution of power in a group." In other words, attributed power consists of the reports made by individuals on their perceptions of the distribution of power. These reports may be self-reports by members of the group (i.e., the husband and wife, in this study), or observations by third parties (such as children). Such reports on the power distribution, which we are calling attributed power, are what is most frequently referred to simply as power.

Power distribution norms were defined in Chapter III as "expectations/beliefs about the way power should be distributed in a group. In a dyad, the right of A to alter B's behavior. Authority." This concept is parallel to attributed power, but on a normative plane. Attributed power refers to perceptions of the way power really is distributed, while power distribution norms refer to beliefs about how power should be distributed. Another way to think of this is that one is prescriptive or normative, and the other is descriptive.

Like attributed power, power distribution norms are reports made by individuals. However, the latter

appear much less likely to be measured through the reports of third parties.

Measuring the Power Distribution Variables

For both attributed power and power distribution norms, indexes were based on the eight-item standard version of the Blood and Wolfe Decision Power Index. In the attributed power (AP) mode, respondents indicated who usually has the final say in a series of family-related decisions. In the power distribution norm (PDN) version, respondents indicated who they think should have the final say on the same set of decisions.

The Decision Power Index (DPI) has been heavily used and heavily criticized as a representative of self-report measures of decision making. It has been much more often used as a descriptive measure (AP), and the objections are to its use for this purpose. A major criticism is that such measures are highly subject to social desirability responses--i.e., are confounded with authority (Safilios-Rothschild, 1970). This objection would seem most telling when the measure is taken as intended to assess the "real" power structure, rather than perceptions/attributions about the distribution of power. Further, in the context of this particular research, participants responded to the AP and PDN versions "back-to-back," and perhaps the explicit

normative wording of the PDN items provided a contrast for them with the more descriptive (AP) items.¹¹

The second kind of criticism of the DPI relates to the content of the items themselves. One variation on this is to argue that the items themselves are not a representative sample of the kinds of decisions made in families, and thus a biased view of the power distribution is obtained. In particular, a disproportionate number of household-related decisions which are likely to be made by wives are included, and this gives a very unfortunate over-estimation of the number of equalitarian and wife-dominated couples.

I believe that this objection may well be warranted. For descriptive purposes, the DPI items probably underestimate the husband's power in marriage particularly in terms of the extent to which husbands make broad decisions which affect the very conditions of the wife's existence. This kind of decision-making is not likely to be reciprocal on the part of the wife in determining the husband's life course (see for example Johnson, 1975). This descriptive inaccuracy is important especially from a feminist perspective on male-female equality. However, when we turn to

¹¹It could be, on the other hand, that the back-to-back placement elicits a desire to show consistency between normative and descriptive items. This can ultimately be determined through further methodological research. However, the fact that the AP-PDN correlations reported later are only moderate argues against the view that responses were subject to a consistency need.

the job of explaining variations in the relative distribution of power, descriptive accuracy is less important.

A final criticism of the DPI items is that the decision areas included are not necessarily equally important to different respondents, and weighing items by importance, or using only items which are previously identified by participants as important, is necessary (Heer, 1963; Safilios-Rothschild, 1970). However, at least one research directly on this issue suggests that there are no significant advantages of a weighted version of the DPI, although further research on the issue was recommended (Price-Bonham, 1976).

On the other side of the ledger, there are several advantages of using the DPI as the basis for the reports on the distribution of power in this research. Most important, it has been extensively used, and this provides continuity with a large proportion of the existing literature. Second, there is considerable evidence of the construct validity of the index (Allen and Straus, 1979). Finally, the test-retest reliability--something like the durability of response--is quite high (Price-Bonham, 1976:631).

Index Construction

For each of the two indexes referring to the distribution of power--AP and PDN--the component items were first standardized in PZ form. Then the sum of the PZ'd items was computed and itself transformed into PZ form. Thus,

each index ranges from 0 to 100, has a mean of 50, and a standard deviation of 20.

Husband-Wife Consistency. Table 4.8 gives the correlations between husbands' and wives' reports for PDN and AP, for the sample as a whole, and for middle class and working class subsets.¹² The lack of consistency for all but one relationship is striking. Only for middle class couples reporting on attributed power is there even a moderate, positive relationship.

Prescriptions and Descriptions: Relationships


Figure 4.1 gives the correlation between power distribution norms and attributed power. The upper arrow indicates the relationship between the husband's report of PDN and his report of AP, for the sample as a whole, and the middle and working class sub-samples. The lower arrow gives the relationship between the wife's report of PDN and her report of AP.

There are strong, positive correlations for all but the working class wives. Thus, for the sample as a whole, the stronger the prescription for a distribution of power

¹²To obtain the middle and working class sub-samples used throughout the research, the total sample was dichotomized based on the husband's occupational rating. Those with unskilled through skilled blue collar occupations were classified as working class. Those with clerical/sales through professional occupations as middle class (see Allen and Straus, 1979). Two cautions: one, the husband's occupation alone was used so as to ensure inclusion of as many cases as possible, although admittedly this represents a sexual bias (Steinmetz and Straus, 1973). Two, this division of the sample results in only ten cases in the working class category.

Table 4.8. Correlations between Husbands' and Wives' Reports of Power Distribution Norms and Attributed Power

Sample	Husband-Wife Correlation	
	PDN	AP
Middle Class	.01	.26
Working Class	-.06	-.05
Total	-.00	.09



*The husband's correlations are between his norms and his report of attributed power. The wife's correlations are between her norms and her reports of attributed power. In subsequent similar figures, the same holds--each partner's score on one variable is related to his/her own score on the dependent variable.

Figure 4.1. Correlations between Power Distribution Norms and Attributed Power, for Wives and Husbands

favoring the husband, the greater the amount of power actually attributed to the husband. This is an especially strong relationship for working class husbands. However, the one reversal in the findings is for their wives. Working class wives show a small, negative correlation between PDN and AP, such that the greater their belief in the husband's authority, the less they actually attribute power to him.

RESOURCES AND THE POWER DISTRIBUTION

The resource theory of conjugal power relations predicts that the greater the relative resources possessed by a partner, the greater that person's "say" in the relationship. In this section, self-reports of the distribution of power, both normative and actual, will be linked to personal resources. The model presented in Chapter I suggests that personal resources have both a direct effect on attributed power and power distribution norms, and an indirect effect on attributed power, by way of power distribution norms.

Figure 4.2 gives the correlations between absolute relative extrinsic resources and power distribution norms, for the sample as a whole and for the middle and working class subsamples. The absolute level of extrinsic resources does not seem to affect norms about power, except slightly in the working class group. Even here, the relationship is the reverse of that expected for the wives: the higher their resources the greater their adherence to male-dominant norms.




Figure 4.2. Correlations between Extrinsic Resources and Power Distribution Norms

When the relative resources are considered, the findings are much stronger and are consistent with resource theory. For the men especially, the greater their extrinsic resources relative to those of their wives, the more they adhere to male-dominant norms. There seems to be little class difference in this. For the middle class women, relative extrinsic resources seem unimportant. However, again we find an unexpected reversal for the working class women: the higher their husbands' relative resources, the less these women give the men authority in the relationship.

In sum, relative extrinsic resources make more of a difference in power distribution norms than do absolute levels of these resources. Further, the relative extrinsic resources are mostly related to power distribution norms for men. The reversal of expected findings for working class women holds both in terms of the absolute level of their own resources, and in terms of relative resources.

It is hard to put much confidence in this finding given the sample size and its inconsistency with previous research (Brown, 1977). Still, one explanation could be that working class wives who are doing relatively well are violating their husbands' (and others') expectations, and so they hold especially strongly to a male dominant ideology in an effort to soften the impact of this violation. This could especially be the case in the early stages of

the wife's success before she is firmly established. Support for this notion is available in a macro-level analysis of wife employment and education and decision-making prescriptions, in which it was found that there is a fourteen-year lag between an increase in these two independent variables, and an effect of increasing shared decision-making prescriptions (Brown, 1977).

The intrinsic resources are much more important for the women than for the men (see Figure 4.3). The absolute index of intrinsic resources is not related to the husbands normative definitions about power, but there is a small negative relationship for the wives. This finding is stronger for the middle class women, but is reversed for working class wives.

Based on the relative intrinsic resources index, there is again no relationship for the men, except for a small one in the working class. For middle class wives, the greater the husband's relative intrinsic resources the higher the male dominant ideology. However, in the working class, the higher the relative intrinsic resources of the husbands, the less their wives subscribe to a male-oriented distribution of power. Thus, not only are the findings the opposite of those expected, but they are in conflict with the ideas of the working class men.




Figure 4.3. Correlations between Intrinsic Resources and Power Distribution Norms

Attributed Power and Resources

Figure 4.4 gives the correlations between extrinsic resources and attributed power. There is a moderate correlation, regardless of class, between the absolute level of the husband's resources and his attribution of greater power to himself. For the middle class wives, there is a small, unexpected association between their own resources and husband-favorable attributions, while the working class women attribute less power to their husbands as their own resources increase.

Interestingly, the relative index of extrinsic resources is not related to husband's attributed power. Thus, it seems to be the actual level of extrinsic resources in itself which affects attributed power for the men. Among working class wives, the greater their husbands' relative resources, the more they attribute power to the husbands, and this is consistent with the "absolute" findings. However, for middle class women, the higher the husbands resources relative to their own, the less they attribute power to the husband. This is also consistent with the absolute findings, but not with resource theory.

Figure 4.5 gives the correlations between intrinsic resources and attributed power. For the men, there is a surprisingly strong relationship in the working class only between the absolute IRI and AP. For the relative version of the index, however, the more interpersonal resources




Figure 4.4. Correlations between Extrinsic Resources and Attributed Power

working class men have relative to their wives, the less they attribute power to themselves.

For middle class women, the higher their IRI, the lower the attributed power score for the husband. This is reversed for working class women. Finally, the relative interpersonal skills of the spouses is not linked to wives' power attributions.

Overall, it seems that for the men extrinsic resources are more strongly associated with attributed power than with power distribution norms. This suggests that the ideology of male dominance is somewhat more resistant to changes in resource levels than is the (reported) actual distribution of power. Also, intrinsic resources tend to make less difference than extrinsic ones among the men. The relative indexes are a consistently more important variable than the absolute ones only in the relationship between extrinsic resources and power distribution norms.

The picture is more murky for the women, since there are more reversals in expected findings. Generally, the ERI is most strongly related to PDN in the working class, but in the "wrong" direction. Across classes, intrinsic resources seem more consistent in their importance.

THE END RESULTS: OUTCOMES

The variables and relationships discussed so far are all based on self-reports. These yield important information about power in marriage. Still, at some point




Figure 4.5. Correlations between Intrinsic Resources and Attributed Power

I am moved to say: "Now I want to know what happens when it comes right down to facing real disagreements and conflicts." Family researchers have expended a fair amount of energy on this issue, mostly in the form of the question, "Who won?"

Unilateral and Bilateral Outcomes

The Inventory of Marital Conflict (IMC) task asks participants to make a pair of judgments about each vignette. For this research, three outcomes measures were derived from these pairs of judgments. If both choices favor the husband's point of view, the husband is given a unilateral "win." If both decisions favor the wife, the wife is given a unilateral win. If one judgment favors one partner and the other choice favors the other, this is counted as a compromise or bilateral solution.

To give an example from an actual vignette (see Figure 4.6), one case involves a conflict over the car breaking down on a weekend trip, after the husband--on short notice--asks the wife to have the spark plugs checked. The crucial issues are whether she followed through on asking for the necessary repairs, or whether the garage did a poor job, and whether the husband's angry reaction was justified. The participants must (1) choose which spouse is primarily responsible for the conflict, and (2) decide whether "Linda should thoroughly carry out her responsibilities once she has accepted them" or "Steve is being

unreasonable in blaming his wife for the work not getting done." A husband-unilateral outcome would result if the couple decides that the wife is to blame and Linda should carry out her responsibilities. The other two choices in combination would be scored as a wife-unilateral outcome. However, if the couple either (1) blames the wife but thinks the husband should be more understanding, or (2) blames the husband but thinks the wife should be more responsible, then this is scored as a bilateral outcome.

To obtain the three measures, the number of each type of outcome is simply summed. There are twelve conflict-inducing cases, so the combined total of the three outcomes is 12. Each particular measure has a theoretical range of 0 to 12, although the upper extreme is unlikely to occur. For example, for a wife-unilateral score to be 12, there must be no husband-unilateral nor bilateral outcomes for the couple.

Marital Relations as a "Zero-Sum Game." The most startling findings for the outcomes measures are also the simplest. Table 4.9 gives basic descriptive information on the three variables. Most striking is the low number of bilateral outcomes--an average of 1.9 per couple. Twenty-seven percent of the couples come up with no compromise solutions at all, and only about one-fifth devised at least four bilateral decisions.

The low number of compromise outcomes produced by these couples is relevant to Sprey's (1972, 1975) claim

Husband's Version

"Linda and Steve plan to take a weekend trip by car. While Linda is driving Steve to work on Friday morning, Steve hears a "pinging" noise and realizes that the spark plugs should be changed along with other minor adjustments. Since they plan to leave Friday evening and Steve has to work, he has to ask his wife to take the car to the garage. Linda complains about the other preparations she says she has to make for them and their two children but says she will have time to take the car to the garage, and agrees to do so. Later on the trip, Steve hears the "pinging" noise and realizes the spark plugs have not been changed. It turns out that Linda took the car to the garage but did not bother to mention the spark plugs. Linda says that if Steve doesn't like the way she does things he can do them himself. Steve points out that he was unable to take the car to the garage and that when she agrees to do something she should do it."

- a. Who is primarily responsible for the problem? (husband, wife)
- b. Should Linda thoroughly carry out her responsibilities once she has accepted them? (yes, no)

Wife's Version

"Linda and Steve plan to take a weekend trip by car. While Linda is driving Steve to work on Friday morning, Steve decides that the spark plugs need changing and that other minor adjustments should be made. He tells his wife to get the work done in time for them to leave that evening. Linda also has all the other preparations to manage for them and their two children but she manages to get the car to the garage and asks for a tuneup. On the trip, Steve hears a "pinging" noise, discovers that the spark plugs are the same ones he had been using, and blames his wife for the spark plugs not being changed. Linda feels that if he is going to be so picky about how things are going to be done, he should assume some responsibility for doing them himself. Steve tells her he was too busy."

- a. Who is primarily responsible for the problem? (husband, wife)
- b. Is Steve being unreasonable in blaming his wife for the work not getting done? (yes, no)

Joint Form

- a. Who is primarily responsible for the problem? (husband, wife)
 - b. Should Linda thoroughly carry out her responsibilities,
or
Is Steve being unreasonable in blaming his wife?
-

Figure 4.6. Sample Vignette, Inventory of Marital Conflicts (IMC)

Table 4.9. Descriptive Statistics for Three Outcomes Measures

Statistic	Outcome Measure		
	H-Unilateral	W-Unilateral	Bilateral
Mean	4.22	5.5	1.92
SD	1.807	1.959	1.793
Median	4.42	5.62	1.45
Mode	5.0	4.0	0
Range (N)	0(2) - 8(2)	0(1) - 10(2)	0(21) - 7(1)

that families are not analogous to zero-sum games. If Sprey is correct, then research based on simple "win scores" is seriously flawed, since such scores assume an "I win-you lose" situation.

Sprey's position, unfortunately, amounts to substituting one assumption for another, rather than treating the issue as an "empirical question." In other words, in place of the assumption that families are like zero-sum games, Sprey makes the counter assumption that they are not--i.e., that they are like mixed-motive games in which both (all) group members can at least partially win or lose at the same time.

Sprey's assumption may be based on the fact that in families there is no structural reason for "I win-you lose" behavior, as there is in a formal zero-sum game. Yet, as I argued in Chapter III, group members may treat a situation as if it were structurally zero-sum, even though it is not. My interpretation of the low number of bilateral solutions by the couples is that this is exactly what happened in this research.

Before concluding that the research couples were treating the task as a zero-sum game "voluntarily," we need to rule out the possibility that the task induced such behavior, at a rate higher than what we would expect in "real life." I think this can be done.

There are three aspects of the task which might induce unilateral solutions (treating the task as a zero-sum

game). One, each partner comes to the joint discussion with a unilateral position and since this is already set it may be resistant to change. There is variation, however, in how firm these positions are, as there would be in everyday life. The link with everyday life is further underscored when we remember that at home the partners often must resolve matters on which they have initial disagreements (or prior unilateral positions). In other words, conflicts of interest and disagreements on which group members must come together from initially divergent positions are a normal part of family life (Foss, 1979; Sprey, 1975), which are well modeled by this aspect of the task.

The second element of the task which might induce I win-you lose behavior is the instructions themselves. However, there seems to be nothing here that suggests to the couples that they should make unilaterally-consistent pairs of judgments.

The third possibility is that the couples are not operating on a zero-sum basis, but are just trying to be logically consistent, or rational, in their choices for each vignette. For example, to say that Linda is to blame for the conflict concerning the car breakdown, and then to say that Steve should still have been more understanding--just doesn't "make sense."

Or does it? In fact, many of the couples were able to make just such choices, and to do so in a way which

seemed entirely logical to them. One approach is to decide that it was Linda's responsibility to have the car checked properly, and she did give incomplete information to the mechanic, so she really is responsible for the problem--at least in the sense of providing the initial conflict issue. However, Steve's resulting rage is far out of proportion to the offense, and therefore he should change his ways.

Another entirely rational bilateral approach occurred among couples who became aware that they simply had different perspectives or information on a vignette. Given no basis for choosing one person's information over the other's, they might rather arbitrarily choose to "blame Linda, but make Steven more understanding," or vice versa. This makes eminent good sense in the context of the task. Thus, there is nothing inherently irrational about making bilateral choices in the IMC task.

Having ruled out these three elements as possible artificial incentives for zero-sum behavior, it seems safe to conclude that the marital partners in this research, generally speaking, are trying to win outright, rather than to arrive at mutually satisfactory solutions in which each must give up something but also gains something. Further evidence on the analogy between families and zero-sum games is found in the power modes findings in later chapters.

Unilateral "Wins." Table 4.9 also gives the basic descriptive statistics for husband-unilateral and wife-

unilateral outcomes. On the average, the number of wife-unilateral solutions is higher than the number of husband-unilateral outcomes. As with the attributed power index, we are not justified in concluding from this that the couples are wife-dominant or equalitarian. This is because it is hard to judge whether the items themselves (the vignettes) are exactly "fair." What is most important is determining what factors account for variation in the three outcomes measures.

Outcomes and the Distribution of Power

The model presented in Chapter I suggests that several important factors in explaining variations in outcomes should be attributed power, power distribution norms, and personal resources. We start by looking at the two power distribution variables. Table 4.10 gives the product-moment correlations for these relationships.

The husband's view of the normative distribution has only a small positive relationship to husband-unilateral outcomes and a corresponding small negative correlation with wife-unilateral outcomes. There is no relationship between bilateral outcomes and either the husband's or the wife's prescriptions. Also, as expected, the more the wife believes decisions should be made by the husband, the fewer wife-unilateral outcomes.

Husband's attributed power is more strongly related to husband-unilateral decisions (as well as negatively to

Table 4.10. Correlations between Power Distribution Variables and Outcomes, for Husbands and Wives

Outcomes	<u>Power Distribution Norms</u>	
	Husband	Wife
Husband-Unilateral	.14	.06
Wife-Unilateral	-.09	-.20
Bilateral	-.03	.03
	<u>Attributed Power</u>	
	Husband's Report	Wife's Report
Husband-Unilateral	.22	.10
Wife-Unilateral	-.19	-.08
Bilateral	.00	.16

wife-unilateral ones) while for the wives attributed power is a weaker factor than prescriptive power. Again, bilateral outcomes do not relate to husband's attributed power. However, for the wives, the more husband-oriented their attributions, the higher the number of bilateral solutions.

Outcomes and Personal Resources

Table 4.11 gives the product-moment correlations for personal resources and outcomes. What is most interesting here is the relatively greater importance of the intrinsic rather than the extrinsic resources. None of the correlations between extrinsic resources and outcomes are large enough to be given much weight.¹³

The greater the husband's intrinsic resources, the lower the number of wife-unilateral outcomes. The corresponding increase in the other outcomes is for bilateral more than husband-unilateral choices. Among the wives there is the unexpected finding that the higher their intrinsic resources, the lower the number of wife-unilateral outcomes, and--correspondingly--the higher the number of husband-unilateral ones. Finally, as the husband's intrinsic resources relative to the wife's increase, there is a very small drop in the husband-unilateral outcomes.

¹³When each of the five extrinsic resources were examined separately, the results were no different, except that husband's income was related negatively to the number of husband-unilateral outcomes and positively to the number of bilateral outcomes. Also, the work status of the wife showed a small negative relationship with bilateral outcomes, but her occupational level a small negative relationship to wife-unilateral outcomes.

Table 4.11. Correlations between Personal Resources and Outcomes, for Husbands and Wives

Outcomes	Resources		
	Husband	Wife	Relative
<u>A. Extrinsic Resources</u>			
Husband-unilateral	-.09	.02	-.12
Wife-unilateral	-.06	.00	-.06
Bilateral	.03	-.03	.12
<u>B. Intrinsic Resources</u>			
Husband-unilateral	.05	.25	-.13
Wife-unilateral	-.25	-.25	.02
Bilateral	.11	-.04	.08

Overall, it appears that as the husband contributes more interpersonally to the relationship, the likelihood of compromise solutions--and perhaps of a more negotiation-oriented, give-and-take process--increases. However, wives with high levels of interpersonal resources do not "win" more or compromise more, but actually "lose" more often. Perhaps these are women who see their proper contribution to the relationship as interpersonal, and who define this rather traditionally as at least partly an ability to be cooperative and supportive to men in decision-making processes. This would be something like the wife as complement model of marriage described by Scanzoni (1972:37-39), or even the model of women in the family prescribed by popular books such as The Total Woman (Morgan, 1973).

CONCLUSION

All of the concepts analyzed in this chapter can actually be viewed as "distributional" variables. Each reflects how a power-related attribute is distributed in a group. Figure 4.7 illustrates several notions about how these distributional elements relate to one another through an hypothetical power event. First, each variable can be seen as a single "slice-of-life," or one frame in an on-going moving picture. Second, each overlaps with the others, but also partially does not overlap. Thus, the picture of the power distribution given in each frame is somewhat different, but also somewhat the same. Third, and related to the last

point, while each frame can be partially explained by the previous one(s), it is reasonable to expect each to be partially explained by additional, disparate elements. The additional explanatory factors which are important are not always the same for each group member. In the present case, what each marital partner brings to the moving picture may differentially affect the images.

The earliest frame in the process, personal resources, was divided into extrinsic and intrinsic attributes of the marital partners. The extrinsic resources seem to have a greater impact on later variables for the men than for the women, while the intrinsic assets are especially important for the women.

Of the two explicitly distributional variables, power distribution norms--the ideological component--seems less subject to changes in personal resources than attributed power--the descriptive component. In other words, the normative frame seems relatively more independent of personal resources, and thus gives a picture of the power distribution which is less congruent with the one given by resources. Concomitantly, the attributed power distribution overlaps somewhat more with the distribution of resources.

One special finding with the "achieved power" variables is that the couples in this research do seem to be treating the task as a zero-sum game, contrary to the analogy of the family with a mixed motive game (Sprey, 1972).




Figure 4.7. Changes in the Distribution of Power through a Power "Event"

As a result, there are few bilateral or compromise outcomes for the couples. For the most part one person or the other unilaterally wins. The question of the distribution of those wins is a matter of achieved power, or power outcomes. Here, the intrinsic resources of the partners are a more powerful explanatory factor than extrinsic ones. Further, attributed power seems to affect outcomes more for men, while power distribution norms affect them more for women.

Still, there is a big gap in the moving picture between the resources and normative and descriptive perceptions of the power distribution, and outcomes in a conflict situation. A large part of that gap is the interaction process through which married partners produce group outcomes.

CHAPTER V

THE CONCEPT OF POWER MODES

This Chapter and the next, are devoted to the central concept in the research: power modes or types of power assertion used by marital partners. The format of the presentation is similar to that used in Chapter III in examining other important dimensions of power. In this Chapter, power modes are first defined. Then, relationships with other dimensions of power, existing measures relevant to the concept, and considerations important to the development of a system of coding power modes in marital interaction, are examined. Chapter VI presents the Marital Power Assertion Coding System (MPACS) developed specifically for this research, and includes basic descriptive analysis of the system, and analysis of inter-code relations.

DEFINING POWER MODES

Power modes is defined as "the specific type of act carried out as a power assertion" (Straus, 1976:1). A synonym for power modes which is used frequently is "types of power assertion." Straus has defined power assertions as "attempts which A makes to control the behavior of the other. Synonyms are 'influence attempts' and 'control

attempts'" (1976:1). Within the framework of the present terminology, power assertions are "attempts to alter group outcomes (or the other's behavior, in a dyad)."

The term "power modes" itself is essentially new to the study of husband-wife power relations, although there is some precedent for the concept. Sprey has repeatedly called for the study of process, strategy, bargaining, and more specifically "powering" in the field of family power (1972: 236). Burr had suggested that it is "important to distinguish between the distribution of power and the different methods that are used in controlling. For example, attempts to control can be made verbally or nonverbally, overtly or covertly, and with physical threats or without them" (1973:189). Another source for this concept and a direct influence on the research [proposed] here, is the distinction made by Foss and Straus (1975) between measures of the distribution of power and measures of "powering techniques."

Relationship to Other Variables

Power modes are the central focus of the research, and a major concern and contribution is the development of a system of coding marital interaction in the laboratory in terms of power modes. However, relationships between power modes, the other power variables, and personal resources, will also be explored. Figure 1 in Chapter I, roughly indicates the relationships to be examined. Since

the research is exploratory and designed to generate hypotheses, it is inappropriate to present specific prepositions to be tested. Even if this were desirable, it would prove very difficult. First, while some leads as to expected relationships can be found in the literature, they are not systematic and do not suggest consistent sets of expectations. For example, Safilios-Rothschild suggests that the spouse with the greater personal resources and/or greater attributed power will not need to use direct, overt power modes (1970:80). However, in a laboratory setting which confronts spouses with new issues not previously settled, that may not be the case. Further, even in a non-laboratory setting, the spouse with greater resources or attributed power has little to lose by using overt power modes, and therefore may not be less likely to use them.

An additional difficulty in unearthing specific propositions at the outset of the study is that the few systematic discussions of marital power modes in relation to other variables tend to include a different or broader range of power modes than are available in the present study. For example, the degree of husband-wife violence (which may be conceptualized as an extreme type of power assertion) as measured through the Conflict Tactics Scales, is negatively related to the resources possessed by the spouse, and this relationship is further specified when power distribution norms, attributed power, and social class are considered

(Allen and Straus, 1979). While such findings provide leads for the present study, and will be considered in interpreting findings, they do not provide clear guides for advancing specific hypotheses concerning the "finer" power modes observable in a laboratory setting.

DEVELOPING A MEASURE OF POWER MODES

While there have been a number of systems developed for coding marital interaction, none has been specifically designed to focus on types of power assertions made by intimates. One possibility for the present study would have been to use an existing system and concentrate analysis on categories which seem relevant to power modes. One such system is that designed by Olson and Ryder for use with the Inventory of Marital Conflicts (IMC) task used in the present research. The authors note that this is a "purely descriptive, non-theoretically based coding system," and suggest that "an investigator always has the option of selecting codes from the IFC system which seem most appropriate for use in a given research project" (1973:1). However, two characteristics of this particular coding system make it inappropriate for our purpose. First, a large number of the categories are designed to distinguish between interaction over the IMC task itself and other, more personalized interaction--a distinction which is not of particular interest here. Second, the system appears to be procedural and format-oriented, rather than content-oriented. This characteristic

means that it would be very difficult to extract categories which clearly reflect types of power assertions. Thus, compared to existing coding systems, it seemed preferable to develop a new coding system which would explicitly reflect our interest in power modes.

A rare typology of power modes, based on responses to an open-ended question in a survey research, which might have been adapted for use in coding laboratory interaction, was developed by Safilios-Rothschild (1969). However, adaptation of this typology did not seem advantageous for two reasons. First, like Straus' Conflict Tactics Scales mentioned above, this typology covers a broader range of techniques than is likely to occur in a laboratory setting. Second, like the Olson and Ryder IMC coding system, the Safilios-Rothschild typology does not seem to have the kind of theoretical base necessary for our purposes. For example, a major division of the typology is between verbal and non-verbal techniques, a distinction which is clearly not relevant in the present context. Thus, this typology, like the IMC coding system, was bypassed in favor of developing a new system tailormade for coding marital power assertions in the laboratory.

Identifying the Range of Behavior to Be Considered

The first step in developing a system for coding marital interaction in terms of power modes is to specify the range of behavior to be included. At one extreme,

anything that anyone does can be viewed as a power assertion. Hawley has argued that "every social act is a power equation, and every social system is an organization of power" (1963: 423). In the sense that every social act may be positively or negatively reinforcing of another's behavior, or as Turk (1975:85) puts it, "all the actions of every individual in the choice situation have some impact on the outcome," then indeed any behavior could be seen as a power assertion.

While this is intuitively reasonable, it does not seem to be viable for research purposes. In this view, power assertions are apparently equivalent to causal influences. Thus, any behavior which has a causal influence on the other is a power assertion.¹ In a very strict sense, we would have to find out whether a behavior did in fact have a causal influence (or was "effective" or "successful") before we could classify it as a power assertion. And, we should probably have to do this for each couple individually, for what is reinforcing within the context of one relationship may not be in another. Not only would such a task approach the dimensions of a "life's work," but it also shifts attention away from attempts to alter or maintain the other's behavior, which may or may not be effective, to successful power assertions ("achieved power") which is an entirely different dimension.

¹If so, why not also include non-human causal influences as power assertions?

In a sense, the definition of power assertions as attempts to alter group outcomes necessarily implies some assessment or attribution of intent. We are interested in whether the actor is trying to alter the other's behavior. If a husband were on his way out the door and he brushed against the on-off button on the TV set and turned it off, we would probably count this as an accident. But if the husband were arguing with his wife over what program to watch and finally just changed the channel to his program, we would attribute intentionality to his action and count it as a power assertion. Similarly, when an actor is offering persuasive arguments for his/her position (or against the other's position), we assume that the actor is making a power assertion, or is attempting to change or influence the behavior of the other. There is no doubt that it is very difficult at times to assess intent. Certainly this involves making attributions which may sometimes be mistaken. Since there is no external, unambiguous criterion available for assessing intent, the final test of the success of the coding system is interrater reliability.

Ultimately the appropriate range of behavior for a power modes coding system, can only be more precisely defined when the more specific types of power assertion are delineated. Few existing measures of husband-wife power in any way classify modes of powering used by spouses (Foss and Straus, 1975). However, many observation systems which have

been used to study the distribution of marital power use the occurrence of power assertions as an indirect way of measuring the distribution of power (i.e., the actual control of the other's behavior). Two basic approaches have been taken--one is "content-free" and the other is "content-based."

Content-Free Approaches. Content-free approaches disregard the content of the behavior, and focus on its existence or form. For example, Strodbeck (1951, 1954) and Farina (1960) have used as measures of power who talks the most, and who most often initiates discussion. Leighton et al. (1971) have used the number of interruptions and the number of simultaneous speeches. Farina (1960) also used the number of interruptions. Mishler and Waxler (1968) use two types of behavior: "attention control strategies" (who speaks to whom, statement length, etc.) and "person control strategies" (interruptions and questions). Cromwell and Olson (1975) have criticized many of these measures as being essentially a-theoretical and conceptually unsophisticated. Further problems in terms of the present project are the very limited range of behavior which they include and the fact that they do not suggest any typology of power modes.

Content-Based Approaches. Several approaches are content-based in that the determination of whether an act represents power is based on its content. Two fairly narrow approaches are Caputo's (1963) measure using the number of instrumental (task-oriented) acts which are directive, and

the Riskin and Faunce (1970) measure of the number of "behave yourself requests" and "requests for commitment." Both of these have the disadvantage of including only the most directive and obvious strategies, and excluding more subtle tactics like attempts at persuasion. Kenkel's (1963) somewhat broader measure is the total number of instrumental (rather than expressive) acts, based on Bales' Interaction Process Analysis coding system (1950). In this system, instrumental acts include giving and requesting suggestions or directions, opinions, and information. While this measure has the advantage of offering a neat typology, it appears to lack content validity in that it includes behaviors which seem at best remotely related to power assertions (as in asking for information) and excludes actions which seem clearly relevant (such as rejection, antagonism, and defending or asserting self, which are classified as expressive behaviors). Counting all instrumental acts as power-relevant and all expressive acts as non-power-related is inappropriate.

One additional approach classifies power acts as "any direction, instruction, suggestion, or request intended to control or modify the behavior of another member of the family" (Straus and Tallman, 1971:392). Cromwell et al. (1975) adopt the same criterion, and specify that any behavior which is not coded as a power act is coded "sociable act" and these include "nondirective, non-goal-oriented, supportive, and climate setting types of statements (1975:156).

Using this criterion, Cromwell et al. (1975) found that in a discussion task 15 percent of a family's total activity was power activity, and in a more physical, game task (SIMFAM), 31 percent was power activity. While this measure of power acts is broader than many others, both the behaviors which are not included as power acts, and the relatively low percentage of activity classified as power assertions, suggest that this measure also focuses on the most obvious power assertions and excludes more subtle ones. On the other hand, this measure is most consistent with the conception of power assertions as attempts to modify group outcomes.

While the approaches discussed thus far offer some criteria for classifying acts as power assertions, they do not suggest typologies of power assertions or distinctions among power modes. Perhaps some of the best leads for developing a power modes typology come from the parent-child literature. As Foss and Straus (1975) point out, in parent-child measures of power the emphasis is not on the distribution of power, but on power modes--specifically, the types of power assertions which parents make in attempting to "get their children to do something."

HOFFMAN'S QUALIFIED AND UNQUALIFIED POWER ASSERTIONS

In looking at parental power modes, Hoffman (1963) makes an important distinction between qualified and unqualified power assertion techniques. Unqualified power

assertions include direct commands, threats, and deprivations as well as physical force, and no explanations or justifications are offered by the parent. Qualified power assertions are influence techniques which are qualified by explanation and various types of persuasive appeals. This distinction is an important one in the coding system for husband-wife power assertions developed for this research.

In a later analysis, Hoffman (1970) offers a somewhat different model. Here he classifies parental influence techniques into power assertive and non-power assertive techniques. Power assertive techniques include "physical punishment, deprivation of material objects or privileges, the direct application of force, or the threat of any of these . . . The parent seeks to control the child by capitalizing on his physical power or control over material resources" (1970:285). This category appears to be equivalent to unqualified power assertions in the first model. Non-power assertive techniques are divided into "love-withdrawal" and "induction." Love-withdrawal means that "the parent simply gives direct but non-physical expression to his anger or disapproval of the child . . . Examples are ignoring the child, turning one's back to him, refusing to speak or listen to him, explicitly stating a dislike for the child, and isolating or threatening to leave him" (1970:285). Induction techniques are those in which the parent "gives explanations or reasons for requiring the

child to change his behavior" (1970:286). Thus, induction in this model is equivalent to "qualified power assertion" in the first. While Hoffman seems to ultimately view persuasive appeals as non-power assertive techniques, we prefer the view that they represent qualified power assertions. Power assertions were defined above as any attempt to alter group outcomes, and persuasive appeals, or induction techniques, clearly fit this definition, even though they are aimed at obtaining the change "voluntarily."

The distinction between qualified and unqualified power assertions is used as a broad framework for the power modes coding system developed for this research. The next Chapter provides a detailed presentation of the coding system itself, as well as the basic findings from initial use of the coding system in the present project.

CHAPTER VI

THE MARITAL POWER ASSERTION CODING SYSTEM (MPACS)

In this chapter, the power modes coding system and basic descriptive findings derived from it are presented. First, there is a summary of the final system with the discussion focusing on the broad categories within which the specific codes fit. Then, the process of developing the system and the fairly technical aspects of the system itself and the coding procedures are described. Finally, descriptive findings are given, including code frequencies, inter-code correlations, and relationships between the power assertions of wives and husbands.

OVERVIEW OF THE CODING SYSTEM

Two of the three major divisions of the coding system--unqualified and qualified power assertions--are based on Hoffman's (1963) analysis, as described in the last chapter. The third division--bilateral power assertions--is based on an assumption that an important part of power processes in marriages, as in other groups, is not only unilateral, win-oriented behavior, but also bargaining, negotiation, and trading of positions. Figure 6.1 lists the specific MPACS codes in the context of the major

divisions of the system. The full MPACS package is presented in Appendix B.

Unqualified Power Assertions

In the last chapter, power modes were defined as "the specific type of act carried out as a power assertion," or "attempts to alter group outcomes." Unqualified power assertions are unilateral attempts to alter group outcomes, in which no effort is made to provide other group members with a rationale for one's position. These assertions may be blunt, directive, and relatively coercive in the sense that no effort is made to obtain compliance "voluntarily." In addition, these communications are relatively unadorned. They tend to be short, choppy phrases like "that was stupid;" "No, he didn't;" "Yes, he did;" "Don't do that."

Included in this broad category are seven specific behaviors. Rejecting/attacking involves direct negative statements which are personally critical. These are usually given in angry or ridiculing tones. I count them as the most extreme of power modes represented in this system, as they are instances of verbal aggression, or verbal expressions which are intended to injure the other (Foss, 1979).

The command code is the only one in the system defined solely in terms of formal grammatical structure. Any statement which is a formal command or directive is included. Do anyway attempts are especially important in paralleling other variables in the research, since they

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- I. Unqualified Power Assertions (UPA)
- 01 Reject/attack other
 - 02 Command
 - 03 "Do anyway" attempt
 - 04 Surrender under protest
 - 05 Reiteration
 - 06 Unqualified disagreement/refusal
 - 07 Unqualified partisan assertion
- II. Qualified Power Assertions (QPA)
- A. Consequence Identification
 - 10 Promise
 - 11 Threat
 - B. Qualified Partisan Assertions
 - 20 Qualified partisan assertions and persuasion attempts
 - C. Definitional Assertions
 - 30 Task/procedure definition
 - 31 Situation definition (vignettes)
 - 32 Personal definition
 - 33 Other's position definition
 - 34 Progress definition
- III. Bilateral Power Assertions (BPA)
- 40 Explicit position trade
 - 41 Other compromise/bilateral solution
 - 42 Role division solution
- Other
- 49 Other power assertion/related behavior (SPECIFY)
 - 50 Self-depreciation/deference
 - 98 Non-power assertions
-
-

Figure 6.1. Summary of Marital Power Assertion Coding System Categories

are unilateral attempts to impose one's position despite opposition. In the IMC context, this is usually a situation where one partner goes ahead and writes in his own response against the objections of the other. It can almost be seen as the prototype of all unqualified power assertions--and not surprisingly is often responded to with verbal aggression.

Surrender under protest is a rather unusual code developed in the process of listening to tapes. This is a one-sided capitulation in which the message is actually not "I give in," but almost the opposite. This is a power assertion in that it is a final attempt to either "guilt-trip" or threaten the other for "browbeating" behavior. In fact, surrender under protest seems to occur when the actor thinks the other is being coercive, and it represents a giving notice or threat of withdrawal or attack if the coerciveness continues. There is usually either hostility or exaggerated indifference in the voice-tone.

The last three codes in this category are parallel to one another. Reiteration is flat repetition of one's position. Unqualified disagreement/refusal includes flat disagreements such as "No, I won't," or "It didn't say that." Unqualified partisan assertions are flat statements of position like "I had the wife on mine." All are unelaborated statements in which the actor is making no attempt to persuade or qualify or obtain voluntary compliance or agreement.

Qualified Power Assertions

Like the unqualified power assertions, qualified power assertions are also unilateral in the sense that the communication is one-sided. The actor is operating with a view toward the other person--not herself--changing. However, here the actor is attempting to provide some inducement or incentive for the other to alter behavior. There are three subtypes of QPA which represent different degrees of subtlety in the inducements for changes offered by the actor. All are still attempts to obtain "voluntary" compliance rather than to coerce the other.

Consequence Identification. The most direct kind of QPA is consequence identification, in which the actor explicitly promises rewards or threatens punishments in exchange (or as inducements) for behavioral/positional change. These are very clear statements of the form "If you do . . . , then I will" Promises are offers of rewards for desired behavior, and threats are statements of the retaliation or punishment which will result from undesired behavior. The reward or punishment may be either material or expressive.

These behaviors are the most explicit out-croppings of underlying relational structures based on exchange. Since the exchange base of intimate relationships is thought to be less readily acknowledged than that of other social relationships, we can expect consequence identifications to be relatively infrequent.

In this research, there were no instances of promises, and only five instances of threats being made in the entire sample. I would expect the frequency of both to be quite a bit lower in a laboratory than in a natural setting, if only because the cues for the full range of exchange items available at home are not available in the laboratory. One is likely to only think of offering or threatening emotional and positional items. I would also expect threats to far outnumber promises in the home setting if only because explicit exchanges may not be considered very legitimate in families, and by the time one is making them one is probably in a state of anger. The area in which promises are most likely to occur is in the division of household duties, and one would expect this to be more common among couples who are questioning traditional family roles.

Qualified Partisan Assertion. The second type of QPA is parallel to one of the UPA codes--unqualified partisan assertion. Qualified partisan assertions are elaborated statements of one's own position, where there is an attempt to persuade or convince the other. They are persuasive arguments based on the use of such things as logic, analogies, hypothetical appeals, and appeals for empathic understanding. The actor is not just stating a position, but also providing a rationale for it. The partner is being offered some "good reason" for compliance.

Definitional Assertion. These are the most subtle QPA's, and perhaps the most difficult to justify as power assertive behaviors. Here the actor is presenting his definition of some aspect of the situation, and thus laying the groundwork for behavior change by the other. If one actor can get the other to accept his view of the "facts of the case," he is closer to obtaining a position change. Further, if the partner does change her position, she has been given an opportunity to rationalize the change as a function of a new understanding of "the facts," rather than "giving in" or losing the argument.

The justification of definitional assertions as power assertions rests on two points. One, what is "information" at all in a given interaction sequence is questionable. The speaker may be elaborating, distorting, attributing motives or meaning, making generalizations, or drawing conclusions. As the IMC task itself models, two persons' perceptions of the "facts" may be quite different. Thus, whose version is adopted for group use is an important determinant of group outcomes.

Second, the control of information has been recognized as an important personal resource--part of the bases of power domain (French and Raven, 1959; Raven, Centers, and Rodrigues, 1977; Smith, 1970). Indeed, the access to "information" which seems relevant to the resource domain and the actual control of information relevant to the power

outcomes domain, seem to have a natural parallel in attempts to control information in the power processes domain.

There are five types of definitional assertion identified in MPACS. Task/procedure definitions refer to the nature of the task itself and how it can be done. Situation definitions are attempts to supply the facts of the case (in this research, mainly what went on in the vignettes). Personal definitions are characterizations of self, spouse, their relationship, friends, relatives, etc. Other's position definition is an attempt to define or feedback to the other her own position. Ostensibly this is just a helpful checking out procedure, but it can also be used to "lead" the other or make his position look absurd, simplistic, etc. Finally, progress definition is a summary statement as to the couple's progress on the task, or a laying out of alternative positions and approaches. Generally, it provides a broader perspective on the discussion itself.

Bilateral Power Assertions

These are explicit suggestions or offers for both partners to partially change their positions simultaneously. The expectation is that partial concessions will be reciprocated in kind. Thus, both actors win something and lose something, but neither totally experiences either "the thrill of victory or the agony of defeat." The behavior involves making contracts, bargaining, negotiating, trading.

The most direct BPA is an explicit position trade.

In the context of the IMC task, this means offering to give in on one of the choices so you can have your way on the other: "I'll agree on blaming Steve, if you'll say the wife on the second part." Another explicit trade, which can also occur on other than IMC tasks, is to exchange one item for another, as in "I'll give you this one, if I can have the next."

Other compromise/bilateral solution includes any explicit compromise offer, other than direct trade-offs of position. One possibility is to broadly suggest compromising. Another is to "agree to disagree" and just pick choices out of expediency. Another is to suggest an arbitrary/external decision rule such as flipping a coin.

Role division solution is actually a special case of the preceding code, in which the decision rule being invoked is a pre-existing division of labor. The actor is genuinely saying that there is a general rule which can be used to develop a solution, and that is whose area of responsibility the issue falls in. One is saying "when the item is in my area, my views will take precedence, in your area you will have more say."

Miscellaneous Codes

The other power assertive behavior category was included at the outset, but became less and less used as MPACS was revised and necessary codes added. There are only a few incidents counted here.

Self-depreciation/deference is not a power assertion behavior, but is included as a parallel to "Reject/attack other." It seemed theoretically interesting also in that submissive, victim-like behavior has been seen as inviting attack (Gelles, 1972:155-6).

All other statements not covered by MPACS categories were tallied as non-power assertions. Many of these were statements of agreement, support, or conceding to the other.

PROCEDURES

The preceding discussion dealt with the final version of MPACS used in the research. This section indicates how the coding system was developed, and describes the actual procedures used in coding.

A Trial and Error Process

It seems that the only way to develop a new coding system is to try it out. The only thing for it is to set up some categories, attempt to code some materials with them, see how they work, and then go back to the drawing board. The process is repeated until one is satisfied that it works reasonably well--that the codes reflect one's theoretical concerns, they are as clear as possible, and there is a minimum of overlap. Refining the codes and making their descriptions more precise may go on through the coding itself--and in fact could go on indefinitely.

In devising the MPACS package, the above process was followed. Starting with the broad divisions partly based on Hoffman's qualified/unqualified power assertion distinction, a number of more specific codes were filled in. Many of these were actually adapted from existing systems, such as the Inventory of Marital Conflicts System (Olson and Ryder, 1973). These were tried on transcripts for two or three couples, then reworked, some discarded, some added. The same transcripts were recoded, and additional transcripts covered, until another problem was reached. Then the system was restructured again. By the time ten transcripts could be coded with it, the system was ready for use.

Coding Procedures

Each couples' IMC discussion had been taped, and the coding was done on the transcript while listening to the tape. Two of the tapes were of such poor quality that they could not be coded, so the sample size for the power modes data is 76--62 noncounseling and 14 counseling couples.

Two-thirds of the transcripts were coded by the investigator, and one-third by an MA student in sociology. For the first few efforts by the assistant coder, the transcripts were double-coded. Then, we went over the codings together as a training exercise, and as time went on to ensure that our uses of the categories were consistent.

While resources were not available to double-code all cases and run full reliability assessments, some steps were taken to minimize intercoder discrepancies and drift over time. First, each coder reviewed the MPACS summary before each session to be sure that infrequently used categories would be kept in mind. Second, about every fifth transcript, a portion of the discussion was double-coded. Then the two coders went over the section together, resolving differences, reviewing categories, and discussing problems with particular items. In this way, a common understanding of MPACS was maintained.

BASIC MPACS FINDINGS

The concluding part of this chapter provides basic descriptive findings, some of which are mainly of methodological interest and some more substantive. First, the intercorrelations of the codes are discussed, in order to gain an understanding of the internal workings of the system. Then the code frequencies are given. Finally, the degree and nature of husband-wife similarities and differences are considered.

Internal Relationships

Tables 6.1 and 6.2 give the product-moment correlation matrixes for MPACS categories, for husbands and wives respectively.¹ In assessing how the system works internally,

¹A full, code-by-code version of these tables is in Appendix D.

we are primarily concerned with questions of validity. One thing to look for is that codes which are clustered together in the system for conceptual reasons--such as the "definitional assertions"--do in fact correlate with one another, and generally more highly than with other categories. Generally speaking, the system seems adequate in this respect. For example, rejecting/attacking is most highly correlated with three codes from its own group (UPA's)--command, reiteration, and unqualified disagreement. This holds for both men and women.

Another consideration for the validity of the system is whether particular codes are highly related to other theoretically linked categories (construct validity), and unrelated to categories which are theoretically unconnected (discriminant validity). To use reject/attack other as an example again, this code was expected to show very little relationships to the BPA codes. The degree of ego involvement and emotion, and aggression, accompanying attack behavior seems incompatible with the sense of perspective and rationality which go with bilateral power assertions. For both men and women, there are no relationships between these variables.

Clearly the MPACS package does not meet these internal criteria for validity without exception. Also, the system seems to work somewhat differently for men and women. However, in general the codes seem to cluster both conceptually and empirically, and there are no glaring anomalies.

Table 6.1. Correlation Matrix for Power Modes of Husbands

Power Mode	UPA	QPART	DA	BPA	SD	NPA
Unqualified power assertions (UPA)	-					
Qualified partisan assertions (QPART)	.36	-				
Definitional assertions (DA)	.46	.56	-			
Bilateral power assertions (BPA)	.05	-.03	.06	-		
Self-depreciation (SD)	.01	-.06	-.04	-.01	-	
Non-power assertions (NPA)	.46	.13	.38	.18	.05	-

Table 6.2. Correlation Matrix for Power Modes of Wives

Power Mode	UPA	QPART	DA	BPA	SD	NPA
Unqualified power assertions (UPA)	-					
Qualified power assertions (QPART)	.43	-				
Definitional assertions (DA)	.40	.55	-			
Bilateral power assertions (BPA)	.27	.20	.04	-		
Self-depreciation (SD)	.22	-.02	.07	.01	-	
Non-power assertions (NPA)	.29	.00	.30	.06	.09	-

MPACS Scores of Husbands and Wives

Table 6.3 gives the mean scores of the husbands and wives on each of the power modes categories, as well as the product-moment correlations between the partners' scores. The third column in the table indicates whether the husbands had a higher or lower mean score than the wives.

Looking at the mean scores, we uncover perhaps the most significant finding in the table--that there is little difference between the men and women in how frequently, on the average, they exhibit each behavior.

Previous Research. One of the problems with research on sex differences in communication is that there tends to be an overly defensive approach to women's communication patterns. The focus is often one which ignores the strengths of female communication, and instead seeks to rather apologetically explain why women aren't more like men (Thorne and Henley, 1975).

Another difficulty with sex differences research, however, is that it overemphasizes the differences, and thus gives a vastly inaccurate underestimate of the extent to which human communication is the same, whether emitted by women or men. In line with this, when we seek differences between men and women, we tend to overlook the extent to which findings of sex difference are highly mixed and inconsistent (Thorne, 1978).

Nevertheless, when studies do show sex differences in language, they suggest that women use a weaker, more

Table 6.3. Mean Power Modes Scores of Husbands and Wives, and Correlations between Husbands' and Wives' Scores

Power Mode	Mean		*	Correlation between Husband and Wife
	Husbands	Wives		
<u>Unqualified Power Assertions</u>				
Reject/attack	1.88	2.08	-	.48
Command	2.38	1.88	+	.22
"Do anyway"	.30	.12	+	.12
Surrender in protest	.76	.64	+	.17
Reiteration	11.63	10.74	+	.90
Unqualified disagreement	4.88	4.38	+	.67
Unqualified partisan asser- tion	18.01	16.42	+	.70
<u>Qualified Power Assertions</u>				
Consequence identification:				
Promise	-	-	0	-
Threat	.04	.03	+	-
Qualified partisan assertions:				
Qualified partisan asser- tion	16.42	18.29	-	.59
Definitional assertions:				
Task definition	5.49	4.96	+	.56
Situation definition	17.71	17.58	+	.77
Personal definition	7.16	7.88	-	.72
Other's position definition	1.72	1.78	-	.16
Progress definition	1.91	1.91	0	.16
<u>Bilateral Power Assertions</u>				
Explicit position trade	.22	.08	+	-.02
Other bilateral solution	.43	.18	+	.14
Role division solution	-	-	0	-
<u>Other</u>				
Other power-related behavior	.03	.05	-	-.02
Self-depreciation	.58	.86	-	.65
Non-power assertion	19.17	19.00	+	.72

*The symbols in the third column indicate the direction of difference between wives' and husbands' scores. A "+" means the husbands' score is higher, a "-" means the husbands' is lower, and a "0" means there is no difference.

hesitant style. In reviewing research employing a number of content and form variables, Walum concludes that women's speech suggests "someone who lacks confidence, is uncertain of her own feelings, seeks approval from others, cannot make up her mind, and lacks an opinion of her own" (1977:29).

In contrast, men are constrained to indicate "seriousness of purpose, hard hittingness, and decisiveness, whether they feel that way or not," and it is difficult for them to express any feeling except anger (1977:30).

In another analysis of male/female speech, the conclusion is that:

1. Women's speech tends to be more person-centered and concerned with interpersonal matters. It is apt to deal with the speaker's own and other's feelings. It is more polite, more indirect, and uses the method of implication. It employs qualifiers and other softening devices to avoid imposing belief, agreement, or obedience on others through overly strong statements, questions or commands.
2. Men's speech tends to be more centered around external things and is more apt to involve straight factual communication. It is more literal, direct, and to the point. It employs stronger statements and forms that tend to press compliance, agreement, or belief on the listener (Eakins and Eakins, 1978:49).

Given these previous research findings, we would expect men to use the more direct UPA's and the threat category more than women. Women are expected to use qualified partisan assertions, personal and other's positions definition, and self-depreciation more often.

Difference and Similarity. While the differences actually indicated in Table 6.3 are small, they are almost all in the expected direction. Women do use qualified assertions, personal definition (but not other's position definition), and self-depreciation more than men. Men use all the UPA's more frequently, except for reject/attack. Women have a slight edge here. In addition, men more often define the task, and are slightly more likely to engage in bilateral power assertions.

The consistency with which these findings of sex difference meet expectations clearly warrants attention. However, it is still important to recognize the small size of the differences, and thus the degree of similarity in the women's and men's patterns.

One possibility that cannot be overlooked is that the laboratory task induces an artificially high degree of similarity in behavior. One, in a two-person task it is difficult for one person to engage in much less sheer behavior than the other. In this research, the mean total number of coded behaviors for the men was 131.07, and 129.77 for the women, showing little difference. Thus, there seems to be a conversation-based limit to how discrepant the behaviors can be. This does not explain, though, why there is such similarity category by category. A second, more plausible consideration, is that the formal nature of the task and the even treatment of the partners in the instructions and by the session administrator, gave many of the

women clear permission to operate on an equal footing with their spouses. That is a permission that many women would not have in their more informal private encounters with men and without which they would not be as active and direct. I would suggest, then, that if there is a laboratory/natural setting discrepancy here, it is in the direction of the women being more like men in their behavior than they would be in everyday life.

Relationships Between Husbands' and Wives' Scores.

Tables 6.3 and 6.4 give the product-moment correlations between husbands' and wives' scores. Here we can see how closely the behavior of one partner resembles that of the other. The relationships are very strong except for bilateral power assertions. The largest coefficient is for unqualified power assertions. For reiteration, especially, the number of reiterative statements made by one spouse is closely related to the number made by the other. The experience of actually listening to tapes and coding transcripts really brings this finding to life. Very frequently the partners become enmeshed in a rhythmic sequence of interaction, consisting of a series of alternating repetitions. The phrasing was something like "Yes, he did," "No, he didn't," repeated for two to four cycles, and then snapped out of by one of the partners.

Table 6.4. Intercorrelations of Power Modes of Husbands and Wives

Power Modes of Husbands	Power Modes of Wives					
	UPA	QPART	CA	BPA	SD	NPA
Unqualified power assertions (UPA)	<u>.90</u>	.44	.50	.21	.18	.41
Qualified partisan assertions (OPART)	.38	<u>.59</u>	.53	.22	-.12	.17
Definitional assertions (DA)	.43	.40	<u>.73</u>	.01	.04	.50
Bilateral power assertions (BPA)	.11	.01	.00	<u>.07</u>	.01	.06
Self-depreciation (SD)	-.00	-.11	.00	-.02	<u>.65</u>	.10
Non-power assertions (NPA)	.43	.19	.35	.27	.19	<u>.72</u>

Basic Frequencies and the Laboratory-Field Continuum

The final issue to be addressed in this chapter concerns the ways in which the MPACS system as applied to a laboratory task may or may not reflect behavior in natural settings. There are a number of power modes which we would expect to be more frequent and more important at home.

First, there is aggressive behavior which is represented in MPACS only through the reject/attack code. This code covers only verbal aggression, and in the laboratory only the milder forms of it. Thus, physical aggression--the ultimate power mode particularly of men (Goode, 1971)--is left out.

I would expect "do anyway" attempts to be more important--have a big impact--at home, even if they are not more frequent. "Surrender in protest," is only one special kind of withdrawal. A laboratory task does not allow the two partners to withdraw or offer the same variety of withdrawal forms as can be used in the home. As a strategy in confrontation processes, then, withdrawal is probably very important for married couples in everyday life (Foss, 1979).

Finally, the use of threats and promises should be much higher in everyday life, at least among some social groups. Particularly in couples who have negotiated over the household division of labor (and are there any who have not, at least on a few items?), we can expect fairly

frequent exchanges of promises and threats. Probably younger, more modern, and more career-oriented couples operate less in terms of normative beliefs in a traditional division of labor, and thus negotiate the order more extensively and use such power modes more often.

In this chapter, the descriptive outlines of the MPACS system have been addressed both conceptually and empirically. Particular attention has been given to discrepancies and similarities between husbands and wives and between the laboratory and the home setting. The following chapter places power modes into the power processes model, by relating it to the other power-related variables.

CHAPTER VII

POWER MODES: LINKS WITH OTHER ASPECTS OF POWER

This Chapter provides the initial examination of links between other, more familiar, power variables and the newly developed power modes concept. Figure 1 in the first Chapter is a guide to the relationships to be explored.

Developing the MPACS system for codifying types of power assertions is a first step toward the ultimate goal of devising a more dynamic model of power processes in marriage. The objective of this Chapter is to provide some initial inquiry into relationships between aspects of the power structure and power processes.

Although no specific hypotheses concerning these relationships have been formulated, a general issue can be suggested as a loose guide to these analyses. In her important article assessing the state of family power studies as of 1970, Safilios-Rothschild suggested in passing some competing ideas about power structure variables and types of power assertions. On the one hand, a spouse who lacks authority may not make power assertions which are direct, but will use indirect, "manipulative" approaches in attempting to alter group outcomes. On the other hand, the spouse with greater authority may need to make only mild power assertions

unless directly challenged (1970:80).

We may broaden the issue to include additional aspects of the power structure, besides power distribution norms (authority). Thus, the general issue becomes whether those with a stronger position structurally (as in personal resources, attributed power, and norms) use a strong, directive, or a weak, persuasive or indirect style. Concomitantly, we may ask whether those with a weak structural position resort to manipulation and indirect approaches, or whether they openly challenge the other.

POWER MODES AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER

Table 7.1 gives the product-moment correlations between each partner's power modes and his/her report of the distribution of power (attributed power). The correlations are for the sample as a whole, and for the middle and working class subsamples.

Looking at the total sample, there are no really strong relationships. However, there is the finding that almost all the relationships that do exist are negative. That is, the more a husband attributes power to himself, the less likely he is to behave in any of the ways included in the table. Similarly, the more a wife attributes power to her husband, the less likely she is to use four of the types of behavior included. When the MPACS codes are examined one by one, there are only slight differences, and only among the wives.

Table 7.1. Correlations between Attributed Power and Power Modes, for Husbands and Wives and by Class

Power Mode	Correlation between Husband's Report and Husband's Power Modes			Correlation between Wife's Report and Wife's Power Modes		
	MC	WC	Total	MC	WC	Total
Unqualified power assertion (UPA)	-.11	-.40	-.13	-.02	.34	-.01
Qualified partisan assertion (QPART)	-.12	.08	-.16	-.06	-.49	-.13
Definitional assertion (DA)	-.12	.00	-.12	-.25	.01	-.21
Bilateral power assertion (BPA)	-.07	.34	-.12	.14	nc	.10
Self-depreciation (SD)	-.32	.57	-.19	-.17	-.28	-.19
Non-power assertion (NPA)	-.15	-.66	-.09	.13	-.36	.06

The clearest way to interpret these consistently negative relationships is that as the distribution of power increasingly favors the husband, the sheer amount of behavior emitted by the couple decreases. Somehow, it must be that couples with a husband-oriented power distribution get through the task more quickly.

One way to explain this is that when entering a task with an already husband-favoring power balance, wives do not push as hard for their own positions. As the wives display less counter-husband behavior, the husbands have to expend less energy maintaining their own positions. Thus, both partners actually engage in less behavior. In a natural setting in more extreme instances of this, many wives might actually not even put forward their disagreements in the first place. Once the husband's preference is known, in a husband-oriented relationship, the group outcome is known. Even in the conflict-inducing IMC task, in a few cases a wife asked her husband what he put on his answer sheet, and once having heard his response, proceeded to agree with him without ever having disclosed her own initially divergent position.

To show that the quicker completion of the task among couples with a husband-oriented power distribution is due to the wives pushing less hard for their own positions, we would have to show that the husbands actually win more arguments. This seems to be the case. As reported in Chapter IV, as husband-attributed power goes up, the

number of husband-unilateral outcomes increases. This is suggestive, then, of an interactional link between reported power and outcomes.

Middle and Working Class Couples

The broad finding of negative relationships between attributed power and the power modes categories holds for the middle class couples taken separately. The husband's lower use of self-depreciation is especially strong. Further, the two positive correlations--for wives' use of bilateral power assertions and non-power assertions--are intensified a little. Interestingly, a higher frequency of behavior by the wives in these two categories is consistent with the above discussion of why couples with a husband-dominant power distribution generally emit fewer behaviors throughout the task.

For the working class couples, there are some interesting reversals, not necessarily in the expected direction. (The very small sample size warrants a strong caution as the working class couples are discussed.) Working class men who attribute greater power to themselves use fewer unqualified power assertions and more bilateral power assertions. Further, they make fewer non-power assertions but more self-depreciating statements. Taken together, these findings suggest that despite seeing themselves on paper as more powerful, these men do not use a particularly assertive style in face-to-face encounters with their wives.

Working class wives who attribute greater power to their husbands tend to use more unqualified power assertions and fewer qualified power assertions. Further, these women make fewer self-depreciating statements and non-power assertions. For these wives, then, a belief that the power distribution favors their husbands seems to be no barrier to challenging, assertive behavior.

Are the working class husbands inflating their self-reports on attributed power for social desirability reasons, and then unable to "come through" in the reality of face-to-face encounters? Apparently not, since the mean AP score for middle class husbands (52.56) is actually higher than that for working class husbands (40.00). Moreover, working class wives actually attribute much greater power ($X = 53.70$) to their husbands than their husbands do themselves. This means the working class husbands may be under-reporting their own power (AP).

Why are the working class wives more assertive and the husbands less assertive than their AP scores, and previous theoretical and empirical work, would suggest? One possibility is that the IMC task elicits atypical behavior from these couples. Backed by a session administrator who seems to be treating the couple in an egalitarian fashion, the wives may be more assertive than normally. And given situational expectations for egalitarian behavior, the husbands may be more tentative than usual.

Power Distribution Norms and Power Modes

Faced with some puzzling findings in relation to attributed power, we turn now to an examination of power distribution norms and their relationship to power modes. The product-moment correlations between norms and power modes, for husbands and wives and by class, are given in Table 7.2. Here again there are only small relationships, but they are generally more in the expected direction than for attributed power.

For the men, as husband-dominant norms increase, non-power assertions decrease and self-depreciation decreases slightly. The more the wives hold norms favoring husband dominance, the more non-power assertions and the fewer unqualified and qualified power assertions they make. They also make fewer self-depreciating statements.

The Influence of Social Class. Among middle class husbands, the findings for the sample as a whole are intensified. As husband-dominant norms increase, non-power assertions, self-depreciation, and bilateral power assertions decrease, while qualified partisan assertions increase slightly. These husbands seem to be maintaining their position through persuasive argument.

Working class husbands with strong husband-dominant norms use fewer non-power assertions and unqualified power assertions. They make more self-depreciating statements, and slightly more definitional assertions. These are similar to, though not as strong as, the findings for AP.

Table 7.2. Correlations between Power Distribution Norms and Power Modes, for Husbands and Wives and by Class

Power Mode	Correlation between Husband's Norms and Husband's Power Modes			Correlation between Wife's Norms and Wife's Power Modes		
	MC	WC	Total	MC	WC	Total
Unqualified power assertion (UPA)	-.10	-.17	-.07	-.16	-.76	-.20
Qualified partisan assertion (QPART)	.12	-.06	.10	-.23	.02	-.22
Definitional assertion (DA)	.03	.14	.07	-.01	.14	.00
Bilateral power assertion (BPA)	-.19	.05	-.08	.01	nc	.03
Self-depreciation (SD)	-.19	.28	-.13	-.24	-.02	-.19
Non-power assertion (NAP)	-.25	-.38	-.22	.27	-.26	.23

Thus, working class men who hold husband-dominant norms, and those who attribute more actual power to themselves, seem to use a less assertive, more tentative interaction style.

Middle class wives tend to repeat the whole sample findings--more non-power assertions, and fewer unqualified and qualified power assertions and self-depreciations, as husband-dominant norms are stronger.

For the working class wives, there is a particularly strong negative relationship between husband-oriented norms and unqualified power assertions. These women are less inclined, then, to directly challenge their husbands' views.

Relating the Two Power Distribution Variables

Table 7.3 presents the mean attributed power and power distribution norms scores for the husbands and wives, by social class. In the middle class, for both men and women, the mean AP and PDN scores are about the same. For working class couples, there are some discrepancies which may be relevant to the unexpected styles which they adopted in the IMC task.

The working class men hold as strongly to husband-dominant norms as the middle class men, yet they attribute much less actual power to themselves. Holding these norms but seeing oneself as not actually having the corresponding "power" may produce a more hesitant style.

Table 7.3. Mean Attributed Power and Power Distribution Scores of Husbands and Wives, by Class

Power Distribution Variable	Class		Total Sample (N=76)
	Middle (N=60)	Working (N=10)	
<hr/>			
<u>Attributed Power</u>			
Husband's report	52.56	40.00	50.03
Wife's report	49.17	53.70	50.03
<hr/>			
<u>Power Distribution Norms</u>			
Husband's report	49.75	50.40	49.84
Wife's report	51.13	44.60	50.16
<hr/>			

In contrast, the working class wives seem to think their husbands have more power than they should, and therefore may be openly challenging. However, when they do think their husbands should have more say, they use the relatively direct unqualified power assertions less often.

PERSONAL RESOURCES AND POWER MODES

Extrinsic Personal Resources

Table 7.4 gives the product-moment correlations between extrinsic personal resources and power modes, for husbands and wives and by class. For the husbands, there is a slight negative relationship between extrinsic resources and unqualified power assertions, and a slight positive relationship with non-power assertions. The same holds for the women: as their own extrinsic resources increase, they are slightly less likely to use unqualified power assertions and more likely to use non-power assertions. In addition, wives with greater extrinsic resources are slightly more likely to use bilateral power assertions.

These findings are basically replicated or intensified in the middle class subsample (with the exception of the relationship with husbands' use of non-power assertions). Thus, as extrinsic resources increase, the most direct power modes are used less often and more non-power assertions are made.

Table 7.4. Correlations between Extrinsic Personal Resources and Power Modes, for Husbands and Wives and by Class

Power Mode	Correlation between Husband's ERI, Husband's Power Modes			Correlation between Wife's ERI, Wife's Power Modes		
	MC	WC	Total	MC	WC	Total
Unqualified power assertion (UPA)	-.27	-.22	-.16	-.11	-.50	-.13
Qualified partisan assertion (QPART)	.05	.38	-.06	.03	-.06	.10
Definitional asser- tion (DA)	.08	.22	.07	.11	-.16	.08
Bilateral power assertion (BPA)	.07	.23	-.04	.20	nc	.18
Self-depreciation (SD)	-.08	.09	.02	-.06	-.27	-.04
Non-power asser- tion (NPA)	-.01	-.13	.11	.17	.27	.18

Among working class men, as extrinsic resources increase, there is the same decrease in unqualified power assertions. However, non-power assertions also decrease slightly. The slack is then taken up by definite increases in qualified partisan assertions, definitional assertions, and bilateral assertions.

Working class wives with high extrinsic resources show an intensification of the general pattern of fewer unqualified power assertions and more non-power assertions. In addition, they are less likely to make self-depreciating statements.

As a whole, the findings on extrinsic resources and power modes support the idea that those with greater resources are less direct and tend to make milder power assertions. Those with lesser resources are not more indirect or manipulative, as might be expected, but more direct. This suggests that those with more extrinsic resources may need to make only mild power assertions unless directly challenged, and those with fewer extrinsic resources may need to directly challenge in order to be heard.

Intrinsic Personal Resources

The relationships between power modes and intrinsic resources are somewhat different from those for extrinsic resources. Table 7.5 gives the product-moment correlations between intrinsic personal resources and power modes, for husbands and wives and by class.

Table 7.5. Correlations between Intrinsic Personal Resources and Power Modes, for Husbands and Wives and by Class

Power Mode	Correlation between Husband's IRI, Husband's Power Modes			Correlation between Wife's IRI, Wife's Power Modes		
	MC	WC	Total	MC	WC	Total
Unqualified power assertion (UPA)	-.02	-.70	-.09	.16	-.66	.08
Qualified partisan assertion (QPART)	.09	-.01	.01	.45	-.48	.35
Definitional asser- tion (DA)	-.12	-.30	-.14	.28	-.12	.18
Bilateral power assertion (BPA)	-.01	-.07	-.03	.02	nc	.04
Self-depreciation (SD)	.02	-.05	.02	.17	.14	.19
Non-power asser- tion (NPA)	-.21	-.74	-.17	.03	-.47	.02

Among the men, as intrinsic resources increase, the number of definitional assertions and non-power assertions decrease somewhat. For the women, increased intrinsic resources are strongly related to qualified partisan assertions and moderately related to definitional assertions and self-depreciation. Thus, the women rely more on persuasive argument and are rather self-effacing as their interpersonal resources increase. For the middle class subsample, these findings are somewhat stronger.

Working class men with high intrinsic resources are much less likely to make unqualified power assertions and non-power assertions, and somewhat less likely to use definitional assertions. Working class women whose intrinsic resources are high use far fewer unqualified power assertions, qualified partisan assertions, and non-power assertions.

An interesting observation is that for working class men and women almost all the relationships are negative. Thus, as intrinsic resources increase, these couples are less active in general. In contrast, middle class women seem to increase all kinds of activity as their intrinsic resources increase.

In contrast to the ERI relationships, as IRI increases the use of non-power assertions decreases. A similarity, however, is that as either kind of resource increases unqualified power assertions decrease, although more sharply for IRI than for ERI. It seems that those with greater

personal resources of either kind use a more persuasive than directive style.

Relative Personal Resources

Table 7.6 gives the product-moment correlations between relative extrinsic and intrinsic resources and the power modes of husbands and wives, by class.

For the husbands' use of power modes, the relative strength of their extrinsic resources compared to their wives seems to make little difference. There is only one slight positive association with self-depreciation. Middle class men with high relative ERI use fewer non-power assertions and slightly fewer bilateral power assertions. Most interesting, for the working class men relative ERI are positively related to all the power modes. Thus, working class men with high R-ERI seem to increase their activity level as a whole in the task.

For relative intrinsic resources among the husbands there is a slight negative association with all the power modes. Here, then, relatively greater intrinsic resources bring a somewhat lower general activity level. Among middle class men in particular, there are fewer definitional assertions and non-power assertions as R-IRI increases. Working class men with high R-IRI are less likely to use bilateral power assertions and self-depreciation. Such men may be less threatened by a verbal task if they have good interpersonal skills.

Table 7.6. Correlations between Relative Personal Resources and Power Modes of Husbands and Wives, for Extrinsic and Intrinsic Resources and by Class

Power Mode	Correlation with Relative ERI			Correlation with Relative IRI		
	MC	WC	Total	MC	WC	Total
<u>Husbands</u>						
Unqualified power assertion (UPA)	-.09	.53	-.05	-.08	.09	-.13
Qualified partisan assertion (QPART)	.08	.21	-.03	-.11	.16	-.13
Definitional asser- tion (DA)	.06	.35	.09	-.21	.08	-.17
Bilateral power assertion	-.13	.30	-.08	-.07	-.51	-.12
Self-depreciation (SD)	.10	.37	.13	.01	-.42	-.02
Non-power assertion (NPA)	-.22	.48	-.02	-.21	.01	-.16
<u>Wives</u>						
Unqualified power assertion (UPA)	-.00	.64	.05	-.08	.65	-.06
Qualified partisan assertion (QPART)	-.10	.33	-.16	-.34	-.02	-.34
Definitional asser- tion (DA)	-.19	.29	-.11	-.28	-.41	-.25
Bilateral power assertion (BPA)	-.08	nc	.02	-.10	nc	-.09
Self-depreciation (SD)	-.10	.31	.04	-.15	.04	-.15
Non-power assertion (NPA)	-.10	-.18	-.05	-.15	-.05	-.15

As their husbands' relative extrinsic resources increase, women tend to use slightly fewer qualified partisan assertions and definitional assertions. Among middle class wives, the husbands' greater R-ERI actually brings lower frequencies for all the behaviors. Working class wives use more of each of the power modes, except non-power assertions. They are especially likely to use more unqualified power assertions.

For relative intrinsic resources, as husbands' R-IRI goes up, the women use fewer of all the power modes, but especially fewer qualified partisan assertions and definitional assertions. The findings are almost exactly the same among middle class women only. Working class women are especially likely to use fewer definitional assertions, and much more likely to use unqualified power assertions as husbands' R-IRI increases.

In some instances, the findings for relative resources give us important information not obtained when the "absolute" resources indexes are used. For the middle class men, both absolute and relative resources seem to have about the same impact on power modes. For working class men, relative resources are really different from absolute in their associations with power modes. For example, when the R-ERI is used there are increases in all behaviors, but with the absolute ERI unqualified power assertions are lower rather than higher. For intrinsic resources, the unqualified and non-power assertions are much lower when the absolute level

of resources is examined. But these relationships disappear and negative relationships between bilateral power assertions and self-depreciation develop as we use the R-IRI.

For the women, results with the absolute and relative versions of the ERI are fairly similar. The same is true for intrinsic resources, with the exception that among working class wives their own absolute intrinsic resources are negatively related to qualified and non-power assertions. When the R-IRI is used, these relationships disappear and we find that as husbands' relative resources increase, these women use fewer definitional assertions.

The finding with the absolute indexes that lower resources do not necessarily produce an indirect, covert style is generally upheld when relative resources are considered. Particularly for working class wives, as their husbands' relative extrinsic and intrinsic resources increase, the most direct power modes--unqualified power assertions--are more likely to be used. Further, this is consistent with the findings based on self-reports of the power distribution.

THE CASE OF VERBAL AGGRESSION

One of the unqualified power assertions--"reject/attack other"--is perhaps the most extreme behavior of the couples in the IMC task. It is an instance of verbal aggression, and examining even this relatively mild kind of aggressive behavior in families can help shed light on

more general issues surrounding violence in intimate groups. Further, there is a rapidly growing literature relating other dimensions of power to family aggression in natural settings, and this provides good continuity with the present study. Finally, verbal aggression is a good focus for examining the general issue of whether more direct or more indirect power modes are used as levels of the other power variables increase. For these reasons, I will pause here for a special look at verbal aggression.

Allen and Straus have developed and tested what they term the "Ultimate Resource" theory of violence (1979). Violence is seen as a resource, and is used only when a person "lacks other resources to serve as a basis of power" (1979). Given the small sample size especially for the working class subsample in this research, it is not possible to fully replicate the multivariate analyses necessary to test this theory. However, the analyses which can reasonably be carried out offer some strong parallels to the findings by Allen and Straus.

Table 7.7 gives the product-moment correlations between scores on the various power variables and verbal aggression (VA) of husbands and wives, by class.

For husband's attributed power and verbal aggression, there is a small negative correlation which becomes moderate in size in the middle class. Allen and Straus found no relationships here, and indicate that that is consistent with "Ultimate Resource Theory" in that greater

Table 7.7. Correlations between Scores on Power Variables and Verbal Aggression of Husbands and Wives, by Class

Power Variable	Correlation with Use of Verbal Aggression					
	Husbands			Wives		
	MC	WC	Total	MC	WC	Total
Attributed power (AP)	-.28	-.14	-.17	-.07	-.38	-.05
Power Distribution Norm (PDN)	-.15	-.09	-.13	-.16	-.46	-.17
Extrinsic Resources (ERI)	-.36	-.50	-.16	-.17	-.34	-.20
Intrinsic Resources (IRI)	.12	-.45	.12	.14	-.86	-.00
Relative Extrinsic Resources (R-REI)	-.05	.38	.06	.07	.48	.11
Relative Intrinsic Resources (R-IRI)	.12	.05	.13	-.01	.25	.05

"power" per se is not related to VA unless there is also a concurrent lack of other resources. Thus, as long as these relationships are not positive, the theory is not questioned. That the association found is actually negative for middle class men may be a result of their having more than enough other resources to validate their position. The theory is again supported for the women--there is generally no relationship, except that working class women who attribute greater power to their husbands tend to use less VA.

A measure of power distribution norms is not available in the Allen and Straus study, but in this research there are slight negative correlations between PDN and husband's VA. There is also a slight negative relationship between wives' husband-dominant norms and wives' VA, which becomes moderately large among working class women. Thus, working class women, especially, who believe in their husbands' right to decide things, use less VA.

Resources and Verbal Aggression

Consistent with the Allen and Straus study, for both men and women the greater one's extrinsic resources, the lower one's use of VA. These are generally strong negative relationships, especially in the working class. Allen and Straus included intrinsic resources in their research but did not examine them separately from extrinsic resources. In the present study, the strong negative association between resources and VA is replicated for the

IRI only in the working class--and there is an extremely strong negative relationship for working class women.

However, there is a very slight positive relationship between the IRI and VA for both men and women in the middle class. The link may be too small to warrant speculation, but one idea is interesting to consider. Straus has argued that catharsis models legitimize aggression as something that needs a full expression (1974). Middle class couples may adopt expressive violence more than instrumental (Allen and Straus, 1979). I would argue that this may be because of greater exposure to catharsis-oriented writings in the popular and semi-professional literature. Those who attend to "professional advice" on family relations may also have greater intrinsic personal resources. Thus, the (small) link between the IRI and VA for middle class couples may be by way of exposure to a certain kind of advice on marriage.

The findings for relative resources and VA are particularly interesting. Allen and Straus found that " . . . the extent to which a husband's resources exceed those of his wife has little or no relation to violence by either spouse" (1979). The present findings for the ERI bear this out only for the middle class. For the working class, as husband's extrinsic resources outweigh those of his wife, both husband and wife use more VA. (The findings on R-IRI are very small in magnitude.) Thus, the absolute

level of resources in the working class seems to have the most important dampening effect on VA.

In general, these findings are consistent with the Ultimate Resource Theory developed by Allen and Straus. They do not, however, replicate the fuller test offered in the earlier research.

In terms of the general issue for this chapter, the findings on verbal aggression support the idea that those with a better position "structurally" need not use direct--even aggressive--means of affecting group outcomes.

POWER MODES AND OUTCOMES

The final link to be examined is that between power modes and outcomes. Do the kinds of power assertions made by marital partners make a difference in the nature of the outcomes? Tables 7.8 and 7.9 give the product-moment correlations between power modes and three kinds of outcomes, by class. The first table is for husbands' use of power modes, and the second for the wives' power modes.

The pattern of findings seems less clear than for the other power variables. For the sample as a whole, as the husbands use more unqualified power assertions and qualified partisan assertions, the number of wife-unilateral outcomes decreases and the number of bilateral outcomes increases. This is replicated in the middle class subsample. In the working class, the more UPA's and QPART's by the husbands, the fewer husband-unilateral and the more wife-unilateral

Table 7.8. Correlations between Husbands' Power Modes and Three Types of Outcomes, by Class

Outcome	Power Modes of Husbands					
	UPA	QPART	DA	BPA	SD	NPA
<u>Husband-unilateral</u>						
Middle Class	.05	.07	-.10	-.14	.02	-.11
Working Class	-.48	-.57	-.66	.32	.21	-.33
Total	.01	.00	.04	-.18	.02	-.18
<u>Wife-unilateral</u>						
Middle Class	-.30	-.25	-.11	.10	.08	-.14
Working Class	.43	.37	-.56	-.33	-.11	.20
Total	-.27	-.16	-.02	.10	.04	.14
<u>Bilateral</u>						
Middle Class	.23	.22	-.03	-.01	-.05	.09
Working Class	.17	.57	.28	.00	-.29	.38
Total	.25	.20	.02	.05	-.03	.19

Table 7.9. Correlations between Wives' Power Modes and Three Types of Outcomes, by Class

Outcome	Power Modes of Wives					
	UPA	QPART	DA	BPA	SD	NPA
<u>Husband-unilateral</u>						
Middle Class	-.01	.10	.12	-.16	-.05	.09
Working Class	-.37	-.60	-.40	nc	.37	-.53
Total	-.07	.04	.01	-.16	-.06	-.01
<u>Wife-unilateral</u>						
Middle Class	-.27	-.19	-.13	-.07	-.06	-.12
Working Class	.24	.62	.33	nc	-.38	.47
Total	-.21	-.10	-.04	-.09	-.11	.10
<u>Bilateral</u>						
Middle Class	.25	.15	.03	.32	.06	-.04
Working Class	.38	.00	.20	nc	.00	.18
Total	.26	.12	.04	.34	.11	.03

and bilateral outcomes. Definitional assertions by husbands do not affect outcomes much, except in the working class where they are negatively related to husband-unilateral and wife-unilateral outcomes.

Interestingly, bilateral power assertions by husbands are not related to bilateral outcomes. Further, in the working class, the more BPA's by the husbands, the more husband-unilateral and the fewer wife-unilateral outcomes.

Self-depreciation on the part of husbands is also not an important determinant of outcomes. However, one curious finding is that as working class husbands make more SD statements, the number of husband-unilateral outcomes increases and bilateral outcomes decrease.

Finally, non-power assertions of husbands show a slight negative relationship to husband-unilateral outcomes and a slight positive relationship to wife-unilateral and bilateral outcomes.

Overall, there is not a relationship between the husbands' power modes activity and their obtaining increased unilateral "wins." Rather, for the middle class there seems to be a lessening of wife "wins" and an increase in bilateral outcomes. The findings for the working class suggest that increased powering activity by the men actually results in fewer husband wins. However, when these men offer bilateral solutions (BPA) or use self-depreciation, they win more. One can speculate that BPA's and SD's are somehow taken as

a show of good faith (or perhaps as real discouragement) which prompts working class wives to respond with submission.

Wives' Power Modes

For the middle class wives, and the wives as a whole, there is a pattern which is the mirror image to that for the men. Wives' use of UPA's and QPART's actually produces fewer wife outcomes and more bilateral outcomes. The one contrast with the findings for men's power modes, is that wives' use of bilateral power assertions is positively related to the number of bilateral outcomes.

The pattern for the working class women also mirrors that of working class men. This is actually the only group in the research whose increased use of various power modes actually produces more wins for themselves. Self-depreciation results in fewer wife wins and more husband wins. Putting the working class wives and husbands together, it seems that a "strong" approach by the wives pays off for them, but a "weak" approach by the men results in more wins for them.

Verbal Aggression and Outcomes

Looking specifically at verbally aggressive behavior (see Table 7.10) we find that middle class husbands' verbal aggression is negatively related to wife wins and positively related to bilateral outcomes. When working class men use verbal aggression, there are fewer bilateral outcomes.

Actually, the wives' use of verbal aggression seems to have a bigger impact on outcomes. When middle class

Table 7.10. Correlations between Verbal Aggression of Husbands and Wives and Three Types of Outcomes, by Class

Outcome	Verbal Aggression	
	Husbands	Wives
<u>Husband-unilateral</u>		
Middle Class	-.01	-.12
Working Class	-.02	-.50
Total	-.04	-.17
<u>Wife-unilateral</u>		
Middle Class	-.19	-.08
Working Class	.14	.53
Total	-.16	.01
<u>Bilateral</u>		
Middle Class	.19	.20
Working Class	-.30	-.05
Total	.19	.19

wives are verbally aggressive, there are slightly fewer husband wins and more bilateral outcomes. Working class wives using verbal aggression obtain much greater wins, at the expense of their husbands.

Overall, for the men and the middle class women, aggression may produce more bilateral solutions, but little in the way of purely personal gain. However, for working class women verbal aggression seems to be a fairly effective tactic in obtaining unilateral wins.

CONCLUSION

The general issue posed at the beginning of the chapter was whether those with a stronger position structurally and normatively use a relatively strong, direct style or are more indirect in their approach. In general, it was found that those with fewer resources and not favored by norms or power attributions use the more direct power modes.

When verbal aggression is examined separately, similar findings result. Those with a better position structurally do not need to use the most direct--verbally aggressive--power modes.

The final issue addressed in how the use of different power modes affects the outcomes of a confrontation. The findings here seem compatible with those for the power distribution and power modes findings. For husbands and middle class wives--those in a more favorable position,

structurally--the most direct power modes are used less and do not really seem very effective anyway. The working class wives, who may be seen as the most structurally disadvantaged group, are the most direct and their directness seems to be effective in producing more wife-unilateral wins.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

This research was designed to explore the types of power assertions used by married couples. This question of how husbands and wives go about "powering" has largely been neglected by family researchers. Instead, attention has been focused almost exclusively on explaining variations in the distribution of power in marriages. I have argued that the incorporation of power modes into a model of power can lead to a much more complete understanding of marital power relations, and ultimately to a more dynamic, process-oriented approach to confrontation and change in families.

OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH

The combined observation and self-report study was carried out with a sample of seventy-eight married couples, some of whom were in marital counseling. Each member of a couple completed a questionnaire and then the couple participated in the Inventory of Marital Conflict (IMC) task (Olson and Ryder, 1970). This is a highly-involving conflict resolution task which offers a great deal of realism in inducing disagreement between the marital

partners. A comprehensive system of coding the power modes used by the couples was developed for this research.

Limitations and Strengths

In reviewing the research it is appropriate to consider some of its strengths and limitations. Particularly in the area of sample selection and characteristics, some cautions are necessary.

First, several of the couples were referred to the project by local marriage counselors. The rest were selected through a random sampling procedure which produced a response rate of less than half--a low response, but one which is by no means atypical of laboratory researches which demand much time of the subjects. Therefore, the group of couples included in this research is not representative of any definable population and generalizations are largely unjustified.

Second, while the actual social characteristics of the couples, such as age, education, children, etc., are fairly broad in range, overall the sample is heavily middle class and professional. The couples in counseling are generally younger and of lower social class standing than the others, so they help make the sample more broad than it would be otherwise. Some of the most interesting findings involve middle and working class comparisons, yet because of the small number of working class couples, these findings must be viewed as mainly providing a basis for further hypothesis-development and research.

The focus of the research on interaction in the laboratory over a researcher-defined task is both a limitation and a strength. The degree of control over "extraneous" variables is clearly an advantage. Yet, obviously the present task and laboratory setting preclude investigating some important aspects of marital power processes in natural settings. These will be discussed more below.

There are two major strengths of the research design itself. One is the inclusion of both marital partners. The other is the multi-method approach, which includes self-reports on several aspects of power, direct observation of behavior, and a rather unique assessment of the task outcomes. This still uncommon combination of methods and viewpoints in a single research allows a "triangulation" both by method and by person to yield special insight into marital power relations.

Finally, two additional contributions of the project should be mentioned. One is the clarification of major power concepts presented in Chapter III. The other is the contribution to measurement in the field of the Marital Power Assertion Coding System.

SOME SELECTED FINDINGS

Most of the findings for the research have been reviewed in each chapter. Rather than resummarize them here, I would like to highlight some of the findings in terms of important issues which have cropped up throughout

the research and which have implications for different bodies of theory and research.

Husbands and Wives

In an important analysis of modern marriage, Bernard (1973) has discussed the ways in which husbands' and wives' experiences of marriage are essentially different. In many instances, the findings for this research underscore Bernard's analysis. On two important self-report measures--attributed power and power distribution norms--there is not a great deal of congruence between the husbands' and wives' reports or beliefs. When personal resources are related to attributed power, different kinds of resources are important for the two partners. Further, the effect of resources on task outcomes seems to be different for men and women. For example, when husbands have high intrinsic resources there are more bilateral solutions for a couple. However, when wives' intrinsic resources are high, the wives simply tend to outright lose more decisions.

Turning to the types of power assertions used by marital partners, while there are strong correlations between the behavior of the wives and husbands, there are also some differences. When there are differences, they are generally in the direction of the women using a "weaker" less confident style. Finally, there are differences between men and women in how the power distribution variables relate to outcomes. For example, working class men who use very

direct power modes do not seem to gain much in outcomes, but working class women who are direct win more.

Taken together, these findings suggest that the question of how power processes in marriage differ and are the same for men and women needs to be addressed much more systematically. That there are significant differences is clear.

Personal Resources

The relative resource theory of power has dominated investigations of family power. While testing this theory was not a goal of this research, many relevant relationships have, in fact, been considered.

Probably the most significant contribution of the research in this area is the overall finding that the type of resource makes a difference in the relationship to other power variables. Only a few previous researchers (such as Allen and Straus, 1979; Safilios-Rothschild, 1976; Smith, 1970) have systematically considered both extrinsic, or economic and status resources, and intrinsic or interpersonal resources.

There are differences in how the two types of resources operate. In this research, extrinsic resources influenced the attributed power scores of the husbands, but not the wives. Intrinsic resources had a greater influence on wives' reports.

In addition, extrinsic resources were a relatively unimportant factor in the task outcomes. The level of intrinsic resources was more significant, for both men and women.

These findings suggest that different kinds of resources relate to power differently for men and women. Also, different resources affect power differently at different points in the process and depending on the dimension of power being considered.

Marriage and Zero-Sum Games

The finding that the couples in this research devised very few bilateral solutions to the task has already been discussed in relation to marriage as a zero-sum or non-zero-sum game. I have argued that it is inappropriate to replace the assumption that marriage is a zero-sum game with the counter assumption that it is not. Both the small number of bilateral outcomes and the types of power modes used by the partners suggest that much of the time they were operating at least as if the situation were a zero-sum game. At this point, I would like to raise a broader issue relating to conditions under which intimate relationships are likely to operate as zero-sum games.

It is only possible for all group members to share in "winning" (a non-zero-sum outcome) when there is, in fact, "enough to go around." Conversely, a group situation is objectively a zero-sum structure when there is, in fact, not enough to go around. We then need to ask, what is it

that is sought after in marriages, and is there enough to go around?

We may divide valued ends in families into instrumental and expressive, or extrinsic and intrinsic rewards. Steiner (1976:131-137, 352-361) makes a convincing case that in intimate family relationships, there is actually no structural reason for there not to be expressive rewards for everyone. There is no objective scarcity of expressions of liking and caring. Yet many, if not most, families operate as if there were such a scarcity, and it is only with great difficulty that some families are able to break out of this scarcity-based "stroke economy."

When we turn to instrumental rewards, there is a much clearer objective basis for structured zero-sum behavior. In a society in which economic goods are distributed unequally and on a principle of scarcity, there obviously are many families in which there really is not enough economically to go around, and many more who lack basic economic security. Having to operate within a framework of economic scarcity may in turn produce objective and subjective conditions which make it hard to freely exchange expressive rewards (evidence for this may be found in Scanzoni's (1970) work on economic position and intrinsic aspects of married life). Even if the objective economic scarcity does not produce objective expressive scarcity, it may produce a generalized style which is based on the belief that there are not enough of such rewards to go around.

Thus, the findings of this study related to Sprey's (1972) comments on families as non-zero-sum games, are indirectly suggestive of some broader issues about economies and families. The objective and subjective determinants of zero-sum behavior cannot be adequately assessed without reference to the larger economy in which they are embedded.

POWER MODES AND GOVERNANCE IN FAMILIES

One of the frustrating aspects of carrying out this research has been the gnawing sense that only one level of power processes is being tapped. I would like to close by discussing the level at which the power modes system operates, and its significance within the broader context of marital power relations.

Broderick (1975) has offered a fascinating analysis of what he terms "governance of families." He argues that "all families face the problem of making decisions about the allocation of shared resources," and that the "process of resolving conflicting interests (essentially the process of governance) involves the issue of power in several important ways" (1975:117).

Governance in families is then divided into three levels. (1) "Zero-sum power confrontations" involve "unilateral imposition" or attempts to gain one's ends without "serious consideration of the opposing view" (1975:118). These are rather similar to the unqualified

power assertions, consequence identification, and perhaps some of the qualified power assertions in the MPACS system.

(2) Governance through rules involves developing and referring to rules which group members see as fair. There are different types of rules, such as those which directly allocate resources (as in setting personal allowances), those which define who gets to decide contested issues in certain areas (authority rules), or rules about how negotiations may fairly be carried out (1975:120-121). MPACS includes some of this sort of governance, insofar as couples refer to such rules in making qualified power assertions, and also in some of the bilateral power assertions. Generally, however, among the couples in this research any reference to supposedly previously established rules seemed to meet with a contest over the rule itself--back to the zero-sum power confrontation level. (3) Governance through "principled interaction" rests on the internalization of a moral precept for guiding conflict resolution, shared by all family members. Such a precept might be placing group needs before individual needs (1975:121-122). MPACS does not really cover this sort of governance. Little principled interaction appeared among the research couples, in any event. It may be that in a group with only two members, it is hard to conceive of conflicts as group issues rather than as personal confrontations. However, in large families the difference between doing something "for the

good of the group" and simply giving into another individual, may be more readily felt by group members.

Broderick's distinctions between governance levels address some important issues in studying family power. For example, clearly not all instances of needing to allocate scarce resources are openly negotiated in families, the way the IMC vignettes must each be confronted by the research couples. For many issues a person is assigned to make decisions (authority rule), or a rule is set in advance to cover such situations, or both.

Second, Broderick's typology raises some important connections between family governance and the study of deviant behavior. One important question is under what conditions rules are shared or imposed by a group member, and if they are shared, how these shared rules emerge out of the day-to-day interaction in the group. Further, we may ask who breaks the family's rules, who enforces them, and under what conditions they will be broken and enforced. Finally, how and under what conditions are family rules and shared moral precepts questioned and renegotiated?

Figure 8 is suggestive of how Broderick's levels of governance in families may be integrated with other aspects of power. I have added two additional governance options--withdrawal/avoidance and covert resistance/sabotage. I think both are important options not covered by the other levels. These two might be placed with power

modes, in that they are unilateral actions. Yet, the circumstances under which they are used and their implications for the group are probably so different as to warrant separate status. For example, sabotage might be used by the weaker partner in an extremely unequal relationship, where the other essentially governs capriciously (i.e., without consistent reference to even self-imposed rules), and where an open approach at the power modes level would meet with a severe, even life-threatening response.

Each of the variables relating to the distribution of power can be related to the governance options, perhaps in different ways. Thus, different kinds of resources may have a different impact on the several levels of governance. The inclusion of governance norms indicates the possibility that whatever option is chosen, there is always the possibility that the option itself will be contested.

The power modes themselves may well be the most important of the governance options. Broderick (1975) suggests that the proportion of conflicting interests settled by each form of governance will vary by family. I would add that they will also vary over the course of the family life cycle. For instance, early in a marriage the number of conflicts settled through reference to established rules or moral precepts will be lower than later in the group history. In another case, as the first child in a family reaches successive stages of maturity, a shift




Figure 8. Power Distribution and Governance Options

will probably occur from rule-bound to power modes-based governance, as the application of existing rules is rejected by the child. Power modes have a special importance both because of their frequent use in resolving substantive issues, and because of the likelihood that they will come into play whenever the legitimacy of any of the other governance options is questioned.

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APPENDIX A

QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS FOR KEY VARIABLES

PERSONAL RESOURCES

Extrinsic Personal ResourcesEducation. (Q10 in original questionnaire)

How much education have you completed?

- 1 - Less than seven years of school
- 2 - Junior high school (grades 7-9)
- 3 - Partial high school (10th or 11th grade, but not graduation from high school)
- 4 - High school graduation
- 5 - Partial college training (completion of at least one year, but not full college course)
- 6 - Standard college or university program (completed a college or university course leading to a recognized college degree)
- 7 - Graduate professional training

Personal Income. (Q18 in original questionnaire)Which of the following categories indicates your personal income in the past year?

- | | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| 0 - less than \$1,000 | 6 - \$10,000-\$14,999 |
| 1 - \$1,000-\$1,999 | 7 - \$15,000-\$19,999 |
| 2 - \$2,000-\$3,999 | 8 - \$20,000-\$24,999 |
| 3 - \$4,000-\$5,999 | 9 - \$25,000 and over |
| 4 - \$6,000-\$7,999 | |
| 5 - \$8,000-\$9,999 | |

Work Status. (Q20B10 in original questionnaire)

Work status

- | | |
|-------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1 - full time | 6 - unemployed, not looking |
| 2 - part time | for a job |
| 3 - student | 7 - disabled |
| 4 - housewife | 8 - retired |
| 5 - unemployed, looking | |
| for a job | |

Occupation. (Q20C10 in original questionnaire)

Open-ended responses coded on a 7-point scale using Hollingshead's occupational classification, and ranging from unskilled workers to "higher executives and major professionals."

Economic Contribution to Marriage. (Q11.1 in original questionnaire)

In terms of our economic life, my contribution as a (wife/husband) is:

much more than it ought to be
 more than it ought to be
 just about right
 less than it ought to be
 much less than it ought to be

Intrinsic Personal Resources

Marital Contributions. (Q11.2 to 11.4 in original questionnaire)

In terms of our social life, my contribution as a (wife/husband) is:

much more than it ought to be
 more than it ought to be
 just about right
 less than it ought to be
 much less than it ought to be

In terms of our emotional life, my contribution as a (wife/husband) is:

much more than it ought to be
 more than it ought to be
 just about right
 less than it ought to be
 much less than it ought to be

In terms of our sexual life, my contribution as a (wife/husband) is:

much more than it ought to be
 more than it ought to be
 just about right
 less than it ought to be
 much less than it ought to be

Self Esteem. (Q8.1 to 8.10 in original questionnaire)
 For each of the following statements, circle one of the 4 possible responses.

I feel that I'm a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others.

Strongly agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

I feel that I have a number of good qualities.

Strongly agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.

Strongly agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

I am able to do things as well as most other people.

Strongly agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

I feel I do not have much to be proud of.

Strongly agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

I take a positive attitude toward myself.

Strongly agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.

Strongly agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

I wish I could have more respect for myself.

Strongly agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

I certainly feel useless at times.

Strongly agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

At times I think I am no good at all.

Strongly agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

ATTRIBUTED POWER AND POWER DISTRIBUTION NORMS

	Power Distribution Norms	Attributed Power
	Who SHOULD have the final say*	Who REALLY has the final say*
A. What car to buy.....	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
B. Whether or not to buy some life insurance.....	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
C. What house or apartment to take.....	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
D. What job you should take...	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
E. Whether or not your wife should go to work or quit work.....	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
F. What job your wife should take (If your wife doesn't have a paid job now, answer in terms of who should, and then who <u>would</u> decide this if she took such a job).....	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
G. How much money your family can afford to spend per week on food.....	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
H. What doctor to have when someone is sick.....	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5
I. Where to go on a vacation..	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5

*Circle a number using these categories:

- 1 - the wife only
- 2 - the wife more
- 3 - husband and wife exactly the same
- 4 - the husband more
- 5 - the husband only

APPENDIX B

INVENTORY OF MARITAL CONFLICT (IMC)

FORMS AND INSTRUCTIONS

INTRODUCTION TO IMC PROCEDURE

Tonight, you will be involved in a procedure centering around your joint discussion of some real cases where couples are having various types of marital conflicts. These case descriptions have been incorporated into what we call the "Inventory of Marital Conflict" or the IMC.

After collecting information from about 2,000 couples like yourselves, we have found certain things that have frequently caused disagreements or conflicts. We have provided brief case descriptions of couples having some of these conflicts. Your task is to read each of these case descriptions and decide which spouse is primarily responsible for the conflict.

It is very important to us that you take this task seriously because your recommendations will be combined with others so that couples with these problems might be helped. In some cases you may have experienced the conflict yourselves. In others you may know friends who have had similar problems. In all the cases, these are serious problems for some couples.

As in any conflict situation, there are two points of view presented in these case descriptions. In some of the cases, one of you will learn about the conflict from the point of view of the husband. The other person will learn the wife's point of view regarding the same situation. In each case, however, both of you will be given the same essential facts.

It is very important that for every case you decide who is at fault in the conflict even though this might be difficult at times. You should not indicate that both are to blame or leave any question blank.

I am now going to take you to separate rooms so that you can read and evaluate these cases. After you have finished filling out the Inventory of Marital Conflict, bring these materials out to me. Later we will bring you and your spouse to a room where you can jointly discuss these case descriptions.

INVENTORY OF MARITAL CONFLICTS (IMC)
CASE DESCRIPTIONS

1. Bob and Frank are good friends. Janis, Bob's wife, likes Frank but is becoming increasingly annoyed with his unannounced and excessively long visits to their apartment, especially at mealtimes. She has suggested to Bob that he ask Frank to please phone before visiting, but her husband feels this would be insulting to his friend. Janis suggests that she might ask Frank to please phone before visiting, but this only makes her husband angry. After accusing his wife of interfering with his friendship, he refuses to discuss the matter further.
2. Cora doesn't really enjoy sexual relations. When she was first married she would avoid love making by telling her husband it was painful. More recently she has pretended to be tired when her husband has approached her. Now she has resorted to retiring earlier than her husband. Cora believes sex is an unpleasant subject that one does not discuss unless absolutely necessary, and she becomes furious when Jack insists they should talk about this problem.
3. When Don finally gets home from work he takes off his jacket, tie and shoes, and makes himself comfortable with a can of beer. After dinner Don has a little more energy, so he goes back and puts away the various articles of clothing he has taken off. One day Francine tells Don he is sloppy and lazy and demands that he not leave clothes lying around, even for a short period of time. Two days later, Don forgets to do as his wife had demanded, and she angrily repeats her complaint. An argument develops.
4. Nina has been looking for a pair of shoes to wear with her favorite dress. Upon finding a pair of shoes on sale, Nina just cannot resist and purchases them. Later that evening she shows her new purchase to Peter. He remembers that she already has many pairs of shoes and asks about the necessity of such a purchase at this time. Nina becomes outraged and accuses him of being cheap and inconsiderate.
5. Mark and Elaine have both been working since their marriage in order to live at a level which they feel to be comfortable. Occasionally, Elaine becomes depressed because she wants to have a child but knows that on Mark's salary alone this would be extremely difficult. Elaine's emotions get the best of her and she accuses Mark of not being aggressive enough, implying that he is an inadequate provider. Mark was advised not to go to college because of scholastic difficulties and has done as well as could reasonably be expected, but his wife continually compares him unfavorably to his college-educated friends. Mark's self-esteem is injured and an argument begins.
6. A conflict has arisen between Jack and Colleen following a party with friends. During the party, Jack talked to another woman, resulting in his wife becoming very angry. Following the party, Colleen angrily accuses Jack of intentionally ignoring her for the entire evening and becomes argumentative.
7. Betty and Phil have been having marital difficulties for the past year. One of the problems has been Betty's extravagance. Now Betty insists on immediately seeking costly professional counseling. Phil points out that there simply is no money to pay for such an expensive venture until they can cut down their expenses some place else. Betty will not hear of waiting until money is available, and many arguments arise in the weeks to come.
8. Jim routinely arrives home from work at 5:00 PM and enjoys his dinner soon after his arrival. Susan has been a full-time housewife since the birth of their first child one year ago but still leaves her domestic chores undone. Jim has asked Susan if she would have the house clean and dinner prepared when he returns home. Upon arriving home, Jim again finds the ironing board with a pile of clothes in the living room, a dining table that has not been set, and his wife sitting on the sofa reading a magazine. Upon viewing the situation Jim appears discouraged, whereupon Susan accuses him of always finding fault with her and angrily storms into the kitchen.
9. It's Friday evening and the Carter family have a dinner engagement, which had been made the previous week. Frank comes home a half hour early so he can be sure to be ready on time. He showers, shaves and is dressed and ready to leave on time. But when it is time to go, Mary is still in the bathroom combing her hair and putting on makeup. Since Mary almost always makes them late this way, Frank becomes upset. Mary retorts that she isn't very concerned about being late since they always get where they are going sooner or later.
10. Linda and Steve plan to take a weekend trip by car. While Linda is driving Steve to work on Friday morning, Steve hears a "pinging" noise and realizes that the spark plugs should be changed along with other minor adjustments. Since they plan to leave Friday evening and Steve has to work, he has to ask his wife to take the car to the garage. Linda complains about the other preparations she says she has to make for them and their two children but says she will have time to take the car to the garage, and agrees to do so. Later on the trip, Steve hears the "pinging" noise and realizes the spark plugs have not been changed. It turns out that Linda took the car to the garage but did not bother to mention the spark plugs. Linda says that if Steve doesn't like the way she does things he can do them himself. Steve points out that he was unable to take the car to the garage and that when she agrees to do something she should do it.
11. When Charlotte and Richard were living with Charlotte's family, a lot of ill will developed between Richard and his in-laws. Charlotte told her parents just about everything that happened, and when Richard told her to stop, his mother-in-law said she was hurt and told Charlotte to keep Richard in his place. Richard and Charlotte now have their own home, but the situation continues. Richard will rarely visit his in-laws, but whenever he is not around Charlotte is on the phone with her mother, passing on information and receiving advice. When Richard tells Charlotte again that she should stop telling things to her mother, Charlotte becomes enraged.

Please Continue on Reverse Side

12. Each night Larry promises Judy that he will throw the garbage out after they finish dinner. Invariably, Larry forgets and leaves the kitchen without doing what he has promised. Judy has felt that the best thing to do is to throw the garbage away by herself and has been doing this later in the evening. When he notices this, Larry becomes angry with Judy, stating that this is his job. As Larry continues to follow his old habits, Judy begins to do the chore herself, only to be angrily criticized by her husband.
13. At parties that Bob and Nancy attend, Nancy spends most of her time with the men present and obviously enjoys being with them. Bob is very concerned and has tried to tell Nancy that her behavior is interpreted as flirtatious and could lead to a romantic involvement with another man. Nancy denies this, but Bob knows from his own experience that this type of thing does frequently happen and feels that she is being inconsiderate of his feelings by not giving up this behavior.
14. When Jerry comes home from work in the evening he is tired and likes to relax over a pleasant meal. After dinner he prefers to be alone with his wife. However, Betty does not understand Jerry's unwillingness to go out after a hard day's work, and she is after him to go out partying in the evenings. She tells Jerry he is a lazy do-nothing.
15. Dick and Diane have been married for three years. Dick likes his job and is anxious to get ahead. For the past year he has been voluntarily spending a great deal of extra time at his work. Diane has repeatedly accused Dick of caring more about his job than he cares for her. Dick explains that his career is important to both of them and that it is necessary for him to work additional hours if he expects to get promoted. Diane refuses to listen to Dick's explanations and unreasonably demands that he substantially cut down his hours of over-time work.
16. Tom is very concerned about his wife's smoking habits. Betty is a very heavy smoker and has a severe cough. Although Tom used to be a heavy smoker himself, he has now quit completely, so he is convinced that Betty could at least cut down. He has told her in detail about the health hazards involved in smoking and he has asked her to stop or at least cut down, if not for herself then because of her love for him. Betty's usual reaction has been to get sarcastic. She says she is trying but doesn't change. As a result there has been a series of arguments.
17. Chuck is a football fan who likes to watch the pro games on Sunday afternoons. His wife Betty is upset at this, so she plans a series of activities for them together on Sundays and tells him he will have to give up the football games. Chuck feels that this is an unreasonable demand. He points out that he works all week and should be entitled to a couple of hours of relaxation watching TV on Sunday. He reminds her that she watches many hours of soap operas during the week when he is at work. Chuck also reminds Betty that the other wives they know do not get so upset just because their husbands watch football. Betty, however, continues to be annoyed and insists that he stop watching games.
18. John has been out of college for three years and is able to provide a modest but adequate income for himself and his wife, Jean. They have been planning a vacation, which Jean has been enthusiastically anticipating. John has always been a stereo enthusiast and presently feels that he wants to improve his stereo by buying new speakers. If John proceeds with his plan, the vacation they have planned would be impossible. John states that he is the breadwinner in the family and deserves a luxury. He insists that as the man in the family, he should make the decision.

COURTSHIP AND MARRIAGE STUDY
INVENTORY OF MARITAL CONFLICTS (IMC)

ANSWER SHEET

NAME

DATE

COUPLE NO

SEX:

☐ MALE

☐ FEMALE

INSTRUCTIONS: Please read each case description and answer questions a, b, c and d for each case.
Check the appropriate box in each column and do not leave any questions unanswered.

Item No.	(a) Who is primarily responsible for the problem?		(b) Have you had a similar problem?		(c) Have you known other couples who have similar problems?		(d)
	Check One		Check One		Check One		
	HUSBAND	WIFE	YES	NO	YES	NO	
1							Should Bob ask Frank to phone before visiting? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
2							Is Cora being reasonable in refusing to discuss their sexual problems? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
3							Should Don be able to relax this way before dinner? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
4							Is it reasonable for Peter to question the necessity of Nina's purchase? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
5							Is Elaine justified in accusing Mark of being an inadequate provider? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
6							Should Jack be permitted to talk to another woman at a party without Collen becoming upset? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
7							Is Phil justified in worrying about starting counseling without being able to afford it? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
8							Should Susan be reading a magazine when her household duties are not completed and dinner is not prepared? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
9							Should Mary make a greater effort to be ready on time? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
10							Should Linda thoroughly carry out her responsibilities once she has accepted them? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
11							Is Richard justified in becoming upset with Charlotte discussing matters with her mother? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
12							Is Larry neglecting his responsibilities by not carrying out the garbage? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
13							Should Nancy realize that her behavior can be interpreted by other men as flirtatious and could unintentionally lead to further involvements? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
14							After working hard all day should Jerry be allowed to spend a quiet evening at home with his wife? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
15							Should Dick continue to devote the time that he knows is necessary to obtain advancement in his career? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
16							Should Tom feel he has the right to concern himself with his wife's health? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
17							Should Chuck be able to watch football on Sunday afternoon? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
18							Is it John's prerogative to decide how the family money will be spent? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No

PLEASE MAKE SURE YOU HAVE ANSWERED ALL THE QUESTIONS AND HAVE CHECKED ONE ANSWER IN EACH COLUMN.
When you have completed this answer sheet, return this and the case descriptions to the research assistant in the lobby before completing the other material.

INVENTORY OF MARITAL CONFLICTS (IMC) CASE DESCRIPTIONS

1. Bob and Frank are good friends. Janis, Bob's wife, likes Frank but is becoming increasingly annoyed with his unannounced and excessively long visits to their apartment, usually at mealtimes. She has suggested to Bob that he ask Frank to please phone before visiting, but her husband feels this would be insulting to his friend. Janis suggests that she might ask Frank to please phone before visiting, but this only makes her husband angry. After accusing his wife of interfering with his friendship, he refuses to discuss the matter further.
2. Cora doesn't really enjoy sexual relations. When she was first married she would avoid love making by telling her husband it was painful. More recently she has pretended to be tired when her husband has approached her. Now she has resorted to retiring earlier than her husband. Cora believes sex is an unpleasant subject that one does not discuss unless absolutely necessary, and she becomes furious when Jack insists they should talk about this problem.
3. When Don finally arrives home from work he immediately sits down and makes himself comfortable with a can of beer and scatters his jacket, tie and shoes on the furniture and/or floor, where they stay until some time after dinner. After putting up with this sloppiness for a while, Francine asks Don to stop tossing his clothes around the apartment, even if he does eventually pick them up. Two days later, Don repeats his usual performance as if Francine had said nothing. When she mentions it again, an argument develops.
4. Nina has been shopping around carefully for some time to find a pair of shoes she can afford that will go with her favorite dress. She finally finds a satisfactory pair of shoes and is happy to discover that they are on sale. She purchases the shoes and takes them home to show her husband, Peter. He does not care whether or not the shoes are satisfactory. He doubts that they are necessary at all and fails to understand their importance to her or how much trouble she has gone to in order to save money.
5. Mark and Elaine have both been working since their marriage in order to live at a level which they feel to be comfortable. Occasionally, Elaine becomes depressed because she wants to have a child but knows that on Mark's salary alone this would be extremely difficult. Elaine's emotions get the best of her, and she accuses Mark of not being aggressive enough, implying that he is an inadequate provider. Mark was advised not to go to college because of scholastic difficulties and has done as well as could reasonably be expected, but his wife continually compares him unfavorably to his college-educated friends. Mark's self esteem is injured and an argument begins.
6. A conflict has arisen between Jack and Colleen following a party with friends. During the party, Jack becomes involved with another woman and ignores his wife. Colleen feels hurt and attempts to discuss her feelings of being neglected but feels like she is not understood.
7. Betty and Phil have been having marital difficulties for the past year. Betty is no longer reassured by having her husband minimize her unhappiness and wants to seek professional counseling. Phil, on the other hand, insists on holding off indefinitely before spending money on counseling. He says she is far too extravagant. In the weeks to come, many arguments arise because of their differing opinions.
8. Jim routinely arrives home from work at 5:00 PM and enjoys his dinner soon after his arrival. Susan has been a full-time housewife since the birth of their first child one year ago but still leaves her domestic chores undone. Jim has asked Susan if she would have the house clean and dinner prepared when he returns home. Upon arriving home, Jim again finds the ironing board with a pile of clothes in the living room, a dining table that has not been set, and his wife sitting on the sofa reading a magazine. Upon viewing the situation Jim appears discouraged, whereupon Susan accuses him of always finding fault with her and angrily storms into the kitchen.
9. It's Friday evening, and the Carter family has a dinner engagement, which had been made the previous week. Frank surprises his wife by getting home from work a half hour early and uses the bathroom continuously until it is almost time to leave. Since it takes Mary more than the few minutes Frank has left her to wash, comb her hair, and put on her makeup, it becomes obvious that they will be late for their appointment. Frank raises his voice and accuses her of always making them late. Mary tries to calm Frank down by saying that being a little late is not all that serious, but Frank just becomes more enraged and an argument develops.
10. Linda and Steve plan to take a weekend trip by car. While Linda is driving Steve to work on Friday morning, Steve decides that the spark plugs need changing and that other minor adjustments should be made. He tells his wife to get the work done in time for them to leave that evening. Linda also has all the other preparations to manage for them and their two children but she manages to get the car to the garage and asks for a tuneup. On the trip, Steve hears a "pinging" noise, discovers that the spark plugs are the same ones he had been using, and blames his wife for the spark plugs not being changed. Linda feels that if he is going to be so picky about how things are going to be done, he should assume some responsibility for doing them himself. Steve tells her he was too busy.
11. When Charlotte and Richard were living with Charlotte's family, a lot of ill will developed between Richard and his in-laws. Richard told his wife to stop talking so much with members of her family. When Charlotte's mother found out how Richard felt, she was hurt and said she thought Richard was out of place to make such a demand. Richard and Charlotte now have their own home but the situation continues. Richard will rarely visit his inlaws, so Charlotte's only regular contact with them is by phone. Charlotte usually speaks only to her mother and only phones her mother when her husband is not around, but Richard is still not satisfied. Richard insists that Charlotte stop speaking with her mother.

12. Each night Larry promises Judy that he will throw the garbage out after they finish dinner. Invariably, Larry forgets and leaves the kitchen without doing what he has promised. Judy has felt that the best thing to do is to throw the garbage away by herself and has been doing this later in the evening. When he notices this, Larry becomes angry with Judy, stating that this is his job. As Larry continues to follow his old habits, Judy begins to do the chore herself, only to be angrily criticized by her husband.
13. At parties Nancy prefers the company of men to the other women and spends much of the evening with them because she finds them intellectually stimulating and shares many of their interest. Nancy finds at parties that the women's conversations are limited to housekeeping, children, etc. Nancy is upset by Bob's accusations that her behavior may lead to involvement in an affair or, at the very least, misinterpretation of her behavior by other people, which would cause gossip. She is deeply hurt by his lack of trust since she is a devoted wife and would not consider an involvement with another man.
14. Jerry regularly comes home from work, eats, and sits down in front of the television screen for the entire evening. Betty is cooped up in the house all day and feels that she will go crazy if she can't get out and have some sort of contact with other human beings. Jerry refuses to go out and so there is a disagreement between Betty and Jerry.
15. Dick and Diane have been married for three years. Dick likes his job and is anxious to get ahead. For the past year he has been voluntarily spending a great deal of time at his work. Diane feels that their marital relationship is deteriorating due to the lack of time they are able to spend together. She attempts to explain to Dick that financial success will be meaningless if their marriage is destroyed in the process. Dick coolly tells his wife that her response is so immature that it is pointless to discuss the subject further.
16. Tom claims to be worried about Betty's health because she smokes so much and has a cough. He gives her endless detailed lectures about health hazards and is always demanding that she stop or cut down. Betty realizes that she smokes too much and is trying to cut down, but Tom's continued badgering is no help. Tom apparently feels that because he stopped smoking without any difficulty, everybody else should quit too and should have no trouble doing so. He seems unable to understand that it is difficult for her to change her smoking habits and he says that if she really loved him she would quit. Betty has tried to control herself and not get angry at Tom's continuous comments, but Tom goes right on lecturing to her and eventually there are a series of arguments.
17. Chuck is an ardent sport fan who spends every Sunday afternoon glued to the television screen watching football. His wife Betty is getting tired of being left by herself every Sunday, so she asks him to give up this part of his football watching and plans some Sunday activities for them together. Chuck not only refuses to give up any football, but he launches into a whole series of arguments to defend himself. He tells Betty that no one else's wife is as unreasonable as she is. He accuses her of spending her time watching soap operas while he is at work. He also tells her that since he works hard he should be able to watch football games if he wishes. Betty is upset by his attitude but continues to want him to spend Sunday with her.
18. John has been out of college for three years and is able to provide a modest but adequate income for himself and his wife, Jean. They have been planning a vacation, which Jean has been enthusiastically anticipating. John has always been a stereo enthusiast and presently feels that he wants to improve his stereo by buying new speakers. If John proceeds with his plan, the vacation they have planned would be impossible. John states that he is the breadwinner in the family and deserves a vacation. He insists that as the man in the family, he should make the decision.

COURTSHIP AND MARRIAGE STUDY
INVENTORY OF MARITAL CONFLICTS (IMC)

ANSWER SHEET

NAME _____

DATE _____

COUPLE NO _____

SEX:

☐ Male☐ Female

INSTRUCTIONS: Please read each case description and answer questions a, b, c and d for each case.
Check the appropriate box in each column and *do not leave any questions unanswered.*

Item No.	(a) Who is primarily responsible for the problem?		(b) Have you had a similar problem?		(c) Have you known other couples who have similar problems?		(d)
	Check One		Check One		Check One		
	HUSBAND	WIFE	YES	NO	YES	NO	
1							Should Bob ask Frank to phone before visiting? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
2							Is Cora being reasonable in refusing to discuss their sexual problems? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
3							Should Don be more considerate of Francine by not scattering his clothes around? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
4							Should Peter try to understand Nina's well-planned purchase of these particular shoes? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
5							Is Elaine justified in accusing Mark of being an inadequate provider? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
6							Should Jack be more attentive to his wife at parties? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
7							Is Betty justified in feeling that their marriage is more important than any financial considerations? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
8							Should Susan be reading a magazine when her household duties are not completed and dinner is not prepared? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
9							Should John have a greater understanding of why she is late? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
10							Is Steve being unreasonable in blaming his wife for the work not getting done? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
11							Should Charlotte be able to speak freely with her mother? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
12							Is Larry neglecting his responsibilities by not carrying out the garbage? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
13							Should Bob trust his wife and not be upset that she is enjoying the company of other men? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
14							Should Jerry understand and respond to Betty's boredom by going out in the evening? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
15							Should Dick spend more time with his wife? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
16							Should Tom leave Betty alone and quit pressuring her? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
17							Should Chuck spend more time on Sundays with his wife? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
18							Is it John's prerogative to decide how the family money will be spent? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No

PLEASE MAKE SURE YOU HAVE ANSWERED ALL THE QUESTIONS AND HAVE CHECKED ONE ANSWER IN EACH COLUMN.
When you have completed this answer sheet, return this and the case descriptions to the research assistant in the lobby before completing the other material.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE IMC DISCUSSION SESSION

Now we would like you to fully discuss the conflict each couple is having and decide who is primarily responsible for the problem. As was previously mentioned, in some cases the descriptions you each read represented different points of view. For example, if you and your spouse were involved in a disagreement and subsequently you each were to relay to me what happened during the conflict, it is highly probable that each of you would present different points of view regarding your marital conflict. However, please do not be distracted by such differences, for in every case each point of view contains all the essential facts, and our primary concern is how you resolve the conflict each couple is having.

In discussing these cases it is important that you use only the information provided. Also, it is important that you resolve each disagreement before going on to the next case.

Once again, I want to stress the importance of this task for helping couples who are having conflicts. It is vital to our research that your answers be thoroughly discussed.

We will have a tape recorder on so that no one will have to be present in the room while you are discussing these items.

You will have about 30 minutes to discuss these cases. I will come in and remind you 5 minutes before your time is up. If you finish before that time, please bring the materials to me.

These are your individual response sheets (GIVE TO EACH SPOUSE) to help you recall your answers to each item. However, while discussing these cases, do not show your spouse your answer sheet. You will not have the case descriptions to refer to, so do the best you can remembering the details of the cases.

This is the sheet (JOINT DISCUSSION FORM) for recording your joint answers. The brief sentence for each item should help you recall the cases. As you can see, on Part A you must decide which spouse is primarily responsible for the problem and on Part B you must choose one of the two alternatives.

On both Part A and Part B do not leave any question blank and check only one answer for each.

COURTSHIP AND MARRIAGE STUDY
INVENTORY OF MARITAL CONFLICT (IMC)

JOINT DISCUSSION

NAME

206

DATE

COUPLE NO.

DISCUSSION:

START

FINISH

INSTRUCTIONS: It is very important that for EACH case you decide which spouse, either the husband or wife, is primarily responsible for the problem. You should make ONE response for both PART A and PART B. Do not leave any questions unanswered. Complete each case before going on to the next item.

Case	PART A		PART B
	Who is primarily responsible for the problem?		Which of the following would be a better way to resolve the conflict?
	Check One		
	Husband	Wife	Check Only One
1. Conflict over frequent visits by husband's friend and wife's annoyance.			<input type="checkbox"/> Should Bob ask Frank to phone before visiting? OR <input type="checkbox"/> Should Janis stop interfering in her husband's friendship?
2. Conflict regarding satisfaction during sexual relations.			<input type="checkbox"/> Is Cora being reasonable in refusing to discuss the problem of sex? OR <input type="checkbox"/> Is Jack justified in suggesting they discuss the problem of sex?
3. Conflict concerning husband's distributing his shirt, tie, jacket and shoes around the apartment when he gets home from work.			<input type="checkbox"/> Should Don be able to relax this way before dinner? OR <input type="checkbox"/> Should Don be more considerate of Francine by not scattering his clothes around?
4. Conflict about wife's purchase of a pair of shoes to wear with new dress.			<input type="checkbox"/> Is it reasonable for Peter to question the necessity of Nina's purchase? OR <input type="checkbox"/> Should Peter try to understand Nina's well-planned purchase of these particular shoes?
5. Conflict between Mark and Elaine stemming from their desire to have a child but recognizing the financial burden.			<input type="checkbox"/> Is Elaine justified in accusing Mark of being an inadequate provider? OR <input type="checkbox"/> Should Elaine be more understanding concerning Mark's ability and achievements?
6. Conflict caused by wife feeling ignored by husband while at a party.			<input type="checkbox"/> Should Jack be permitted to talk to another woman at a party without Colleen becoming upset? OR <input type="checkbox"/> Should Jack be more attentive to his wife at parties?
7. Conflict over when to seek professional help for the marital difficulties between Betty and Phil.			<input type="checkbox"/> Is Phil justified in worrying about starting counseling without being able to afford it? OR <input type="checkbox"/> Is Betty justified in feeling that their marriage is more important than any financial considerations?
8. Conflict concerning wife's inability to have house clean and dinner ready upon husband's arrival.			<input type="checkbox"/> Should Susan be reading a magazine when her household duties are not completed and dinner is not prepared? OR <input type="checkbox"/> Should Susan try to be a better housekeeper?
9. Conflict over wife's lateness for dinner engagement.			<input type="checkbox"/> Should Mary make a greater effort to be ready on time? OR <input type="checkbox"/> Should John have a greater understanding of why she is late?
10. Conflict over car breakdown while taking a short weekend trip.			<input type="checkbox"/> Should Linda thoroughly carry out her responsibilities once she has accepted them? OR <input type="checkbox"/> Is Steve being unreasonable in blaming his wife for the work not getting done?

JOINT DISCUSSION - (Continued)

Case	PART A		PART B
	Who is primarily responsible for the problem?		Which of the following would be a better way to resolve the conflict?
	Check One		Check Only One
	Husband	Wife	
11. Conflict over wife's conversations with her mother.			<input type="checkbox"/> Is Richard justified in becoming upset with Charlotte discussing matters with her mother? OR <input type="checkbox"/> Should Charlotte be able to speak freely with her mother?
12. Conflict about the responsibility for throwing the garbage away.			<input type="checkbox"/> Is Larry neglecting his responsibility by not carrying out the garbage? OR <input type="checkbox"/> Is Judy expecting too much by asking her husband to carry out the garbage?
13. Conflict over wife's conversations with men at parties.			<input type="checkbox"/> Should Nancy realize that her behavior can be interpreted by other men as flirtatious and could unintentionally lead to further involvements OR <input type="checkbox"/> Should Bob trust his wife and not be upset that she is enjoying the company of other men?
14. Conflict regarding evening entertainment.			<input type="checkbox"/> After working hard all day should Jerry be allowed to spend a quiet evening at home with his wife? OR <input type="checkbox"/> Should Jerry understand and respond to Betty's boredom by going out in the evening?
15. Conflict over husband spending time at the office.			<input type="checkbox"/> Should Dick continue to devote the time that he knows is necessary to obtain advancement in his career? OR <input type="checkbox"/> Should Dick spend more time with his wife?
16. Conflict over wife's smoking.			<input type="checkbox"/> Should Tom feel he has the right to concern himself with his wife's health? OR <input type="checkbox"/> Should Tom leave Betty alone and quit pressuring her?
17. Conflict over TV football games.			<input type="checkbox"/> Should Chuck be able to watch football on Sunday afternoons? OR <input type="checkbox"/> Should Chuck spend more time on Sundays with his wife?
18. Conflict of vacation vs. stereo speakers.			<input type="checkbox"/> Is it John's prerogative to decide how the family money will be spent? OR <input type="checkbox"/> Should financial expenditures be a joint decision?

PLEASE TAKE A MINUTE TO RECHECK YOUR ANSWERS ON EACH QUESTION.
YOU SHOULD HAVE ONE CHECK FOR PART A AND ONE CHECK FOR PART B.
AFTER RECHECKING YOUR RESPONSES, RETURN THIS FORM TO A RESEARCH
ASSISTANT IN THE LOBBY.

APPENDIX C

MARITAL POWER ASSERTION CODING
SYSTEM (MPACS)

INTRODUCTION

MPACS is a scheme for coding power modes or types of power assertion used by marital partners. Power assertions are attempts to alter group outcomes. In the marital dyad, they can be viewed as attempts to alter the other's behavior. Power modes are specific types of power assertion, and are operationalized here as the specific MPACS categories. The combination of all the MPACS categories can be taken as an operationalization of power assertions.

Features

1. The system was developed for interaction elicited by the Inventory of Marital Conflicts (IMC) task (Olson & Ryder, 1970). However, it could be adapted for use with other verbal interaction tasks.
2. MPACS is not intended to provide exhaustive coverage of all verbal behavior in an interaction session. Statements not coded as power assertions are simply tallied in a separate category ("98" - non-power assertion).
3. The formal structure of a statement (e.g., question/command/statement) is generally disregarded except where specified. For example, many attempts to give "information" or express a partisan opinion are couched in the form of a leading question which urges an agreement response from the other. These are coded as if they were in statement form.
4. Statements including expressions of agreement are not automatically defined as non-power modes simply on that basis. Whether and how the statement is elaborated are the deciding factors.
5. Unit of Coding:
 - (a) A statement is any "coherent" utterance bounded at the beginning and end by another person's "coherent" utterance.
 - (b) Statements considered incoherent, and therefore ignored by the coder, are:
 - (1) incomplete ideas which cannot be classified. (Example: "Well, it's . . .") Usually fragments of three words or less, but note that "coherent" statements

of three words or less are coded, unless they fit (2) below (Example: "No, I disagree;" "That's not right;" "Put down husband").

(2) Perfunctory social acknowledgments, usually interspersed through the other's statement. These merely show that one is following the other (Example: "yeah;" "ok;" "right;" "uhuh;" "mmm"). Note that these comments are not always perfunctory--if they indicate active agreement or response to a question, they are coded "98" (non-power assertion).

(3) Statements which cannot be heard after repeated efforts.

(c) A statement may contain more than one idea. If more than one idea is expressed, more than one code may be used for a statement. For example, a statement might include two sentences. If each expresses a different idea, each would be coded differently. But if both sentences express the same thing, they are coded once together. Double coding of the same statement is allowed only if two distinct ideas are contained in it.

If part of a statement can be coded in MPACS, do not use "98" (non-power assertion) for another part of the same statement. "98" is used only if the whole statement does not contain MPACS codes.

6. Priorities among codes are specified where necessary and likely points of confusion among related codes are clarified as much as possible. However, it will often still be necessary to consider the overall context of a statement, the couple's general "style," and/or your own assessment of the statement's general impact, in deciding which code to use. Try to get a sense of the statement as a whole, or the distinct ideas embedded in it if it contains more than one idea, and code on that basis.

Special Notes

1. All statements not covered even partially by the MPACS codes are coded "98"--non-power assertion.
2. Statements coded "49"--other power assertion/related behavior--should be listed, described, and location specified on back of summary code sheet.
3. Interaction with the session administrator is ignored. This is usually before, after, and at 20-minute reminder. Couple's post-completion checking and interaction is also ignored.

4. For the present study discussions of only the twelve conflict-inducing vignettes are coded (3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17).

Overview of Main MPACS Categories

Unqualified power assertions (UPA) are unilateral attempts to alter group outcomes (or the other's behavior, in a dyad), in which no effort is made to provide the partner with a rationale for changing. These assertions may be blunt, directive, relatively coercive in the sense that no effort is made to obtain compliance "voluntarily." Further, the actor may sometimes give off a sense of not attending to or acknowledging the other.

Qualified power assertions (QPA) are also unilateral in the sense that the presentation is one-sided or the actor is operating with a view toward the other person, not herself changing. However, here the actor is attempting to provide some inducement or incentive for the other to alter behavior, and thus may be seen as trying to obtain "voluntary" compliance rather than to coerce the other. The sub-types of QPA represent different degrees of subtlety in the inducements for change offered by the actor.

In the most direct of these sub-types consequence identification, the actor explicitly promises rewards or threatens punishments in exchange (or as inducements) for behavioral/positional change. In qualified partisan assertion, the actor presents rationales and persuasive arguments in an effort to convince the other of the merits of his position. The partner is offered some "good reason" for compliance. The most subtle type of QPA is definitional assertion. The actor is presenting his definition of some aspect of the situation, and thus laying the groundwork for behavior change by the other. If one can get the other to accept one's own view of "the facts of the case," one is closer to obtaining a position change. Further, if the partner does change her position she has been given an opportunity to rationalize the change as a function of a new understanding of "the facts," rather than as "giving in" or losing the argument.

Bilateral power assertions are suggestions or offers of change on the part of both partners simultaneously. The expectation is that partial concessions will be reciprocated in kind. Thus, both actors "win" something and "lose" something, but neither experiences total victory/defeat. The "sense" of the behavior is to be making contracts, bargaining, negotiating, trading.

SUMMARY OF MPACS CATEGORIES

I. Unqualified Power Assertions (UPA)

- 01 - Reject/attack other
- 02 - Command
- 03 - "Do anyway" attempt
- 04 - Surrender under protest
- 05 - Reiteration
- 06 - Unqualified disagreement/refusal
- 07 - Unqualified partisan assertion

II. Qualified Power Assertions (QPA)A. Consequence Identification

- 10 - Promise
- 11 - Threat

B. Qualified Partisan Assertions

- 20 - Qualified partisan assertions and persuasion attempts

C. Definitional Assertions

- 30 - Task/procedure definition
- 31 - Situation definition (vignettes)
- 32 - Personal definition
- 33 - Other's position definition
- 34 - Progress definition

III. Bilateral Power Assertions (BPA)

- 40 - Explicit position trade
- 41 - Other compromise/bilateral solution
- 42 - Role division solution

Other

- 49 - Other power assertion/related behavior (SPECIFY)
- 50 - Self-depreciation/deference
- 98 - Non-power assertion

Related Codes: Keep Separate

- A. 05, 06, 07, 20, 31
- B. 30, 33, 34, 41
- C. 34(2), 20

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF MPACS CATEGORIES

01 Reject/attack other

Direct, negative statements about the other which are personally critical, not just disagreeing.

Example: "That's really stupid."
"You're just being stubborn."

NOTE: "Neutral"/"factual" characterizations of other are coded 32. Example: "You don't take out the garbage."

Also, other statements where voice-tone indicates obvious sarcasm, disbelief, skepticism, impatience with other, frustration with other, anger, ridicule, verbal aggression. Range from mild to extreme is included.

Example: "Are you kidding?" (sarcasm)
"And I suppose you also think he enjoys it."
(ridicule)

NOTE: 01 is a priority code. Regardless of what else a statement represents, if it fits the above, it is coded 01. Example: "Don't threaten me!" (angry)--code 01, not 02 (command).

02 Command

Any statement which is a formal command.

Examples: "Put down this one."
"Turn the page."
"Just don't argue on this one."
"Don't do that."
"Listen to me."
"Tell me what you think."

NOTE: This is a priority code, after 01 (reject/attack).

03 "Do anyway" attempt

Explicit attempt to ignore opposition and mark down own position. Unilateral imposition, disregard of other's view. Usually occurs after some discussion, often at an impasse. Must be explicit.

Example: "Well, I'm gonna put her down, anyway."

(06) (02)
W: "You can't do that. Erase it. We
didn't agree yet."

A prior "do anyway" attempt by H
is inferred from W response, and
coded.

but: "Put down the wife anyway."--code 02.

04 Surrender under protest

One-sided "giving in" or capitulation in which the message is actually not "I give in," but just the opposite. The actor makes it quite clear that he has not been persuaded by the other (in fact, his own position may have hardened), but is yielding to the other's persistence only. This is a power assertion in that it represents a final attempt to prick the other's conscience, or even threaten her, for "browbeating" the actor. It is something like a "rhetorical question" in that it is not what it appears to be at face value. This is a judgment call, and voice-tone (often hostile) and context can help distinguish it from related situations noted below.

Examples: "Do whatever you want. I don't care."
(voice-tone may be hostile, exaggerated
indifference, pouting, etc.)
"I'm really unhappy with this, but I'll go
along."
"Well, if it's that important, ok, but I
don't like it."
"I'll go along with you, but just to get
it over with."

NOTE: If the actor is bowing to the other's special expertise or right to decide in a particular domain, then code it 42 (role division solution), unless the voice-tone indicates that 04 is more appropriate.

Example: "You know more about this sort of thing,
so you decide."--code 42.

NOTE: If the actor has genuinely been persuaded and is acknowledging that, or is saying "no matter what the issue, you're better at this so I'll bow to your judgment," then it is a real surrender and should generally be coded 98 (non-power assertion). Or, if self-depreciation is expressed, code the statement 50.

05 Reiteration

Flat repetition of one's position with no elaboration. Any elaboration requires another code (basically the same phrasing repeated, though not necessarily word for word). May be seen as an attempt to "muscle" one's position across, similar to nagging--if you say it often enough, you may wear the other down. Should not be used if the actor seems to have just run out of arguments and is returning to an earlier one or trying to present an earlier argument in a different way. Rather, should include blunt repetition which gives force, stress, or emphasis to one's position, or has a wearing effect on the other.

Examples: "I still say it's the husband."
 "Again, the wife should understand."
 "It's just her fault, pure and simple."

NOTE: Takes priority over 06 (disagreement/refusal).

Example: "That's just not right." repeated--code 05, rather than 06.

NOTE: At the beginning of a new vignette, the first statement by one of the spouses may be a direct reading from the answer sheet. If that is all that's included in the statement, code it 98 (non-power assertion). But if the reading is followed by disclosure of a position, the statement is coded 07 (unqualified partisan assertion) or 20 (qualified partisan assertion). But, if later in the discussion the actor rereads from the answer sheet to emphasize her own position, this may be coded 05.

Example: "It says 'conflict caused by wife feeling ignored' . . ." --code 05.

06 Unqualified disagreement/refusal

Disagreement/refusal with no elaboration. Flat contradiction. If elaborated at all, another code is used.

Examples: "No, I don't agree."
 "I disagree. It's the wife."
 "It didn't say that."
 "I won't put that down."

NOTE: If 01 is indicated, code 01.

NOTE: 05 (reiteration) takes priority.

07 Unqualified partisan assertion

Non-elaborated one-sided statements of own position. This includes more general partisan assertions than just those specifically about the vignette events and people. Includes initial disclosure of position, even though speaker may be merely "informing" the other of her position and voice-tone may not reflect a strong personal commitment.

Non-elaborated normative (should/ought) statements about the vignette characters are included here. If elaborated, code 20. Characterizations of the vignette characters, even those interpretable as opinions, are coded 31.

Examples: "I put down the wife."
 "I think the husband is responsible."
 "Oh, the wife, of course, don't you think?"
 (leading question)
 "She should have asked him first."

but: "He was being obnoxious."--code 31.

This code is not confined to position disclosures on the specific IMC items. It also includes opinion disclosures on related, and not-so-related issues in the conversation.

Example: "I really think couples should work together on dividing up those sorts of chores."

NOTE: Convention for when an actor's first disclosure is an agreement statement is to code it 07 (or 20 if elaborated).

Example: W: "I put the husband."--code 07.
 H: "I did too."--also code 07.

10 Promise

Explicit or clearly implicit "if-then" statement in which A promises material/expressive rewards in return for desired behavior by B. Rare.

Example: "If you'll just calm down, I'll be much more ready to consider your position."

11 Threat

Same as 10, except A threatens material/expressive retaliation/punishment for undesired behavior by B. Rare.

Example: "If you keep on this way, I'll be really angry."

NOTE: Clear trade-offs in position are not included as 10 or 11. Code those 40. Example: "I'll agree to the wife on this one, if you'll say the husband there."--code 40.

20 Qualified partisan assertions and persuasion attempts

Elaborated one-sided statements of one's own position or attempts to persuade or convince the other. Provides arguments/rationales for position based on use of logic, analogy, hypothetical/conditional examples, appeals to empathic understanding. It is assumed that even if the partisan position is not explicitly stated, the persuasive attempt is a qualification of the implicit position. (For example, read "If he had . . . then she would have . . ." as having "therefore, I conclude that . . ." attached.)

Statements including "information" or characterizations of the people/events/behavior in the vignettes are included only if the "info" is explicitly a rationale for one's position. That is, the "information" is part of an explicitly partisan statement, as in "I think the husband is responsible because he didn't explain what had to be done."

Elaborated normative statements (should/ought) about the vignette couples are included here.

Examples: "I tried to understand how he felt, though, and decided she really had to . . ." (empathy)
 "If she had been willing to listen, he wouldn't have been so upset" (hypothetical/conditional example)
 "I just have to say the wife, because she was the one being extravagant" (explicit information, rationale)
 "Wouldn't it have been just the same, though, even if he hadn't done that?" (hypothetical/conditional example; leading question)
 "I think he should have . . . because . . ." (elaborated normative statement)

NOTE: If the rationale for a position is based on personal information, double code the statement 20 and 32 (personal definition). See 32 for rationale.

30 Task/procedure definition

Supplies task/procedure "information" or suggests procedure. May be in opinion/suggestion form, but there is little affect and no sense of personal commitment to a position.

This code includes two fairly distinct contents: (1) information, questions and suggestions about the task/procedure/equipment imposed by the investigator, and (2) information, questions and suggestions on how the couple might proceed within the externally imposed constraints (like making a list of alternatives). (1) refers to how we have to (must) do it, and (2) to how we can do it. Both refer to "how to do it."

Examples: "I think we have to choose one."
 "We have to finish this one first."
 "Let's skip it and come back to it."
 "It's very hard to check one or the other,
 because of the way they have it here."
 (defines task itself as difficult)

NOTE: Suggestions that some decision-rule (like flipping a coin) be used, or bilateral solution suggestions, would be coded as a bilateral power assertion (one of the 40 codes--usually 41 or 42).

NOTE: This code would be appropriate with any laboratory task. Further, even in a natural setting with no formal task, task definitions would occur. For example, one partner might suggest making a list of alternative solutions, or postponing discussion of an issue, or define precedence of issues, as in "We need to decide on how much money we have before we decide where to go."

31 Situation definition (vignettes)

Gives "information" from vignettes, or clearly relevant to vignettes. Speaker is trying to supply the "facts of the case." The speaker may be elaborating, distorting, attributing motives or meaning, making generalizations, or drawing conclusions about the people/events/behaviors in the vignettes, but presenting this as "information." Affect is generally neutral.

Normative statements (should or ought) about the vignette couples would be coded 07 or 20, and hypothetical/conditional speculation about what might have happened would be coded 20.

Note that situation definitions, as well as other definitional assertions, may begin with "I think . . .," "I feel . . . ," etc.

Examples: "This is the one where the wife . . ."
 "And the husband said . . ."
 "It said she tried to help him."
 "He was asking for it."
 "She was really nagging him and being obnoxious."
 "Wasn't she just worried about his health?"
 (leading question)

but: "No, it didn't say that."--code 06
 (disagreement)

32 Personal definition

Gives personal "information" about self, spouse, couple, relatives, or friends. Includes descriptions/attributions of "real life" behavior and emotions, summary characterizations of personality, relationships, etc. Also includes observations on own or spouse's behavior in the laboratory task, including whether that behavior is "in character" or not (see example 1)

Examples: "That just doesn't seem like you."
 "Of course, I do that all the time."
 "We never argue over such silly details."
 "You're always watching football."
 "I don't mind when you do that."
 "Your parents do exactly the same thing.
 Remember . . ."
 "Well, you know we've talked about how the Smith's over-reacted."

If personal information is explicitly part of a partisan argument, as in clear "arguing by analogy," and is clearly tied to one's position, then it is double coded 20 and 32.

Example: "It's just like your father."--code 32

but: "I had to say that the wife was responsible since I saw it as just like the situation with John and Mary that we've talked about."--code 32 and 20.

NOTE: Negative-toned attacks/evaluations of other are coded 01.

Example: "You're just being stubborn."--code 01

NOTE: Use 33 (other's position definition) for attributions/summaries of other's task-related positions.

NOTE: The notion of "mind-reading" in the clinical literature (as in Bach and Wyden's Intimate Enemy) is covered in codes 01, 32, and 33. (Example: "I know what you're thinking . . .").

If negative, attack, code 01.

If about position, code 33.

If about the other person, but not 01, code 32.

NOTE: "We read them differently."--code 32

but:

"They gave us different stories."--code 30.

33 Other's position definition

Show understanding of, repeat, summarize, or define other's view or position. Does not necessarily imply agreement with other. Includes "attribution" of a position to other, or "leading" definitions of other's view (see examples 4-6).

Examples: "I see what you mean now . . ."
 "Are you saying that . . .?"
 "As I understand you, the husband . . ."
 "I'm sure you would say she accepted the responsibility."
 "Naturally you agree it's a question of long-range effects."
 "I know deep down you feel the same way on this."

NOTE: The code refers to definition or summary of other's position, while 32 (personal definition) would include definition of other's personality, description of behavior, etc.

NOTE: Must be more than perfunctory social acknowledgments ("yeah;" "uh huh;" "ok") which are ignored in the system.

34 Progressive definition

(1) Provides summary perspective/characterizes couple's progress on task, or (2) weighs alternative views equally,

or (3) indicates need for new approach or tactic, or (4) actually suggests a different approach in general terms. Usually occurs after considerable discussion--at an impasse--and provides some broader perspective on the couple's progress.

- Examples:
- (1) "We really seem to disagree on this one."
 - (2) "Well, on one hand he should be responsible because . . ., but on the other hand, she . . ."
 - (3) "'This is going nowhere.' 'We'll have to try something different.'"
 - (4) "Somebody just has to give in."

To distinguish (3) and (4) from 30, they are general assessments of need or general suggestions, while 30 is a specific suggestion. Also, 34 is a perspective-taking move, while 30 is not.

40 Explicit position trade

Explicit offers or suggestions of trade-offs or bilateral compromises. Usually after considerable discussion.

- Examples:
- "I'll agree here, if you'll say the wife on this part."
 - "How about putting your choice on this one and mine on the other."
 - "If you'll give me this one, we can go back and change #7."

41 Other compromise/bilateral solution

Explicit bilateral solutions or attempts at compromise, other than direct trade-offs of position, such as:

- (1) global compromise offer

Example: "Why don't we compromise here."

- (2) suggest arbitrary/external decision rule

Examples: "Let's flip a coin."
"We should take turns."

- (3) agree to disagree

Examples: "Well, since we know that both are all right, let's put . . ."
"Even though we disagree, why don't we just put . . ., to settle the matter."

42 Role division solution

This is actually a special case of 41 (other compromise/bilateral solution), in which the outside decision rule being used is one of individual expertise or a division of labor. The actor is genuinely saying that there is a general rule which can be used to develop a solution, and that is whose area the issue falls in.

Examples: "You know more about this one, so you decide it."
 "Well, when it comes to working on cars, that's my area, so why don't we go with my answer."

49 Other power assertion/related behavior (SPECIFY)

Other unilateral/bilateral; qualified/unqualified behavior which seems important to the study of power assertions but is not covered by the specific MPACS categories.

Must be listed and location specified on special form.

50 Self depreciation/deference

Statements of negative evaluation of self, lack of confidence in own judgment/ability, or self-depreciating deference to other. Fairly broad.

Examples: "I guess I didn't read it carefully."
 "Oh, I misunderstood."
 "I'm terrible at this."
 "Now I don't know at all . . ."

If another code seems applicable, give the other code priority. Use this only for relatively clear behaviors.

98 Non-power assertions

Statements not covered by the MPACS categories.

APPENDIX D

DETAILED CORRELATION MATRIXES FOR POWER MODES OF
HUSBANDS AND WIVES

Table D.1. Detailed Correlation Matrix for Power Modes of Husbands

Power Mode	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	20	30	31	32	33	34	40	41	49	50	98
<u>Unqualified Power Assertions (UPA)</u>																		
01 Reject/attack other	--																	
02 Command	.34	--																
03 "Do anyway" attempt	.41	.13	--															
04 Surrender under protest	.20	.11	-.01	--														
05 Reiteration	.64	.21	.50	.12	--													
06 Unqualified disagreement/refusal	.61	.29	.35	.13	.78	--												
07 Unqualified partisan assertion	.16	.14	-.01	.03	.22	.19	--											
<u>Qualified Power Assertions (QPA)</u>																		
Consequence identification:																		
10 Promise																		
11 Threat																		
Qualified partisan assertion:																		
20 Qualified partisan assertions	.26	.06	.24	.15	.32	.22	.26	--										
Definition assertion:																		
30 Task-procedure definition	.06	.41	.07	.07	.19	.11	.28	.19	--									
31 Situation definition	.39	.15	.46	.16	.51	.33	.23	.50	.26	--								
32 Personal definition	.15	.03	.18	.23	.02	-.01	.18	.36	.13	.32	--							
33 Other's position definition	.34	.16	.18	.04	.17	.23	-.01	.23	.08	.17	.05	--						
34 Progress definition	-.08	-.06	-.14	.23	.05	-.06	.03	.18	.22	.13	-.06	.04	--					
<u>Bilateral Power Assertions (BPA)</u>																		
40 Explicit position trade	.09	.00	.13	.03	.02	.19	-.07	.07	.07	-.06	.18	.15	-.04	--				
41 Other compromise/bilateral solution	-.04	-.09	.14	-.11	.01	.08	.04	-.08	.10	.01	-.06	.10	.03	.12	--			
42 Role division solution (no significant incidence)																		
Other:																		
49 Other power-related behavior	-.06	.01	-.06	.03	-.09	-.06	-.02	-.22	-.14	-.12	-.09	-.10	-.03	-.06	.01	--		
50 Self-depreciation	.18	.10	-.08	.09	.05	.06	-.16	-.06	-.05	-.06	.03	.10	-.09	-.01	-.04	.39	--	
09 Non-power assertion	.32	.20	.07	-.08	.34	.35	.43	.13	.32	.32	.12	.06	.21	.09	.11	-.01	.05	--

Table D.2. Detailed Correlation Matrix for Power Modes of Wives

Power Mode	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	20	30	31	32	33	34	40	41	49	50	98
<u>Unqualified Power Assertions (UPA)</u>																		
01 Reject/attack other	--																	
02 Command	.57	--																
03 "Do anyway" attempt	-.04	-.08	--															
04 Surrender under protest	.39	.40	.06	--														
05 Reiteration	.50	.60	.13	.47	--													
06 Unqualified disagreement/refusal	.55	.52	.29	.39	.69	--												
07 Unqualified partisan assertion	.02	.03	.18	.04	.16	.10	--											
<u>Qualified Power Assertions (QPA)</u>																		
Consequence identification:																		
10 Promise																		
11 Threat																		
(no significant incidence)																		
Qualified partisan assertion:																		
20 Qualified partisan assertions	.27	.35	.06	.37	.43	.22	.16	--										
Definition assertion:																		
30 Task-procedure definition	.13	.24	-.10	.08	.19	.11	-.02	.30	--									
31 Situation definition	.27	.45	.02	.29	.47	.29	.08	.41	.36	--								
32 Personal definition	.19	.13	.08	.30	.06	.08	.12	.45	.30	.29	--							
33 Other's position definition	.11	.10	.07	.08	.14	.03	.22	.20	.26	.11	.10	--						
34 Progress definition	.32	.32	-.07	.20	.26	.16	-.11	.24	.30	.24	.27	.28	--					
<u>Bilateral Power Assertions (BPA)</u>																		
40 Explicit position trade	.05	.06	-.06	.10	.17	.07	.50	.22	-.10	.10	-.07	.14	.02	--				
41 Other compromise/bilateral solution	.01	-.10	-.02	-.04	.21	-.07	.08	.10	.10	.00	.03	-.02	.05	.00	--			
42 Role division solution (no significant incidence)																		
Other:																		
49 Other power-related behavior	-.07	.00	.78	-.07	.16	.33	-.02	-.06	-.08	.09	-.09	-.09	-.04	-.02	-.04	--		
50 Self-depreciation	.40	.16	-.04	.20	.23	.21	-.08	-.02	.11	.07	-.07	.00	.25	.05	-.02	.01	--	
98 Non-power assertion	.06	.10	.22	.06	.18	.02	.44	.00	.19	.35	.11	.12	.02	.15	-.02	.19	.27	--

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- 1974 "Sex differences in the use of mental health clinics: Real illness or patient behavior?" Paper presented at the Society for the Study of Social Problems, Montreal.
- 1976 "Review essay: Theory Construction and the Sociology of the Family, by Wesley R. Burr." With Dennis C. Foss, Journal of Marriage and the Family 38(3):580-585.
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- 1979 "The paradoxical nature of family relationships and family conflict." Chapter 7 in M. A. Straus and G. T. Hotaling (Eds.), The Social Causes of Husband-Wife Violence. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (in press).

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